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Trump v. Hawaii 
16-1540 
Ruling Below: Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017).  
The state of Hawaii and Dr. Elshikh filed a claim seeking a temporary restraining 
order (TRO) on Executive Order 13780 on the basis that it violated the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment; the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause on the basis of religion and/or national origin, nationality, or alienage; the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment based on substantive due process rights; the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment based on procedural due process rights; the Immigration and Nationality 
Act; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; and the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Hawaii issued a nationwide TRO on the grounds that it was likely the plaintiffs could prove their 
claims. The government appealed. The 9th Circuit affirmed without ruling on the merits of the 
claims. 
Question Presented: Whether respondents' challenge to the temporary suspension of entry of 
aliens abroad under Section 2(c) of Executive Order No. 13,780 is justiciable? 
Whether Section 2(c)'s temporary suspension of entry violates the Establishment Clause? 
Whether the global injunction, which rests on alleged injury to a single individual plaintiff, is 
impermissibly overbroad? 
Whether the challenges to Section 2(c) became moot on June 14, 2017? 
 
The State of Hawai’i, 
v. 
Donald J. Trump. 
 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
Decided on June 12, 2017 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
PER CURIAM:  
We are asked to delineate the statutory and 
constitutional limits to the President's power 
to control immigration in this appeal of the 
district court's order preliminarily enjoining 
two sections of Executive Order 13780 
("EO2" or "the Order"), "Protecting the 
Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the 
United States." The Immigration and 
Nationality Act ("INA") gives the President 
broad powers to control the entry of aliens, 
and to take actions to protect the American 
public. But immigration, even for the 
President, is not a one-person show. The 
President's authority is subject to certain 
statutory and constitutional restraints. We 
179 
  
conclude that the President, in issuing the 
Executive Order, exceeded the scope of the 
authority delegated to him by Congress. In 
suspending the entry of more than 180 
million nationals from six countries, 
suspending the entry of all refugees, and 
reducing the cap on the admission of refugees 
from 110,000 to 50,000 for the 2017 fiscal 
year, the President did not meet the essential 
precondition to exercising his delegated 
authority: The President must make a 
sufficient finding that the entry of these 
classes of people would be "detrimental to the 
interests of the United States." Further, the 
Order runs afoul of other provisions of the 
INA that prohibit nationality-based 
discrimination and require the President to 
follow a specific process when setting the 
annual cap on the admission of refugees. On 
these statutory bases, we affirm in large part 
the district court's order preliminarily 
enjoining Sections 2 and 6 of the Executive 
Order.  
  
I  
  
A  
 
One week after inauguration and without 
interagency review, President Donald J. 
Trump issued Executive Order 13769 
("EO1"). Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). Entitled 
"Protecting the Nation From Foreign 
Terrorist Entry Into the United States," EO1's 
stated purpose was to "protect the American 
people from terrorist attacks by foreign 
nationals admitted to the United 
States." Id. EO1 recited that 
"[n]umerous foreign-born individuals have 
been convicted or implicated in terrorism-
related crimes since September 11, 2001, 
including foreign nationals who entered the 
United States after receiving visitor, student, 
or employment visas, or who entered through 
the United States refugee resettlement 
program." Id.  
 
EO1 mandated two main courses of action to 
assure that the United States remain "vigilant 
during the visa-issuance process to ensure 
that those approved for admission do not 
intend to harm Americans and that they have 
no ties to terrorism." Id. In Section 3, the 
President invoked his authority under 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(f) to suspend for 90 days 
immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the 
United States of nationals from seven 
majority-Muslim countries: Iraq, Iran, Libya, 
Sudan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. See id. at 
8978. In Section 5, the President immediately 
suspended the U.S. Refugee Admissions 
Program ("USRAP") for 120 days, imposed a 
ban of indefinite duration on the entry of 
refugees from Syria, and limited the entry of 
refugees to 50,000 in fiscal year 2017. Id. at 
8979. EO1 also ordered that changes be made 
to the refugee screening process "to prioritize 
refugee claims made by individuals on the 
basis of religious-based persecution, 
provided that the religion of the individual is 
a minority religion in the individual's country 
of nationality." Id. EO1 permitted the 
Secretaries of State and Homeland Security 
to make case-by-case exceptions to these 
restrictions "when in the national interest," 
and explained that it would be in the national 
interest "when the person is a religious 
minority in his country of nationality facing 
religious persecution." Id.  
 
EO1 took immediate effect, causing great 
uncertainty as to the scope of the order, 
particularly in its application to lawful 
permanent residents. Notably, federal 
officials themselves were unsure as to the 
scope of EO1, which caused mass confusion 
at airports and other ports of entry. See Brief 
of the Foundation of Children of Iran and 
Iranian Alliance Across Borders as Amici 
Curiae, Dkt. No. 77 at 11-12 (describing how 
an Iranian visa holder was turned away 
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while en route to the United States because of 
the confusion regarding the contours of 
EO1's scope); Brief of Former National 
Security Officials as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 
108 at 25 n.53 & 54 (noting confusion at 
airports because officials were neither 
consulted nor informed of EO1 in advance).  
Shortly after EO1 issued, the States of 
Washington and Minnesota filed suit in the 
Western District of Washington to enjoin 
EO1. On February 3, 2017, the district court 
granted a temporary restraining order 
("TRO"). Washi ngton v. Trump, No. C17-
0141JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16012, 
2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 
2017). On February 4, 2017, the Government 
filed an emergency motion in our court, 
seeking a stay of the TRO pending appeal.  
On February 9, 2017, this court denied the 
Government's emergency motion for a stay of 
the injunction. Washington v. Trump, 847 
F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 
2017) (per curiam), reconsideration en banc 
denied, 853 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2017). In so 
doing, the panel rejected the Government's 
arguments that EO1 was wholly 
unreviewable. See id. at 1161-64. After 
determining that the states had standing 
based on the alleged harms to their 
proprietary interests, id. at 1159-61, this 
court concluded that the states demonstrated 
a likelihood of success on their procedural 
due process claim, at least as to lawful 
permanent residents and nonimmigrant visa 
holders, id. at 1164-66. The panel did not 
review the states' other claims, including the 
statutory-based claims. Id. at 1164.  
 
Rather than continue with the litigation, the 
Government filed an unopposed motion to 
voluntarily dismiss the underlying appeal 
after the President signed EO2. On March 8, 
2017, this court granted that motion, which 
substantially ended the story of EO1. The 
curtain opens next to the present controversy 
regarding EO2.  
   
B  
 
On March 6, 2017, the President issued EO2, 
also entitled "Protecting the Nation From 
Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United 
States." Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 
13209 (Mar. 6, 2017). The revised Order was 
to take effect on March 16, 2017, at which 
point EO1 would be revoked. Id. at 
13218. The Order expressly stated that EO1 
"did not provide a basis for discriminating for 
or against members of any particular 
religion" and was "not motivated by animus 
toward any religion." Id. at 13210.  
Section 2—"Temporary Suspension of Entry 
for Nationals of Countries of Particular 
Concern During Review Period"—reinstates 
the 90-day ban on travel for nationals of six 
of the seven majority-Muslim countries 
identified in EO1: Iran, Libya, Somalia, 
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Id. at 13213. 
Section 2 also directs the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, 
and the Director of National Intelligence to 
"conduct a worldwide review to identify 
whether, and if so what, additional 
information will be needed from each foreign 
country to adjudicate an application by a 
national of that country for a visa, admission, 
or other benefit under the INA 
(adjudications) in order to determine that the 
individual is not a security or public-safety 
threat." Id. at 13212. Section 2(c) states in 
full:  
 
To temporarily reduce investigative burdens 
on relevant agencies during the review period 
described in subsection (a) of this section, to 
ensure the proper review and maximum 
utilization of available resources for the 
screening and vetting of foreign nationals, to 
ensure that adequate standards are 
established to prevent infiltration by foreign 
terrorists, and in light of the national security 
concerns referenced in section 1 of this order, 
I hereby proclaim, pursuant to sections 
181 
  
212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. [§§] 
1182(f) and 1185(a), that the unrestricted 
entry into the United States of nationals of 
Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and 
Yemen would be detrimental to the interests 
of the United States. I therefore direct that the 
entry into the United States of nationals of 
those six countries be suspended for 90 days 
from the effective date of this order, subject 
to the limitations, waivers, and exceptions set 
forth in sections 3 and 12 of this order.  
 
Regarding the six identified countries, EO2 
explains:  
 
Each of these countries is a state sponsor of 
terrorism, has been significantly 
compromised by terrorist organizations, or 
contains active conflict zones. Any of these 
circumstances diminishes the foreign 
government's willingness or ability to share 
or validate important information about 
individuals seeking to travel to the United 
States. Moreover, the significant presence in 
each of these countries of terrorist 
organizations, their members, and others 
exposed to those organizations increases the 
chance that conditions will be exploited to 
enable terrorist operatives or sympathizers to 
travel to the United States. Finally, once 
foreign nationals from these countries are 
admitted to the United States, it is often 
difficult to remove them, because many of 
these countries typically delay issuing, or 
refuse to issue, travel documents.  
 
Id. at 13210. Based on the conditions of these 
six countries, "the risk of erroneously 
permitting entry of a national of one of these 
countries who intends to commit terrorist acts 
or otherwise harm the national security of the 
United States is unacceptably high." Id. at 
13211.  
The Order states that it no longer includes 
Iraq on the list of designated countries 
because of Iraq's "close cooperative 
relationship" with the United States and its 
recent efforts to enhance its travel 
documentation procedures. Id. at 13212. The 
Order also states that its scope has been 
narrowed from EO1 in response to "judicial 
concerns" about the suspension of entry with 
respect to certain categories of 
aliens. Id. EO2 applies only to individuals 
outside of the United States who do not have 
a valid visa as of the issuance of EO1 or 
EO2. EO2, unlike EO1, expressly exempts 
lawful permanent residents, dual citizens 
traveling under a passport issued by a country 
not on the banned list, asylees, and refugees 
already admitted to the United 
States. See id. at 13213-14. The Order also 
provides that consular officers or Customs 
and Border Protection officials can exercise 
discretion in authorizing case-by-case 
waivers to issue visas and grant entry during 
the suspension period, and offers examples of 
when waivers "could be 
appropriate." See id. at 13214-15.  
 
Section 6—"Realignment of the U.S. 
Refugee Admissions Program for Fiscal Year 
2017"—suspends USRAP for 120 days. Id. at 
13215. During this period, the heads of 
certain executive agencies are directed to 
review the current USRAP application and 
adjudication processes, and to determine the 
additional procedures that "should" be 
required for individuals seeking admission as 
refugees. See id. at 13215-16. Invoking 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(f), Section 6(b) reduces the 
number of refugees to be admitted from 
110,000 to 50,000 in fiscal year 2017. Id. at 
13216. The Order also removes EO1's 
preference for refugees facing persecution as 
a member of a minority religion, and no 
longer imposes a complete ban on Syrian 
refugees. Section 6 further provides for 
discretionary case-by-case waivers. Id.  
EO2 supplies additional information relevant 
to national security concerns. The Order 
includes excerpts from the State 
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Department's 2015 Country Reports on 
Terrorism, that it asserts demonstrate "why . 
. . nationals [from the designated countries] 
continue to present heightened risk to the 
security of the United States." Id. at 
13210; see id. at 13210-11 (providing a brief 
description of country conditions for each of 
the designated countries). The Order states 
that foreign nationals and refugees have 
committed acts of terrorism:  
 
Recent history shows that some of those who 
have entered the United States through our 
immigration system have proved to be threats 
to our national security. Since 2001, 
hundreds of persons born abroad have been 
convicted of terrorism-related crimes in the 
United States. They have included not just 
persons who came here legally on visas but 
also individuals who first entered the 
country as refugees. For example, in January 
2013, two Iraqi nationals admitted to the 
United States as refugees in 2009 were 
sentenced to 40 years and to life in prison, 
respectively, for multiple terrorism-related 
offenses. And in October 2014, a native of 
Somalia who had been brought to the United 
States as a child refugee and later became a 
naturalized United States citizen was 
sentenced to 30 years in prison for attempting 
to use a weapon of mass destruction as part 
of a plot to detonate a bomb at a crowded 
Christmas-tree-lighting ceremony in 
Portland, Oregon. The Attorney General has 
reported to me that more than 300 persons 
who entered the United States as refugees are 
currently the subjects of counterterrorism 
investigations by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.  
 
Id. at 13212. EO2 does not discuss any 
instances of domestic terrorism involving 
nationals from Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, or 
Yemen.  
C 
  
Two versions of a report from the 
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") 
surfaced after EO1 issued. First, a draft report 
from DHS, prepared about one month after 
EO1 issued and two weeks prior to EO2's 
issuance, concluded that citizenship "is 
unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential 
terrorist activity" and that citizens of 
countries affected by EO1 are 
"[r]arely [i]mplicated in U.S.-
[b]ased [t]errorism." Specifically, the DHS 
report determined that since the spring of 
2011, at least eighty-two individuals were 
inspired by a foreign terrorist group to carry 
out or attempt to carry out an attack in the 
United States. Slightly more than half were 
U.S. citizens born in the United States, and 
the remaining persons were from twenty-six 
different countries—with the most 
individuals originating from Pakistan, 
followed by Somalia, Bangladesh, Cuba, 
Ethiopia, Iraq, and Uzbekistan. Id. Of the six 
countries included in EO2, only Somalia was 
identified as being among the "top" 
countries-of-origin for the terrorists analyzed 
in the report. During the time period covered 
in the report, three offenders were from 
Somalia; one was from Iran, Sudan, and 
Yemen each; and none was from Syria or 
Libya. The final version of the report, issued 
five days prior to EO2, concluded "that most 
foreign-born, [U.S.]-based violent extremists 
likely radicalized several years after their 
entry to the United States, [thus] limiting the 
ability of screening and vetting officials to 
prevent their entry because of national 
security concerns" (emphasis added).  
 
The same day EO2 issued, Attorney 
General Jefferson B. Sessions III and 
Secretary of Homeland Security John F. 
Kelly submitted a letter to the President 
recommending that he "direct[] a temporary 
pause in entry" from countries that are 
"unable or unwilling to provide the United 
States with adequate information about their 
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nationals" or are designated as "state 
sponsors of terrorism."  
   
D  
 
The State of Hawai'i ("the State") filed a 
motion for a TRO seeking to enjoin EO1, 
which the District of Hawai'i did not rule on 
because of the nationwide TRO entered in the 
Western District of Washington. After EO2 
issued, the State filed an amended complaint 
challenging EO2 in order "to protect its 
residents, its employers, its educational 
institutions, and its sovereignty." 
Dr. Elshikh, the Imam of the Muslim 
Association of Hawai'i, joined the State's 
challenge because the Order "inflicts a grave 
injury on Muslims in Hawai'i, including 
Dr. Elshikh, his family, and members of his 
Mosque." In 2015, Dr. Elshikh's wife filed an 
I-130 Petition for Alien Relative on behalf of 
her mother—Dr. Elshikh's mother-in-law—a 
Syrian national living in Syria. 
Dr. Elshikh fears that his mother-in-law will 
not be able to enter the United States if EO2 
is implemented. Plaintiffs named as 
Defendants Donald J. Trump, in his official 
capacity as President of the United States; the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; John 
F. Kelly, in his official capacity as Secretary 
of Homeland Security; the U.S. Department 
of State; Rex W. Tillerson, in his official 
capacity as Secretary of State; and the United 
States of America (collectively referred to as 
"the Government").  
 
Plaintiffs allege that EO2 suffers similar 
constitutional and statutory defects as EO1 
and claim that the Order violates: 
the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment; the equal protection guarantees 
of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause on the basis of religion and/or national 
origin, nationality, or alienage; the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment based on substantive due 
process rights; the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment based on procedural due 
process rights; the Immigration and 
Nationality Act; the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act; and 
the Administrative Procedure Act. For their 
INA claim, Plaintiffs specifically contend 
that EO2 violates the INA by discriminating 
on the basis of nationality, ignoring and 
modifying the statutory criteria for 
determining terrorism-related 
inadmissibility, and exceeding the President's 
delegated authority under the INA. Plaintiffs 
also filed a motion for a TRO along with their 
amended complaint.  
 
On March 15, 2017, the district court granted 
the TRO, holding that Plaintiffs had shown a 
likelihood of success on the merits of 
their Establishment Clause claim, and 
entered a nationwide injunction prohibiting 
enforcement of Sections 2 and 6 of 
EO2. See Hawai'i v. Trump, No. CV 17-
00050 DKW-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
36935, 2017 WL 1011673 (D. Haw. Mar. 
15, 2017) ("Hawai'i TRO"). On March 29, 
2017, the district court granted Plaintiffs' 
motion to convert the TRO to a preliminary 
injunction. See Hawai'i v. Trump, No. CV 17-
00050 DKW-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
47042, 2017 WL 1167383 (D. Haw. Mar. 29, 
2017) ("Hawai'i PI"). The district court 
declined to narrow the scope of the 
injunction, concluding that the entirety of 
Sections 2 and 6 of the Order ran afoul of 
the Establishment Clause and that the 
Government did not provide a workable 
framework for narrowing the scope of the 
enjoined conduct. See 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
47042, [WL] at *8. The court entered the 
following injunction:  
 
Defendants and all their respective officers, 
agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, 
and persons in active concert or participation 
with them, are hereby enjoined from 
enforcing or implementing Sections 2 and 6 
of the Executive Order across the Nation. 
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Enforcement  of these provisions in all 
places, including the United States, at all 
United States borders and ports of entry, and 
in the issuance of visas is prohibited, pending 
further orders from this Court.  
 
On March 30, 2017, the Government filed a 
notice of appeal. This court granted the 
Government's unopposed motion to expedite 
the case. The Government requests that this 
court vacate the preliminary injunction, or at 
least narrow the injunction, and also stay the 
injunction pending appeal.  
   
II  
 
The district court held that Plaintiffs were 
entitled to preliminary relief because they 
had made a strong showing of success on the 
merits of their Establishment Clause claim. 
Applying the secular purpose test 
from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-
13, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1971), 
and relying on the historical record that 
contained "significant and unrebutted 
evidence of religious animus driving the 
promulgation of the Executive Order," the 
district court concluded that EO2 was issued 
with an intent to disfavor people of Islamic 
faith. See Hawai'i TRO, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 36935, 2017 WL 1011673, at *12-
16. In so doing, the district court decided an 
important and controversial constitutional 
claim without first expressing its views on 
Plaintiffs' statutory claims, including their 
INA-based claim. See 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
36935, [WL] at *11 n.11.  
 
The INA claim was squarely before the 
district court and briefed and argued before 
this court. Mindful of the Supreme Court's 
admonition that "courts should be extremely 
careful not to issue unnecessary 
constitutional rulings," "[p]articularly where, 
as here, a case implicates the fundamental 
relationship between the Branches," we think 
it appropriate to turn first to the INA 
claim. Am. Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 
490 U.S. 153, 161, 109 S. Ct. 1693, 104 L. 
Ed. 2d 139 (1989) (per curiam); accord Lying 
v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 
U.S. 439, 445, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 99 L. Ed. 2d 
534 (1988) ("A fundamental and 
longstanding principle of judicial restraint 
requires that courts avoid reaching 
constitutional questions in advance of the 
necessity of deciding them.").  
 
After first determining that Plaintiffs have 
standing to assert their INA-based statutory 
claim, we conclude that Plaintiffs have 
shown a likelihood of success on the merits 
of that claim and that the district court's 
preliminary injunction order can be affirmed 
in large part based on statutory grounds. For 
reasons further explained below, we need 
not, and do not, reach the Establishment 
Clause claim to resolve this 
appeal. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 
297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S. Ct. 466, 80 L. Ed. 
688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[I]f a 
case can be decided on either of two grounds, 
one involving a constitutional question, the 
other a question of statutory construction or 
general law, the Court will decide only the 
latter.").  
   
III  
 
Before turning to our review of Plaintiffs' 
statutory claim, we first address the 
Government's challenge to the preliminary 
injunction order on justiciability grounds. 
The Government contends both that Plaintiffs 
lack standing to pursue this case and that the 
case is not yet ripe. The Government further 
contends that the 
consular nonreviewability doctrine bars this 
court from reviewing EO2. We address each 
contention in turn.  
  
 A  
"Article III of the Constitution limits federal-
court jurisdiction to 'Cases'  and 
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'Controversies.'" Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 
U.S. 497, 516, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 167 L. Ed. 2d 
248 (2007). "Standing to sue is a doctrine 
rooted in the traditional understanding of a 
case or controversy" and limits who may 
"maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek 
redress for a legal wrong." Spokeo, Inc. v. 
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L. Ed. 2d 
635 (2016). "[T]o satisfy Article III's 
standing requirements, a plaintiff must show 
(1) it has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a) 
concrete and particularized and (b) actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) 
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged 
action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury 
will be redressed by a favorable 
decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 
167, 180-81, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 
610 (2000)(citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 
L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992)). "At this very 
preliminary stage of the litigation, [Plaintiffs] 
may rely on the allegations in their [amended 
complaint] and whatever other evidence they 
submitted in support of their [preliminary 
injunction] motion to meet their 
burden." Washington, 847 F.3d at 
1159; see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.  
 
The district court determined that both the 
State of Hawai'i and Dr. Elshikh have 
standing to pursue their Establishment 
Clause claim. See Hawai'i TRO, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 36935, 2017 WL 1011673, at 
*7-10. The Government argues that Plaintiffs 
fail to satisfy the requirements of Article III 
standing to bring their Establishment 
Clause claim. Plaintiffs must establish 
standing for each of their 
claims. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 
U.S. 332, 352, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 164 L. Ed. 2d 
589 (2006). As we do not reach 
Plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim, we 
address only whether Plaintiffs have standing 
to challenge EO2 based on their INA-based 
statutory claim and conclude that they do.  
   
1  
 
Dr. Elshikh is an American citizen of 
Egyptian descent. He alleges that EO2 will 
prevent his mother-in-law from obtaining a 
visa to reunite with her family. His mother-
in-law is a Syrian national currently living in 
Syria; she last visited her family in Hawai'i in 
2005 and has not yet met two of her five 
grandchildren. Dr. Elshikh's wife filed an I-
130 Petition for Alien Relative on behalf of 
her mother in September 2015, and the 
petition was approved in February 2016. 
After EO1 issued, Dr. Elshikh was told that 
his mother-in-law's visa application for an 
immigrant visa had been put on hold. After 
EO1 was enjoined, he was notified that the 
application had progressed to the next stage 
of the process, and that her interview would 
be scheduled at an embassy overseas. 
Dr. Elshikh understandably and reasonably 
fears that EO2 will prevent his mother-in-law 
from entering the 
country. Dr. Elshikh asserts that he has 
standing based on the barriers EO2 imposes 
in preventing him from reuniting his mother-
in-law with his family.  
 
This court and the Supreme Court have 
reviewed the merits of cases brought by U.S. 
residents with a specific interest in the entry 
of a foreigner. See, e.g., Kerry v. Din, 135 S. 
Ct. 2128, 2131, 192 L. Ed. 2d 183 
(2015) (involving a challenge by a U.S. 
citizen to the denial of her husband's 
visa); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 
756-60, 92 S. Ct. 2576, 33 L. Ed. 2d 683 
(1972) (addressing a challenge by American 
professors to the denial of a visa to a 
journalist they had invited to speak at several 
academic events); Cardenas v. United States, 
826 F.3d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 
2016) (determining that a U.S. citizen could 
challenge the denial of her husband's visa). 
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Most similar to this case, in Legal Assistance 
for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. 
Department of State, Bureau of Consular 
Affairs, the D.C. Circuit determined that visa 
sponsors had standing to assert that the State 
Department's refusal to process visa 
applications of Vietnamese citizens living in 
Hong Kong violated 8 U.S.C. § 1152. 45 F.3d 
469, 471-73, 310 U.S. App. D.C. 168 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 519 
U.S. 1, 117 S. Ct. 378, 136 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1996). The court explained that the State 
Department's actions prolonged the 
separation of immediate family members, 
which resulted in injury to the sponsors. Id.  
Dr. Elshikh seeks to reunite his mother-in-
law with his family and similarly experiences 
prolonged separation from her. By 
suspending the entry of nationals from the six 
designated countries, including Syria, EO2 
operates to delay or prevent the issuance of 
visas to nationals from those countries, 
including Dr. Elshikh's mother-in-law. 
Dr. Elshikh has alleged a concrete harm 
because EO2, specifically the operation of 
Section 2, is a barrier to reunification with his 
mother-in-law in light of her stalled visa 
process. See id. (holding that U.S. resident 
sponsors had standing to challenge the State 
Department's refusal to process visa 
applications); Int'l Refugee Assistance 
Project v. Trump, No. 17-1351, 857 F.3d 554, 
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9109, 2017 WL 
2273306, at *10 (4th Cir. May 25, 
2017) (en banc), as amended (May 31, 2017) 
(identifying prolonged separation between 
plaintiff and his wife as a concrete 
harm). That his mother-in-law's visa 
application process was placed on hold when 
EO1 took effect, but moved forward when 
EO1 was enjoined, further shows that 
Dr. Elshikh's injury is concrete, real, and 
immediate if EO2 takes effect. 
Dr. Elshikh has thus alleged a sufficient 
injury-in-fact. While not challenged by the 
Government, it is also clear that 
Dr. Elshikh has established causation and 
redressability. His injuries are fairly traceable 
to the Order, satisfying causation, and 
enjoining EO2 will remove a barrier to 
reunification and redress that injury, 
satisfying redressability.  
 
Dr. Elshikh has met the requirements for 
constitutional standing with respect to the 
INA-based statutory claim.  
  
2  
 
The State of Hawai'i alleges two primary 
theories of harm in asserting its standing: 
harm to its proprietary interests and 
impairment of its sovereign interests.  
 "[L]ike other associations and private 
parties, a State is bound to have a variety of 
proprietary interests. A State may, for 
example, own land or participate in a 
business venture." Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 
Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 
592, 601, 102 S. Ct. 3260, 73 L. Ed. 2d 995 
(1982). "And like other such proprietors [the 
State] may at times need to pursue those 
interests in court." Id. at 601-02.  
 
The State asserts that it has standing because 
of the injuries inflicted on its university. The 
University of Hawai'i ("the University"), 
which the State operates, has twenty-three 
graduate students, at least twenty-nine 
visiting faculty members, and other 
permanent faculty members from the six 
countries designated in EO2. The State 
asserts that EO2 constrains the University's 
ability to recruit and enroll undergraduate 
and graduate students, and recruit and hire 
visiting faculty from the affected countries. 
The State also contends that EO2 threatens 
the University's ability to fulfill its 
educational mission by hampering 
recruitment of diverse students, preventing 
scholars from considering employment at the 
University, dissuading current professors and 
scholars from continuing their scholarship at 
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the University, hindering the free flow of 
ideas, and harming its values of inclusiveness 
and tolerance.  
 
Given the timing of the admissions cycle and 
this litigation, the State concedes that it is too 
soon to determine the full impact on 
recruitment, but asserts that individuals who 
are not current visa holders or lawful 
permanent residents would be precluded 
from considering the University. In its 
opposition brief, the State gave updated 
information, explaining that eleven graduate 
students from the countries affected by the 
Order have been admitted, and the University 
was still considering applications from 
twenty-one other affected applicants. After 
the case was submitted, Plaintiffs 
supplemented the record with further updates 
on the University's admissions cycle. At least 
three graduate students, each from one of the 
six designated countries, have accepted their 
offers of admission and have committed to 
attending the University. There are 
eleven graduate student applicants, each from 
one of the six designated countries, with 
pending offers of admission for the 2017-18 
school year. University classes begin on 
August 21, 2017, but at least two of the 
students who have accepted their offers of 
admission must be present on campus by 
August 1, 2017 and August 10, 2017, 
respectively, for their graduate programs. 
The State further explains that if EO2 takes 
effect now, these students' ability to obtain 
visas will be impeded.  
 
Before Plaintiffs supplemented the record, 
the Government argued that the State had not 
identified any prospective student or faculty 
member who wished to enter the 
country during Section 2(c)'s 90-day period. 
However, the State's alleged harm is that 
EO2 presently constrains their recruitment 
efforts for students and faculty, and that EO2 
deters prospective students and faculty 
members. Given the short admissions 
cycle—from when the University offers 
admissions to when international students 
must decide whether to attend—and the 
uncertainty of whether EO2 will inhibit their 
ability to secure a visa before the fall 
semester begins, EO2's deterrent effect is an 
injury that is "concrete" and "imminent," as 
opposed to merely "speculative." See Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 560-61 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Of course, a student who is not 
permitted to obtain a visa and enter our 
country would not accept an offer of 
admission.  
 
The Government next contends that Plaintiffs 
cannot rely on events that unfolded after the 
filing of the complaint to establish standing. 
This argument is not persuasive. The State 
had previously contended that its recruitment 
was constrained by EO2 and its supplemental 
declaration merely provides greater detail 
regarding the students who may be unable to 
join the academic community this fall if EO2 
takes effect. We consider the supplemental 
information as further evidence that EO2 will 
harm the State because students affected by 
Section 2(c) may not attend the University, 
and the University will lose tuition and 
educational benefits.  
 
The State's standing can thus be grounded in 
its proprietary interests as an operator of the 
University. EO2 harms the State's interests 
because (1) students and faculty suspended 
from entry are deterred from studying or 
teaching at the University; and (2) students 
who are unable to attend the University will 
not pay tuition or contribute to a diverse 
student body. See Washington, 847 F.3d at 
1161 (holding that states, as operators of 
universities, had Article III standing to 
challenge EO1 based on harms to their 
proprietary interests); Texas v. United States, 
809 F.3d 134, 155-63 (5th Cir. 2015), as 
revised (Nov. 25, 2015), aff'd by an equally 
divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 195 L. Ed. 2d 
638 (2016) (holding that the state of Texas 
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had standing to challenge the Deferred 
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful 
Permanent Residents ("DAPA") program 
based on its alleged injury of subsidizing 
driver's licenses to DAPA beneficiaries). We 
further conclude that the State has shown that 
its injury is fairly traceable to EO2 and that 
enjoining EO2 would redress its harm.  
 
The State also presents an alternative 
standing theory: that the Order impairs its 
sovereign interests in carrying out its refugee 
policies, among other things. A state has an 
interest in its "exercise of sovereign power 
over individuals and entities within the 
relevant jurisdiction," which "involves the 
power to create and enforce a legal 
code." Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 
601. The State contends that EO2 hinders the 
exercise of its sovereign power to enforce its 
laws and policies and this inflicts an injury 
sufficient to provide the State standing to 
challenge the Order. The State has laws 
protecting equal rights, barring 
discrimination, and fostering diversity. See, 
e.g., Haw. Const. art. 1, §§ 2, 5; Haw. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 489-3, 515-3. Specific to refugees, 
the State created the Office of Community 
Services ("OCS"), which is directed to 
"[a]ssist and coordinate the efforts of all 
public and private agencies providing 
services which affect the disadvantaged, 
refugees, and immigrants." Haw. Rev. Stat. § 
371K-4. OCS operates multiple programs for 
refugees.  
 
The State has resettled three refugees this 
fiscal year, and at least twenty since 2010. 
EO2 would prevent the State from assisting 
with refugee resettlement and thus prevent it 
from effectuating its policies aimed at 
assisting refugee and immigrant 
populations. See id. The State's requested 
injunctive relief would permit it to assist in 
the resettlement of refugees, at least through 
fiscal year 2017. As the State exercises 
"sovereign power over individuals and 
entities within the relevant jurisdiction" in 
administering OCS, we conclude, at this 
preliminary stage, that the State has made 
sufficient allegations to support standing to 
challenge the refugee-related provisions of 
EO2. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 
601; see also Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. 
Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 269 (4th Cir. 
2011) (collecting cases where state was 
found to possess sovereign standing based on 
state statutes that regulated behavior or 
provided for the administration of a state 
program).  
 
Concluding that Dr. Elshikh and the State 
have satisfied Article III's standing 
requirements, we turn to whether 
Plaintiffs are within the "zone of interests" 
protected by the INA.  
   
3  
 
Because Plaintiffs allege a statutory claim, 
we must determine whether they meet the 
requirement of having interests that "fall 
within the zone of interests protected by the 
law invoked." Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 
1388, 188 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2014) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 
We have little trouble determining that 
Dr. Elshikh is within the zone of interests of 
the INA to challenge EO2 based on this 
statutory claim. He asserts that the travel ban 
prevents his mother-in-law from reuniting 
with his family. See Legal Assistance for 
Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, 45 F.3d at 471-
72 ("The INA authorizes the immigration of 
family members of United States citizens and 
permanent resident aliens. In originally 
enacting the INA, Congress implemented the 
underlying intention of our immigration laws 
regarding the preservation of the family unit. 
Given the nature and purpose of the statute, 
the resident appellants fall well within the 
zone of interest Congress intended to 
189 
  
protect." (internal quotation marks, citations, 
and alterations omitted)).  
 
Likewise, the State's efforts to enroll students 
and hire faculty members who are nationals 
from the six designated countries fall within 
the zone of interests of the INA. The INA 
makes clear that a nonimmigrant student may 
be admitted into the United States. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F) (identifying students 
qualified to pursue a full course of study); 8 
C.F.R. § 214.2(f) (providing the 
requirements for nonimmigrant students, 
including those in colleges and universities). 
The INA also provides that nonimmigrant 
scholars and teachers may be admitted into 
the United States. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(15)(J) (identifying students, 
scholars, trainees, teachers, professors, 
research assistants, specialists, or leaders in 
fields of specialized knowledge or skill); id. § 
1101(a)(15)(H) (identifying aliens coming to 
perform services in a specialty 
occupation); id. §1101(a)(15)(O) (identifyin
g aliens with extraordinary abilities in the 
sciences, arts, education, business, or 
athletics). International students and visiting 
faculty may qualify for F-1 visas, J-1 visas, 
H-1B visas, or O-1 visas. See Directory of 
Visa Categories, U.S. Dep't of 
State, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/e
n/general/all-visa-categories.html (last 
visited June 6, 2017). The INA leaves no 
doubt that the State's interests in student-and 
employment-based visa petitions for its 
students and faculty are related to the basic 
purposes of the INA.  
 
The State's interest in effectuating its refugee 
resettlement policies and programs also falls 
within the zone of interests protected by the 
INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (defining 
"refugees"); id. § 1157 (providing the 
procedure for determining the number of 
refugee admissions). These provisions of the 
INA were amended to provide a "systematic 
procedure" for the admission of refugees into 
the United States, as well as "uniform 
provisions for the effective resettlement and 
absorption of those refugees who are 
admitted." Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-212, § 101, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). The State 
argues that EO2 upsets this finely-tuned 
system devised by Congress.  
 
We conclude that Plaintiffs' claims of injury 
as a result of the alleged statutory violations 
are, at the least, "arguably within the zone of 
interests" that the INA protects. Bank of Am. 
Corp. v. City of Miami, Fla., 137 S. Ct. 1296, 
1303, 197 L. Ed. 2d 678 
(2017) (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing 
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 
90 S. Ct. 827, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1970)).  
Plaintiffs have standing to assert their INA-
based statutory claim that EO2 exceeds the 
scope of the President's authority under the 
INA and conflicts with various INA 
provisions.  
   
B  
 
The Government next argues that Plaintiffs' 
claims are speculative and not 
ripe. "Ripeness is peculiarly a question of 
timing, designed to prevent the courts, 
through avoidance of premature adjudication, 
from entangling themselves in abstract 
disagreements." Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 
586 F.3d 1109, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotations marks and alteration omitted). 
"Our role is neither to issue advisory opinions 
nor to declare rights in hypothetical cases, but 
to adjudicate live cases or controversies 
consistent with the powers granted the 
judiciary in Article III of the 
Constitution." Thomas v. Anchorage Equal 
Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th 
Cir. 2000).  
 
We are unpersuaded by the Government's 
arguments that until a student or faculty 
member requests a waiver and it is denied, 
or until Dr. Elshikh's mother-in-law requests 
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a waiver and she is denied, Plaintiffs injuries 
are not ripe because they assume "contingent 
future events that may not occur." Texas v. 
United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S. Ct. 
1257, 140 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1998) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 
Although the waiver may, in theory, provide 
students, visiting faculty members, or 
Dr. Elshikh's mother-in-law an opportunity 
to obtain visas, the waiver is 
discretionary. Indeed, no one can count on it. 
The Order poses hardships to nationals from 
the six designated countries by barring 
throughout the suspension period their ability 
to obtain visas. The waiver provision neither 
guarantees that waivers will be granted nor 
provides a process for applying for a waiver; 
moreover, the ultimate decision is clearly 
committed to a consular officer's 
discretion. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 13214 ("Case-
by-case waivers could be appropriate in 
circumstances such as the following . . . .") 
(emphasis added); id. at 13219 (stating 
that nothing in the Order provides any 
"enforceable" rights). The discretionary 
waiver is not "a sufficient safety 
valve," Washington, 847 F.3d at 1169, and is 
a far cry from the "contingent future" argued 
by the Government. Here, nationals from the 
six designated countries, including 
Dr. Elshikh's mother-in-law and students 
who have accepted, or been offered, 
admission to the University of Hawai'i, are 
burdened by EO2 because they are not 
permitted entry, and whether they might 
obtain a waiver is speculative and at the 
discretion of a consular officer or a Customs 
and Border Protection official. See 82 Fed. 
Reg. at 13214.  
 
We decline the Government's invitation to 
wait until Plaintiffs identify a visa applicant 
who was denied a discretionary waiver to 
assess whether Plaintiffs have shown a 
likelihood of success on the merits of their 
claims. Regardless of whether 
Dr. Elshikh's mother-in-law or the 
University's prospective students and faculty 
members might conceivably obtain such a 
waiver, they will face substantial hardship if 
we were to first require that they try to obtain 
a waiver before we will consider their 
case. Cf. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 
136, 149, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681 
(1967). We conclude that the claim is ripe for 
review.  
   
C  
 
Finally, the Government renews the 
argument it made before this 
court in Washington v. Trump that we may 
not review EO2 because the 
consular nonreviewability doctrine counsels 
that the decision to issue or withhold a visa is 
not subject to judicial review. See Li Hing of 
Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin, 800 F.2d 970, 971 
(9th Cir. 1986) ("[I]t has been consistently 
held that the consular official's decision to 
issue or withhold a visa is not subject either 
to administrative or judicial review."). We 
reject this argument.  
 
Plaintiffs do not seek review of an individual 
consular officer's decision to grant or to deny 
a visa pursuant to valid regulations, which 
could implicate the 
consular nonreviewability doctrine. 
Plaintiffs instead challenge "the 
President's promulgation of sweeping 
immigration policy." Washington, 847 F.3d 
at 1162. Courts can and do review both 
constitutional and statutory "challenges to the 
substance and implementation of 
immigration policy." Id. at 1163; see, 
e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 
U.S. 155, 187-88, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 125 L. Ed. 
2d 128 (1993)(addressing the merits of a 
challenge that an executive order violated the 
INA and the United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees); INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41, 103 S. Ct. 
2764, 77 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1983) (addressing 
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whether a section of the INA that authorized 
one House of Congress to invalidate a 
decision of the Executive to allow a 
deportable alien to remain in the United 
States was unconstitutional).  
 
This case is justiciable because 
Plaintiffs seek judicial review of EO2, 
contending that EO2 exceeds the statutory 
authority delegated by Congress and 
constitutional boundaries. "This is a familiar 
judicial exercise." Zivotofsky ex rel. 
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196, 132 
S. Ct. 1421, 182 L. Ed. 2d 423 (2012). We 
reject the Government's argument that the 
Order is not subject to judicial 
review. Although "[t]he Executive has broad 
discretion over the admission and exclusion 
of aliens, [] that discretion is not boundless. 
It extends only as far as the statutory 
authority conferred by Congress and may not 
transgress constitutional limitations. It is the 
duty of the courts, in cases properly before 
them, to say where those statutory and 
constitutional boundaries lie." Abourezk v. 
Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061, 251 U.S. App. 
D.C. 355 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 1, 
108 S. Ct. 252, 98 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1987).  
 
Whatever deference we accord to the 
President's immigration and national security 
policy judgments does not preclude us from 
reviewing the policy at all. See Rostker v. 
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 
69 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1981) ("[D]eference does 
not mean abdication."); Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34, 
130 S. Ct. 2705, 177 L. Ed. 2d 355 
(2010) ("Our precedents, old and new, make 
clear that concerns of national security and 
foreign relations do not warrant abdication of 
the judicial role.").  
 
We do not abdicate the judicial role, and we 
affirm our obligation "to say what the law is" 
in this case. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 
177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). We turn to the merits 
of the appeal of the preliminary injunction 
order.  
   
IV  
  
A  
 
A preliminary injunction is "an 
extraordinary remedy that may only be 
awarded upon a clear showing that the 
plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Winter v. 
NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S. Ct. 365, 
172 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2008). "A plaintiff 
seeking a preliminary injunction must 
establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the 
merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of 
preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of 
equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an 
injunction is in the public interest." Id. at 20. 
We may affirm the district court's entry of the 
preliminary injunction "on any ground 
supported by the record." Enyart v. Nat'l 
Conference of Bar Exam'rs, Inc., 630 F.3d 
1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2011).  
  
B  
 
We consider whether Plaintiffs are entitled to 
preliminary relief based on the likelihood that 
EO2 violates the INA. First, we address 
whether the President complied with the 
conditions set forth in § 1182(f), which are 
necessary for invoking his authority. We next 
address the conflicts between EO2 and other 
provisions of the INA.  
  
1  
 
Under Article I of the Constitution, the power 
to make immigration laws "is entrusted 
exclusively to Congress." Galvan v. Press, 
347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S. Ct. 737, 98 L. Ed. 
911 (1954); see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 
4 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o 
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization . 
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. . ."); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792, 97 S. 
Ct. 1473, 52 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1977) ("[O]ver no 
conceivable subject is the legislative power 
of Congress more complete than it is over the 
admission of aliens." (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); [**49]  id. at 796 ("The 
conditions of entry for every alien, the 
particular classes of aliens that shall be 
denied entry altogether, the basis for 
determining such classification . . . have been 
recognized as matters solely for the 
responsibility of the Congress . . . ." (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
  
In the INA of 1952, Congress delegated some 
of its power to the President through Section 
212(f), which provides:  
 
 Whenever the President finds that the entry 
of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the 
United States would be detrimental to the 
interests of the United States, he may by 
proclamation, and for such period as he shall 
deem necessary, suspend the entry of all 
aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or 
nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of 
aliens any restrictions he may deem to be 
appropriate.  
8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).  
 
In Section 2(c) of the Order, the President 
invokes this power along with § 1185(a) to 
suspend for 90 days the entry of nationals 
from the six designated countries. See 82 Fed. 
Reg. at 13213. In Section 6(a) of the Order, 
the President invokes neither section to 
suspend travel of refugees and to suspend 
decisions on applications for refugee status 
for 120 days, but, in Section 6(b), the 
President invokes § 1182(f) to cap refugee 
admissions at 50,000 for the 2017 fiscal 
year. Id. at 13215-16.  
 
The parties dispute whether EO2 falls clearly 
within the President's congressionally 
delegated authority. To be sure, § 
1182(f) gives the President broad authority to 
suspend the entry of aliens or classes of 
aliens. However, this authority is not 
unlimited. Cf. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 
129, 78 S. Ct. 1113, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1204 
(1958) ("[I]f that power is delegated, the 
standards must be adequate to pass scrutiny 
by the accepted tests."); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & 
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S. 
Ct. 348, 72 L. Ed. 624, Treas. Dec. 42706 
(1928) ("[L]egislative action is not a 
forbidden delegation of legislative power" if 
Congress provides an "intelligible principle 
to which the person or body authorized . . . is 
directed to conform."). Section 
1182(f) requires that the President find that 
the entry of a class of aliens into the United 
States would be detrimental to the interests of 
the United States. This section requires that 
the President's findings support the 
conclusion that entry of all nationals from the 
six designated countries, all refugees, and 
refugees in excess of 50,000 would be 
harmful to the national interest. There is no 
sufficient finding in EO2 that the entry of the 
excluded classes would be detrimental to the 
interests of the United States.  
   
i  
 
Section 2(c) declares that "the unrestricted 
entry into the United States of nationals of 
Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and 
Yemen would be detrimental to the interests 
of the United States" and directs that the entry 
of nationals from those designated countries 
be barred for 90 days. 82 Fed. Reg. at 13213. 
The provision bans more than 180 million 
people from entry based on their national 
origin, including nationals who may have 
never been physically present in those 
countries. See Brief of Former National 
Security Officials as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 
108 at 17. Section 2(c) states:  
 
[1] To temporarily reduce investigative 
burdens on relevant agencies during the 
review period [of the United States' vetting 
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procedures], [2] to ensure the proper review 
and maximum utilization of available 
resources for the screening and vetting of 
foreign nationals, [3] to ensure that adequate 
standards are established to prevent 
infiltration by foreign terrorists, and [4] in 
light of the national security concerns 
referenced in section 1 of this order, I hereby 
proclaim, pursuant to sections 
212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. [§§] 
1182(f) and 1185(a), that the unrestricted 
entry into the United States of nationals of 
Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and 
Yemen would be detrimental to the interests 
of the United States. I therefore direct that the 
entry into the United States of nationals of 
those six countries be suspended.  
 
82 Fed. Reg. at 13213. The Government 
explains that the Order's objective "is to 
address the risk that potential terrorists might 
exploit possible weaknesses in the Nation's 
screening and vetting procedures while the 
review of those procedures is underway."  
We reject the first three reasons provided in 
Section 2(c) because they relate to 
preservation of government resources to 
review existing procedures and ensure 
adequate vetting procedures. There is no 
finding that present vetting standards are 
inadequate, and no finding that absent the 
improved vetting procedures there likely will 
be harm to our national interests. These 
identified reasons do not support the 
conclusion that the entry of nationals from 
the six designated countries would be 
harmful to our national interests.  
 
We turn to the fourth reason—national 
security concerns—and examine whether it 
confers a legally sufficient basis for the 
President's conclusion that the nationality-
based entry restriction is warranted. Section 
1(d) of the Order explains that nationals from 
Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and 
Yemen warrant additional scrutiny because:  
Each of these countries is a state sponsor of 
terrorism, has been significantly 
compromised by terrorist organizations, or 
contains active conflict zones. Any of these 
circumstances diminishes the foreign 
government's willingness or ability to share 
or validate important information about 
individuals seeking to travel to the United 
States. Moreover, the significant presence in 
each of these countries of terrorist 
organizations, their members, and others 
exposed to those organizations increases the 
chance that conditions will be exploited to 
enable terrorist operatives or sympathizers to 
travel to the United States. Finally, once 
foreign nationals from these countries are 
admitted to the United States, it is often 
difficult to remove them, because many of 
these countries typically delay issuing, or 
refuse to issue, travel documents.  
Id. at 13210 (emphasis added). 
  
Because of these country conditions, the 
Order concludes that "the risk of erroneously 
permitting entry of a national of one of these 
countries who intends to commit terrorist acts 
or otherwise harm the national security of the 
United States is unacceptably high." Id. at 
13211. The Order further indicates that 
"hundreds of persons born abroad have been 
convicted of terrorism-related crimes in the 
United States[,]" but does not identify the 
number of nationals from the six designated 
countries who have been so 
convicted. See id. at 13212.  
 
The Order makes no finding that nationality 
alone renders entry of this broad class of 
individuals a heightened security risk to the 
United States. See Int'l Refugee Assistance 
Project, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9109, 2017 
WL 2273306, at *31 (Keenan, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment) 
("[T]he Second Executive Order does not 
state that any nationals of the six identified 
countries, by virtue of their nationality, 
intend to commit terrorist acts in the United 
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States or otherwise pose a detriment to the 
interests of the United States.").  
 
The Order does not tie these nationals in any 
way to terrorist organizations within the six 
designated countries. It does not identify 
these nationals as contributors to active 
conflict or as those responsible for insecure 
country conditions. It does not provide any 
link between an individual's nationality and 
their propensity to commit terrorism or their 
inherent dangerousness. In short, the Order 
does not provide a rationale explaining why 
permitting entry of nationals from the six 
designated countries under current protocols 
would be detrimental to the interests of the 
United States.  
 
The Order's discussion of country conditions 
fails to bridge the gap. Indeed, its use of 
nationality as the sole basis for suspending 
entry means that nationals without significant 
ties to the six designated countries, such as 
those who left as children or those whose 
nationality is based on parentage alone, 
should be suspended from entry. Yet, 
nationals of other countries who do have 
meaningful ties to the six designated 
countries—and may be contributing to the 
very country conditions discussed—fall 
outside the scope of Section 2(c). 
Consequently, EO2's focus on nationality 
"could have the paradoxical effect of barring 
entry by a Syrian national who has lived in 
Switzerland for decades, but not a Swiss 
national who has immigrated to Syria during 
its civil war." Hawai'i TRO, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 36935, 2017 WL 1011673, at 
*15 (internal quotation marks and alterations 
omitted); see also Brief of the Cato 
Institute as Amicus Curiae, Dkt. No. 170 at 
14-15 (providing statistics on nationals of the 
designated countries living in other countries 
as migrants, refugees, or asylum seekers and 
explaining that Syrian and Iranian nationals 
do not gain nationality by virtue of their place 
of birth).  
Although the Order explains that country 
conditions in the six designated countries 
lessen their governments' ability to share 
information about nationals seeking to travel 
to our country, the Order specifically avoids 
making any finding that the current screening 
processes are inadequate. As the law stands, 
a visa applicant bears the burden of showing 
that the applicant is eligible to receive a visa 
or other document for entry and is not 
inadmissible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The 
Government already can exclude individuals 
who do not meet that burden. See id. The 
Order offers no further reason explaining 
how this individualized adjudication process 
is flawed such that permitting entry of an 
entire class of nationals is injurious to the 
interests of the United States.  
 
Finally, the Order relies on 8 U.S.C. § 
1187(a)(12) to explain why the six countries 
have been designated. 82 Fed. Reg. at 
13210. In § 1187(a)(12), Congress prevented 
use of the Visa Waiver Program by dual 
nationals of, or those who have visited in the 
last six years, (1) Iraq and Syria, (2) any 
country designated by the Secretary of State 
as a state sponsor of terrorism, and (3) any 
other country designated as a country of 
concern by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, in consultation with the Secretary of 
State and the Director of National 
Intelligence. Rather than setting an outright 
ban on entry of nationals from these 
countries, Congress restricted access to the 
tourist Visa Waiver Program and instead 
required that persons who are nationals of or 
have recently traveled to these countries enter 
the United States with a visa. This provision 
reflects Congress's considered view on 
similar security concerns that the Order seeks 
to address. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951, 
959 (explaining that our founders 
"consciously" chose to place the legislative 
process in the hands of a "deliberate and 
deliberative" body). The Order identifies no 
new information to justify Section 2(c)'s 
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blanket ban as contrasted with § 
1187(a)(12)'s restriction from the Visa 
Waiver Program. Moreover, relying on § 
1187(a)(12) alone, which requires that aliens 
from these countries undergo vetting through 
visa procedures, does not explain why 
their entry would be detrimental to the 
interests of the United States. To the contrary, 
it effectively negates the Order's statement of 
detriment—that the "unrestricted entry into 
the United States of nationals [of the six 
designated countries] would be detrimental to 
the interests of the United States." 82 Fed. 
Reg. at 13213 (emphasis added). Section 
1187(a)(12) dictates that the entry of 
individuals covered by the Order is never 
"unrestricted."  
 
In conclusion, the Order does not offer a 
sufficient justification to suspend the entry of 
more than 180 million people on the basis of 
nationality. National security is not a 
"talismanic incantation" that, once invoked, 
can support any and all exercise of executive 
power under § 1182(f). United States v. 
Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-64, 88 S. Ct. 419, 
19 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1967); see also Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235, 65 S. Ct. 
193, 89 L. Ed. 194 (1944) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting) ("[T]he exclusion order 
necessarily must rely for its reasonableness 
upon the assumption that all persons of 
Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous 
tendency to commit sabotage and espionage 
and to aid our Japanese enemy in other ways. 
It is difficult to believe that reason, logic or 
experience could be marshalled in support of 
such an assumption."). Section 
1182(f) requires that the President exercise 
his authority only after meeting the 
precondition of finding that entry of an alien 
or class of aliens would be detrimental to the 
interests of the United States. Here, the 
President has not done so.  
   
ii  
Section 6(a) suspends travel of refugees into 
the United States under USRAP and 
suspends decisions on applications for 
refugee status for 120 days but does not 
specifically announce that the entry of 
refugees would be detrimental to the interests 
of the United States. 82 Fed. Reg. at 13215.  
Assuming the President also relied on § 
1182(f) to suspend USRAP for 120 days, 
EO2 provides the following information to 
possibly support the conclusion that refugee 
admissions would injure the national interest. 
First, EO2 explains that the screening and 
vetting procedures associated with USRAP 
"play a crucial role in detecting foreign 
nationals who may commit, aid, or support 
acts of terrorism and in preventing those 
individuals from entering the United States," 
and that it is the policy of the United States to 
improve screening and vetting procedures 
associated with USRAP. Id. at 
13209. Section 1(h) cites two examples of 
refugees who have been convicted of 
terrorism-related crimes in the United States:  
 [1] [I]n January 2013, two Iraqi nationals 
admitted to the United States as refugees in 
2009 were sentenced to 40 years and to life in 
prison, respectively, for multiple terrorism-
related offenses. [2] [I]n October 2014, a 
native of Somalia who had been brought to 
the United States as a child refugee and later 
became a naturalized United States citizen 
was sentenced to 30 years in prison for 
attempting to use a weapon of mass 
destruction . . . . 
 
82 Fed. Reg. at 13212. Section 1(h) also 
explains that there are "more than 300 
persons who entered the United States as 
refugees [who] are currently the subjects of 
counterterrorism investigations by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation." Id.  
 
EO2 does not reveal any threat or harm to 
warrant suspension of USRAP for 120 days 
and does not support the conclusion that the 
entry of refugees in the interim time period 
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would be harmful. Nor does it provide any 
indication that present vetting and screening 
procedures are inadequate. Instead, EO2 
justifies the 120-day suspension as a review 
period of USRAP application and 
adjudication processes. 82 Fed. Reg. at 
13215. The Government reiterates that the 
President directed the suspension "in order to 
allow the Secretary of State to review 
application and adjudication processes." 
These explanations do not support a finding 
that the travel and admission of refugees 
would be detrimental to the interests of the 
United States.  
   
iii  
 
Section 6(b) of EO2 restricts entry of 
refugees to no more than 50,000 in the 2017 
fiscal year because entry in excess of 50,000 
"would be detrimental to the interests of the 
United States." 82 Fed. Reg. at 13216. But in 
accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1157, President 
Obama previously determined that the 
admission of 110,000 refugees to the United 
States during fiscal year 2017 was justified 
by humanitarian concerns or otherwise in the 
national interest. See Presidential 
Determination on Refugee Admissions for 
Fiscal Year 2017, Presidential Determination 
No. 2016-13, 81 Fed. Reg. 70315 (Sept. 28, 
2016); see also Proposed Refugee 
Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017: Report to 
the 
Congress, https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/262168.pdf . 
 
 To the extent that 60,000 additional refugees 
can be considered a class of aliens, EO2 
makes no findings to justify barring entry in 
excess of 50,000 as detrimental to the 
interests of the United States. EO2 gives no 
explanation for why the 50,001st to the 
110,000th refugee would be harmful to the 
national interest, nor does it specify any 
further threat to national security. And there 
is not any rationale explaining why the 
previous target admission of 110,000 
refugees this fiscal year was justified by 
humanitarian concerns or otherwise in the 
national interest, see 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2), 
but that the entry of more than 50,000 
refugees this same fiscal year would be 
detrimental to the national interest. Here too, 
the President did not meet the statutory 
precondition of exercising his authority 
under § 1182(f) to cap refugee admissions.  
The actions taken in Sections 2 and 6 require 
the President first to make sufficient findings 
that the entry of nationals from the six 
designated countries and the entry of all 
refugees would be detrimental to the interests 
of the United States. We conclude that the 
President did not satisfy this precondition 
before exercising his delegated authority. 
Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success 
on the merits of their claim that the President 
exceeded his authority under §§ 
1182(f) and 1185(a).  
   
2  
 
Plaintiffs contend that Section 2(c) of the 
Order violates the INA because it 
discriminates on the basis of nationality, thus 
violating the non-discrimination mandate 
of § 1152(a)(1)(A) of the INA. They argue 
that although the President is given broad 
authority under § 1182(f), this authority is 
restrained by § 1152(a)(1)(A).  
 
Contemporaneous to enacting the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, Congress passed the INA of 1965 to 
eliminate the "national origins system as the 
basis for the selection of immigrants to the 
United States." H.R. Rep. No. 89-745, at 8 
(1965). Section 1152(a)(1)(A) was enacted as 
part of that act, and provides: 
  
[N]o person shall receive any preference or 
priority or be discriminated against in the 
issuance of an immigrant visa because of the 
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person's race, sex, nationality, place of birth, 
or place of residence.  
8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (emphasis 
added). Section 1152(a)(1)(A) contains 
specific exemptions, and § 1182(f) is not 
among them.  
 
The Government tries to reconcile the Order's 
Section 2(c) with § 1152(a)(1)(A) by arguing 
that Section 2(c) bars entry of nationals from 
the six designated countries but does not deny 
the issuance of immigrant visas based on 
nationality. EO2's suspension of entry on the 
basis of nationality, however, in substance 
operates as a ban on visa issuance on the basis 
of nationality. The Order's text confirms as 
much. Its primary purpose is to evaluate 
screening and vetting procedures associated 
with the visa issuance process. 82 Fed. Reg. 
at 13209. EO2 affects nationals of the six 
designated countries who were outside of the 
United States on the effective date of the 
Order but did not have a valid visa at specific 
times, such as the effective date of EO1. 82 
Fed. Reg. at 13213. Further, it provides for a 
waiver so consular officers or Customs and 
Border Protection officials may authorize the 
issuance of visas during the suspension 
period. Id. at 13214. The Government also 
stresses that it should not be required to issue 
visas for aliens who are validly barred from 
entry, explaining that "[r]equiring that such 
aliens be issued visas permitting them to 
travel to this country, only to be denied entry 
upon arrival, would create needless 
difficulties and confusion." Indeed, the 
Government clarified at oral argument that as 
a practical matter, the entry ban would be 
implemented through visa denials. Moreover, 
the statute makes clear that aliens deemed 
inadmissible under § 1182, including under § 
1182(f) "are ineligible to receive visas," thus 
confirming the substantial overlap between a 
denial of entry under § 1182(f) and a visa 
denial. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a); see also Int'l 
Refugee Assistance Project, 2017 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 9109, 2017 WL 2273306, at 
*52 (Thacker, J., concurring) (explaining that 
the Government's "own arguments and the 
text and operation of [EO2] belie [the] 
notion" that the visa issuance process is a 
different activity than suspension of entry).  
 
We cannot blind ourselves to the fact that, for 
nationals of the six designated countries, EO2 
is effectively a ban on the issuance of 
immigrant visas. If allowed to stand, EO2 
would bar issuance of visas based on 
nationality in violation of § 
1152(a)(1)(A). The Government did not 
dispute this point at oral argument, and it 
stands to reason that the whole system of the 
visa issuance would grind to a halt for 
nationals of the six designated 
countries whose entry is barred from the 
United States. Issuance of visas will 
automatically stop for those who are banned 
based on nationality. Yet Congress could not 
have used "more explicit language" in 
"unambiguously direct[ing] that no 
nationality-based discrimination shall 
occur." Legal Assistance for Vietnamese 
Asylum Seekers, 45 F.3d at 473.  
 
The Government additionally argues that § 
1152(a)(1)(A) does not displace the 
President's preexisting authority under § 
1182(f), because the President may validly 
bar entry and the non-discrimination mandate 
applies strictly to the issuance of visas. Based 
on the plain statutory text, the Government 
contends that the non-discrimination 
mandate of § 1152(a)(1)(A) does not reach 
the President's suspension of entry under § 
1182(f).  
 
This argument, however, presents a clear 
conflict between § 1152(a)(1)(A) and § 1182, 
because it would enable the President to 
restore discrimination on the basis of 
nationality that Congress sought to 
eliminate. It is our duty, if possible, to 
reconcile the President's statutory authority 
under § 1182(f) with the non-discrimination 
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mandate of § 1152(a)(1)(A). We begin with 
the instruction that "all parts of a statute, if at 
all possible, are to be given 
effect." Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & 
Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 633, 93 S. Ct. 
2469, 37 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1973); accord Food 
& Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133, 120 S. Ct. 
1291, 146 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2000) ("A court 
must . . . fit, if possible, all parts into an 
harmonious whole." (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted)). We also look "to 
the design of the statute as a whole and to its 
object and policy." Gozlon-Peretz v. United 
States, 498 U.S. 395, 407, 111 S. Ct. 840, 112 
L. Ed. 2d 919 (1991) (quoting Crandon v. 
United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158, 110 S. Ct. 
997, 108 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1990)).  
 
Under the Government's argument, the 
President could circumvent the limitations set 
by § 1152(a)(1)(A) by permitting the 
issuance of visas to nationals of the six 
designated countries, but then deny them 
entry. Congress could not have intended to 
permit the President to flout § 1152(a) so 
easily. See Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 16, 
128 S. Ct. 2307, 171 L. Ed. 2d 178 
(2008) (courts should not read statutes in 
such a way that renders them a "nullity" or is 
"unsustainable").  
 
To avoid this result, and to give effect to § 
1152(a)(1)(A), the section "is best read to 
prohibit discrimination throughout the visa 
process, which must include the decision 
whether to admit a visa holder upon 
presenting the visa." Brief of Former 
Immigration and Homeland Security 
Officials as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 176 at 9. 
In prohibiting nationality-based 
discrimination in the issuance of immigrant 
visas, Congress also in effect prohibited 
nationality-based discrimination in the 
admission of aliens. "Congress could not 
have intended to prohibit discrimination at 
the embassy, but permit it at the airport gate." 
Brief of Technology Companies as Amici 
Curiae, Dkt. No. 180 at 20. We do not 
suggest that visa holders must gain automatic 
entry into the United States, but rather, that 
visa holders cannot be discriminated against 
on the basis of "race, sex, nationality, place 
of birth, or place of residence" throughout the 
visa process, whether during the issuance of 
a visa or at the port of entry.  
 
Our conclusion that § 1152(a)(1)(A)'s non-
discrimination mandate cabins the President's 
authority under § 1182(f) is reinforced by 
other canons of statutory construction.  
First, a later enacted, more specific statute 
generally governs over an earlier, more 
general one. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts 183-87 (2012). Here, § 
1152(a)(1)(A) was enacted in 1965, after § 
1182(f) was enacted in 1952. Section 
1152(a)(1)(A) is also more specific, and sets 
a limitation on the President's broad authority 
to exclude aliens—he may do so, but not in a 
way that discriminates based on 
nationality. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 
LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 
132 S. Ct. 2065, 2071, 182 L. Ed. 2d 967 
(2012) ("The general/specific canon is 
perhaps most frequently applied to statutes in 
which a general permission or prohibition is 
contradicted by a specific prohibition or 
permission. To eliminate the contradiction, 
the specific provision is construed as an 
exception to the general one.").  
 
Second, § 1152(a)(1)(A) specifically 
identifies exemptions from the non-
discrimination mandate, implying that 
unmentioned sections are not 
exempted. See United Dominion Indus., Inc. 
v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 836, 121 S. 
Ct. 1934, 150 L. Ed. 2d 45 (2001) ("The logic 
that invests the omission with significance is 
familiar: the mention of some implies the 
exclusion of others not mentioned."). Section 
1152(a)(1)(A) explicitly exempts three 
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different INA provisions from its 
application—8 U.S.C. §§ 
1101(a)(27), 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), and 1153—all 
of which deal with giving preference to 
certain immigrants, such as family members 
of current citizens and permanent 
residents. Had Congress likewise intended to 
permit § 1182(f) to override § 
1152(a)(1)(A)'s non-discrimination 
requirement, it would have done so in the 
same way it did for the other provisions.  
 
The Government contends that §§ 
1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) "have long been 
understood to permit the president to draw 
nationality-based distinctions." However, as 
discussed above, supra note 13, prior 
executive orders and proclamations did not 
suspend classes of aliens on the basis of 
national origin, but instead on the basis of 
affiliation or culpable conduct. See Kate M. 
Manuel, Executive Authority to Exclude 
Aliens: In Brief 6-10, Congressional 
Research Service (2017). The other instances 
cited by the Government are 
distinguishable. The executive order at issue 
in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 
U.S. 155, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 125 L. Ed. 2d 128 
(1993), made no nationality-based 
distinctions and concerned "suspend[ing] the 
entry of aliens coming by sea to the United 
States without necessary 
documentation." Exec. Order No. 12807, 57 
Fed. Reg. 23133 (May 24, 1992). President 
Carter's executive orders in response to the 
Iranian hostage crisis delegated authority to 
the Secretary of State and the Attorney 
General to prescribe limitations governing 
the entry of Iranian nationals and did not ban 
Iranian immigrants outright. See Exec. Order 
12172, 44 Fed. Reg. 67947 (Nov. 26, 
1979), amended by Exec. Order 12206, 45 
Fed. Reg. 24101 (Apr. 7, 1980). Finally, 
President Reagan's Proclamation 5517 
suspended the entry of Cuban nationals 
coming as immigrants, with some 
exceptions. 51 Fed. Reg. 30470 (Aug. 22, 
1986). The proclamation did not exclude all 
foreign nationals, as exceptions were 
provided, and the proclamation was in 
response to Cuba's decision "'to suspend all 
types of procedures regarding the execution' 
of the December 14, 1984, immigration 
agreement between the United States and 
Cuba." Id. To be clear, Presidents have 
invoked §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) to restrict 
certain aliens or classes of aliens from 
entering the United States, but EO2 is 
unprecedented in its scope, purpose, and 
breadth.  
 
The Government also argues that the 
President may engage in discrimination on 
the basis of nationality because of the 
exception provided in § 
1152(a)(1)(B). Section 
1152(a)(1)(B) provides, "[n]othing in [§ 
1152(a)(1)(A)] shall be construed to limit the 
authority of the Secretary of State to 
determine the procedures for the processing 
of immigrant visa applications or the 
locations where such applications will be 
processed." However, this provision governs 
the Secretary of State's manner and place for 
processing applications, not the President's 
asserted ability to deny immigrant visas on 
the basis of nationality.  
 
Having considered the President's authority 
under § 1182(f) and the non-discrimination 
mandate of § 1152(a)(1)(A), we also 
conclude that Plaintiffs have shown a 
likelihood of success on the merits of their 
claim that Section 2(c) of the Order, in 
suspending the issuance of immigrant visas 
and denying entry based on nationality, 
exceeds the restriction of § 
1152(a)(1)(A) and the overall statutory 
scheme intended by Congress.  
  
3  
 
Aside from the President's failure to make the 
requisite findings to justify reducing the entry 
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of refugees in fiscal year 2017 as an exercise 
of authority under § 1182(f), Plaintiffs 
contend that 8 U.S.C. § 1157 circumscribes 
the President's actions in setting the number 
of refugees to be admitted this fiscal year. We 
agree.  
 
The Refugee Act of 1980 amended the INA 
"to provide a permanent and systematic 
procedure for the admission to this country of 
refugees of special humanitarian concern to 
the United States, and to provide 
comprehensive and uniform provisions for 
the effective resettlement and absorption of 
those refugees who are admitted." Pub. L. 
No. 96-212, § 101, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).  
The Act requires that the President, after 
consulting with Congress, set the annual 
admission of refugees before the beginning 
of every fiscal year:  
 
[T]he number of refugees who may be 
admitted under this section in any fiscal year 
. . . shall be such number as the President 
determines, before the beginning of the fiscal 
year and after appropriate consultation, is 
justified by humanitarian concerns or is 
otherwise in the national interest.  
8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2). "Appropriate 
consultation" is defined as "discussions in 
person by designated Cabinet-level 
representatives of the President with 
members of the Committees on the Judiciary 
of the Senate and of the House of 
Representatives." Id. § 1157(e). After 
undergoing this process in 2016, President 
Obama determined that the admission of 
110,000 refugees to the United States during 
fiscal year 2017 was justified by 
humanitarian concerns or otherwise in the 
national interest. See 81 Fed. Reg. at 
70315. Section 6(b) of EO2 reduced the 
refugee admission cap for the same year to 
50,000. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 13216.  
 
The statute requires the President to set the 
number of annual refugee admissions (1) 
before the start of the new fiscal year, and (2) 
after appropriate consultation with Congress. 
The Government responds that § 1157 only 
refers to a ceiling—not the floor—for the 
number of refugees who may be admitted, 
and that §§ 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1) permit the 
President to lower the number of refugees 
permitted to enter.  
 
We disagree. This interpretation reads out the 
language that the number of refugees who 
may be admitted shall be the number 
determined by the President. See 8 U.S.C. § 
1157(a)(2). The Government's argument 
would require us to conclude that Congress 
set forth very specific requirements for the 
President to provide the number and 
allocation of the refugees to be admitted as 
justified by humanitarian concerns or the 
national interest, after appropriate 
consultation, only to permit the President to 
order a midyear reduction in the level of 
refugee admissions, and to do so without 
consulting Congress. Section 
1157 contemplates that the President, after 
consultation with Congress, may increase the 
number of refugees admitted in the middle of 
the fiscal year, but does not provide a 
mechanism for the President to decrease the 
number of refugees to be admitted mid-
year. See id. § 1157(b) (describing how, after 
appropriate consultation, the President may 
fix a number of additional refugees to be 
admitted to the United States). 
  
Well-settled interpretive canons further 
explain why § 1182(f) does not give the 
President authority to override the 
requirements of § 1157. First, applying the 
"later in time" canon, § 1182(f) was adopted 
in 1952, and § 1157 was adopted in 1980, 
indicating that this subsequent statute shapes 
the scope of the President's 
authority. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. at 143 ("The 'classic judicial 
task of reconciling many laws enacted over 
time, and getting them to 'make sense' in 
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combination, necessarily assumes that the 
implications of a statute may be altered by the 
implications of a later statute.'" 
(quoting United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 
439, 453, 108 S. Ct. 668, 98 L. Ed. 2d 830 
(1988))).  
 
Second, § 1157, the more specific provision, 
controls the more general § 
1182(f). See id. ("This is particularly so 
where the scope of the earlier statute is broad 
but the subsequent statutes more specifically 
address the topic at 
hand."); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 
426 U.S. 148, 153, 96 S. Ct. 1989, 48 L. Ed. 
2d 540 (1976). Section 1157 provides a very 
specific process for "appropriate 
consultation" that the President must follow 
before setting the number of refugees to be 
admitted to the United States that is justified 
by humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in 
the national interest. "Appropriate 
consultation" requires in-person discussions 
between cabinet-level representatives and 
members of Congress "to review the refugee 
situation or emergency refugee situation, to 
project the extent of possible participation of 
the United States therein, [and] to discuss the 
reasons for believing that the proposed 
admission of refugees is justified by 
humanitarian concerns or grave humanitarian 
concerns or is otherwise in the national 
interest . . . ." 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e). As part of 
the consultation, the Executive also must 
present the following information:  
 
(1) A description of the nature of the refugee 
situation.  
(2) A description of the number and 
allocation of the refugees to be admitted and 
an analysis of conditions within the countries 
from which they came.  
(3) A description of the proposed plans for 
their movement and resettlement and the 
estimated cost of their movement and 
resettlement.  
(4) An analysis of the anticipated social, 
economic, and demographic impact of their 
admission to the United States.  
(5) A description of the extent to which other 
countries will admit and assist in the 
resettlement of such refugees.  
(6) An analysis of the impact of the 
participation of the United States in the 
resettlement of such refugees on the foreign 
policy interests of the United States.  
(7) Such additional information as may be 
appropriate or requested by such members.  
Id. According to the statute, this information 
would ideally be provided at least two weeks 
in advance of the discussions. Id.  
 
Congress prescribed specific actions the 
President must take before setting the number 
of refugees who may be admitted as justified 
by humanitarian concerns or as otherwise in 
the national interest. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 
1157. The President relied on § 1182(f)—an 
earlier and more general provision—to 
conclude that admission of refugees above 
50,000 is detrimental to the interest of the 
United States. But § 1157, a "narrow, precise, 
and specific" statutory provision, may not be 
overridden by § 1182(f), a provision 
"covering a more generalized spectrum" of 
issues. Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 153-54; see 
also Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 
U.S. 17, 133 S. Ct. 500, 504, 184 L. Ed. 2d 
328 (2012) (explaining that the interpretive 
principle generalia specialibus non derogant
 means that "the specific governs the general" 
and applies to conflict between "laws of 
equivalent dignity").  
 
As a result, Plaintiffs have also shown a 
likelihood of success on the merits for their 
argument that Section 6(b) of EO2 conflicts 
with 8 U.S.C. § 1157.  
   
4  
 
Plaintiffs additionally argue that EO2 
conflicts with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), 
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which sets forth detailed and "specific criteria 
for determining terrorism-related 
inadmissibility." Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2140.  
 
EO2 attempts to eliminate the marginal risk 
of "erroneously permitting entry of a national 
of one of these countries who intends to 
commit terrorist acts," 82 Fed. Reg. at 13211, 
by suspending entry of all nationals from the 
six designated countries. We need not decide 
the precise scope of § 1182(f) authority in 
relation to § 1182(a)(3)(B) because the 
President has not met the precondition to 
exercising his power under § 1182(f), that is, 
of making a detrimentality finding. We note, 
however, that executive action should not 
render superfluous Congress's requirement 
that there be a "reasonable ground to believe" 
that an alien "is likely to engage after entry in 
any [specifically defined] terrorist activity," 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(II), and other 
specific grounds for terrorism-related 
admissibility. Cf. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1049 
n.2 ("The President's sweeping proclamation 
power [under § 1182(f)] provides a safeguard 
against the danger posed by any particular 
case or class of cases that is not covered by 
one of the categories in section 1182(a)." 
(emphasis added)); Allende v. Shultz, 845 
F.2d 1111, 1118 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Each 
subsection [of § 1182(a)] creates a different 
and distinct ground for exclusion.").  
   
5  
 
Finally, we note that in considering the 
President's authority, we are cognizant of 
Justice Jackson's tripartite framework 
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer. See 343 U.S. 579, 635-38, 72 S. Ct. 
863, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 417 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Section 
1182(f) ordinarily places the President's 
authority at its maximum. "When the 
President acts pursuant to an express or 
implied authorization of Congress, his 
authority is at its maximum, for it includes all 
that he possesses in his own right plus all that 
Congress can delegate." Id. at 635. However, 
given the express will of Congress through § 
1152(a)(1)(A)'s non-discrimination 
mandate, § 1157's procedure for refugee 
admissions to this country, and § 
1182(a)(3)(B)'s criteria for determining 
terrorism-related inadmissibility, the 
President took measures that were 
incompatible with the expressed will of 
Congress, placing his power "at its lowest 
ebb." Id. at 637. In this zone, "Presidential 
claim to a power at once so conclusive and 
preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, 
for what is at stake is the equilibrium 
established by our constitutional 
system." Id. at 638. We have based our 
decision holding the entry ban unlawful on 
statutory considerations, and nothing said 
herein precludes Congress and the President 
from reaching a new understanding and 
confirming it by statute. If there were such 
consensus between Congress and the 
President, then we would view Presidential 
power at its maximum, and not in the 
weakened state based on conflict with 
statutory law. See id. at 635-38.  
 
* * *  
 
In sum, we conclude that Plaintiffs have 
shown a likelihood of success on the merits 
at least as to their arguments that EO2 
contravenes the INA by exceeding the 
President's authority under § 1182(f), 
discriminating on the basis of nationality, and 
disregarding the procedures for setting 
annual admissions of refugees. 
   
C  
 
The current record is sufficient to permit the 
court's evaluation of the irreparable harms 
threatening Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs identify 
harms, such as prolonged separation from 
family members, constraints to recruiting and 
attracting students and faculty members to 
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the University of Hawai'i, decreased tuition 
revenue, and the State's inability to assist in 
refugee resettlement. Many of these harms 
are not compensable with monetary damages 
and therefore weigh in favor of finding 
irreparable harm. See, e.g., Washington, 847 
F.3d at 1169 (identifying harms such as 
harms to States' university employees and 
students, separated families, and stranded 
States' residents abroad); Regents of Univ. of 
Cal. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 747 F.2d 511, 
520 (9th Cir. 1984) (crediting intangible 
harms such as the "impairment of their 
ongoing recruitment programs [and] the 
dissipation of alumni and community 
goodwill and support garnered over 
the years"); cf. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 
Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 
52 L. Ed. 2d 531 (1977) (explaining that "the 
Constitution protects the sanctity of the 
family precisely because the institution of the 
family is deeply rooted in this Nation's 
history and tradition").  
 
We conclude Plaintiffs are likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of 
preliminary relief.  
  
D  
In considering the equities of a preliminary 
injunction, we next "balance the competing 
claims of injury" and "consider the effect on 
each party of the granting or withholding of 
the requested relief." Winter, 555 U.S. at 24.  
The district court did not abuse its discretion 
in finding that the balance of hardships tipped 
in Plaintiffs' favor. The Government argues 
that the injunction causes direct, irreparable 
injury by constraining the Executive's 
authority in "protect[ing] national security on 
behalf of the entire United States." "[T]he 
Government's interest in combating terrorism 
is an urgent objective of the highest 
order." Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 
at 28. Nonetheless, the President must 
exercise his authority under § 
1182(f) lawfully by making sufficient 
findings justifying that entry of certain 
classes of aliens would be detrimental to the 
national interest and ensuring that such 
exercise does not conflict with other INA 
provisions. Because the President has not 
done so, we cannot conclude that 
national security interests outweigh the 
harms to Plaintiffs. See Int'l Refugee 
Assistance Project, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 
9109, 2017 WL 2273306, at *32 (Keenan, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  
 
Further, the Government has not put forth 
evidence of injuries resulting from the 
preliminary injunction, or how the screening 
and vetting procedures in place before the 
Order was enjoined were inadequate such 
that the Order should take immediate effect. 
Continuing to enjoin portions of EO2 restores 
immigration procedures and programs to the 
position they were in prior to its 
issuance. See Washington, 847 F.3d at 
1168; see also Brief of Former National 
Security Officials as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 
108 at 9 (explaining that a number of amici 
officials, in office on January 20, 2017 and 
current on active intelligence, knew of no 
"credible terrorist threat streams directed 
against the United States" at that time).  
In weighing the harms, the equities tip in 
Plaintiffs' favor.  
  
E  
Plaintiffs must finally show that preliminary 
injunctive relief is in the public interest.  
National security is undoubtedly a paramount 
public interest. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 
280, 307, 101 S. Ct. 2766, 69 L. Ed. 2d 640 
(1981) ("[N]o governmental interest is more 
compelling than the security of the Nation."). 
Although we recognize that "sensitive and 
weighty interests of national security and 
foreign affairs" are implicated, Humanitarian 
Law Project, 561 U.S. at 33-34, the President 
must nonetheless exercise his executive 
power under § 1182(f) lawfully. The public 
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interest is served by "curtailing unlawful 
executive action." Texas, 809 F.3d at 187.  
 
The public interests in uniting families and 
supporting humanitarian efforts in refugee 
resettlement support the conclusion that the 
public interest is served by preliminarily 
enjoining EO2 and maintaining the status 
quo. Cf. Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 401 
F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Public 
policy supports recognition and maintenance 
of a family unit. The [INA] was intended to 
keep families together. It should be construed 
in favor of family units and the acceptance of 
responsibility by family 
members."); Kaliski v. Dist. Dir. of INS, 620 
F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir. 1980) (explaining that 
"the humane purpose" of the INA is to reunite 
families).  
 
Amici also have identified specific harms 
that will result if EO2 takes effect, bolstering 
the conclusion that the injunction is in the 
public interest. They explain that EO2 
would, inter alia: curtail children's ability to 
travel to the United States to obtain life-
saving medical care, see Brief of the 
Foundation for the Children of Iran and 
Iranian Alliances Across Borders as Amici 
Curiae, Dkt. No. 77; undermine the efforts of 
religious organizations in the United States 
rendering humanitarian aid, see Brief of 
Episcopal Bishops as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 
87; compromise the diversity interests that 
are central to universities, see Brief of New 
York University as Amicus Curiae, Dkt. No. 
95; deter international students, faculty, and 
scholars from studying at American 
universities and  harm the research mission of 
universities, see Brief of Colleges and 
Universities as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 97; 
impose additional hardship for child refugees 
already facing violence and 
trauma, seeBrief of Professional Society on 
the Abuse of Children as Amicus 
Curiae, Dkt. No. 107; immediately harm 
refugees who will be denied entry and risk the 
vitality of entire refugee assistance programs 
and resettlement efforts, see Brief of 
Interfaith Group of Religions and 
Interreligious Organizations as Amici 
Curiae, Dkt. No. 121, Brief of Oxfam 
America as Amicus Curiae, Dkt. No. 149, 
Brief of HIAS, IRC, and USCRI as Amici 
Curiae, Dkt. No. 155, Brief of Doe Plaintiffs 
as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 276; uniquely 
exclude Muslim family members, scholars, 
religious leaders, and professionals from 
entry, see Brief of Muslim Rights, 
Professional, and Public Health 
Organizations as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 
124, Brief of Muslim Justice League et al. as 
Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 207; inflict 
proprietary harms on the states by harming 
state colleges, disrupting staffing and 
research at state medical institutions, and 
reducing tax revenues and reinvestment of 
refugee funding into local 
economies, seeBrief of Illinois et al. as Amici 
Curiae, Dkt. No. 125; undermine trust 
between law enforcement and immigrant 
communities and inflict financial and social 
costs, such as loss of tourism 
dollars, see Brief of Chicago et al. as Amici 
Curiae, Dkt. No. 137; interfere with union 
members' ability to do their work and serve 
the American public, see Brief of Service 
Employees International Union et al. as 
Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 166; harm American 
competitiveness by disrupting ongoing 
business operations and inhibiting 
technology companies' abilities to attract 
talent, business, and investment to the United 
States, see Brief of Technology Companies 
as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 180, Brief of 
Massachusetts Technology Leadership 
Council as Amicus Curiae, Dkt. No. 194; 
place victims of gender-based violence at 
particular risk, see Tahirih Justice Center et 
al. as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 185; interrupt 
foreign artists' exhibitions and performances 
in the United States, see Brief of the 
Association of Art Museum Directors et al. as 
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Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 204; and prevent 
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents 
from receiving visits from or reuniting with 
family members, see Brief of Human Rights 
First et al. as Amici Curiae, Dkt. No. 222.  
The public interest favors affirming the 
preliminary injunction. See Winter, 555 U.S. 
at 24 ("In exercising their sound discretion, 
courts of equity should pay particular regard 
for the public consequences in employing the 
extraordinary remedy of injunction.").  
 
* * *  
 
Plaintiffs have satisfied all four factors to 
warrant entry of the preliminary 
injunction. See id. at 20. The district court did 
not abuse its discretion in granting an 
injunction.  
  
V  
 
With respect to the injunction's scope, the 
Government contends that the district court 
erred by enjoining internal government 
procedures, giving nationwide relief, and 
entering an order against the President.  
 
We review the scope of a preliminary 
injunction for abuse of 
discretion. McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 
F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2012). Although 
the district court has "considerable discretion 
in fashioning suitable relief and defining the 
terms of an injunction," Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. 
McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 974 (9th 
Cir. 1991), there are limitations on 
this discretion. Injunctive relief must be 
tailored to remedy the specific harms shown 
by the plaintiffs. See id. ("Injunctive relief . . 
. must be tailored to remedy the specific harm 
alleged."); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 
682, 702, 99 S. Ct. 2545, 61 L. Ed. 2d 176 
(1979) ("[T]he scope of injunctive relief is 
dictated by the extent of the violation 
established . . . ."). "An overbroad injunction 
is an abuse of discretion." Stormans, 586 F.3d 
at 1140.  
  
A  
 
The Government first argues that the 
injunction improperly enjoins enforcement of 
parts of Sections 2 and 6 that are unrelated to 
any alleged harm to Plaintiffs—specifically, 
the provisions that pertain to internal 
government operations and procedures.  
 
Portions of Section 2 require various 
agencies to conduct a review of worldwide 
vetting procedures to determine what 
additional information, if any, is needed from 
each foreign country to adjudicate a visa 
application, prepare a report on the results of 
the worldwide review, submit a list of 
countries that do not provide requested 
information to the President, and recommend 
other lawful restrictions or limitations 
deemed necessary for the security of the 
United States. 82 Fed. Reg. at 13212-13. 
Likewise, during the interim period when 
refugee admissions is suspended, Section 6 
directs the Secretary of State, in conjunction 
with the Secretary of Homeland Security and 
the Director of National Intelligence, to 
conduct an internal review and implement 
additional procedures identified by the 
review. Id. at 13215. Section 6 also requires 
the Secretary of State to review the "existing 
law" to determine how State and local 
jurisdictions could have greater involvement 
in the process of determining refugee 
placement. Id. at 13216.  
 
Although other unenjoined sections of EO2 
permit interagency coordination to review 
vetting procedures, the district court 
nonetheless abused its discretion in enjoining 
the inward-facing tasks of Sections 2 and 
6. Enjoining the entirety of Sections 2 and 6 
was not narrowly tailored to addressing only 
the harms alleged. For example, internal 
determinations regarding the necessary 
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information for visa application 
adjudications do not have an obvious 
relationship to the constitutional rights at 
stake or statutory conflicts at issue here. 
Plaintiffs have not shown how the 
Government's internal review of its vetting 
procedures will harm them. We vacate the 
preliminary injunction to the extent it enjoins 
internal review procedures that do not burden 
individuals outside of the executive branch of 
the federal government. See Bresgal v. 
Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 
1987) ("An injunction against a government 
agency must be structured to take into 
account 'the well-established rule that the 
government has traditionally been granted 
the widest latitude in the "dispatch of its own 
internal affairs."'" (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 
423 U.S. 362, 378-79, 96 S. Ct. 598, 46 L. 
Ed. 2d 561 (1976))); cf. Bowen v. Roy, 476 
U.S. 693, 700, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 90 L. Ed. 2d 
735 (1986) (explaining that the Free Exercise 
Clause "affords an individual protection from 
certain forms of governmental compulsion 
[but] does not afford an individual a right to 
dictate the conduct of the Government's 
internal procedures").  
  
B  
 
The Government next argues that the district 
court erred in enjoining Section 6's refugee 
provisions, specifically the suspension of 
refugees and adoption of the 50,000 refugee 
cap.  
 
The State alleges that Section 6 will force it 
to abandon the refugee program that 
embodies the State's traditions of openness 
and diversity. The State has several policies 
that aid and resettle refugees, and has a "long 
history of welcoming refugees impacted by 
war and oppression." As discussed earlier, 
OCS, a division of the Department of Labor 
and Industrial Relations, is directed to 
"[a]ssist and coordinate the efforts of all 
public and private agencies providing 
services which affect the disadvantaged, 
refugees, and immigrants." Haw. Rev. Stat. § 
371K-4(5). OCS also operates the Refugee 
Social Services Program and the Refugee 
Cash and Medical Assistance 
Program. See Department of Labor and 
Industrial Relations, Office of Community 
Services, 2017 Hawaii State Plan for Refugee 
Assistance and Services 
(2016); https://labor.hawaii.gov/ocs/files/20
13/02/FY17-State-Plan-for-Hawaii.pdf (last 
visited June 6, 2017). The State further 
highlights that aiding refugees is central to 
the mission of private organizations, like 
Catholic Charities Hawai'i and Pacific 
Gateway Center.  
 
Since fiscal year 2010, at least twenty 
refugees have arrived and resettled in 
Hawai'i, and in fiscal year 2017 to date, three 
have resettled there. While this is a small 
number of refugees, it does not diminish 
Hawai'i's interest in effectuating its refugee 
programs and investments. Enjoining the 
suspension and cap would protect the State's 
programs and efforts in resettling refugees.  
Although the Government is correct in 
pointing out that most of Plaintiffs' alleged 
injuries center on the implementation of 
Section 2(c), at this preliminary stage of 
litigation, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by enjoining Section 6's operative 
provisions suspending refugee admission on 
the basis of the current record. We therefore 
reject the Government's challenge on this 
point.  
  
C  
 
The Government next contends that the 
district court erred by enjoining Section 2(c) 
as to all persons everywhere, rather than 
redressing only Plaintiffs' injuries. The 
Government requests that the nationwide 
injunction be limited to Plaintiffs only. 
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The district court identified two reasons to 
support a nationwide injunction. First, the 
district court emphasized that in certain 
circumstances, it is appropriate for courts to 
issue nationwide injunctions. Hawai'i PI, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47042, 2017 WL 
1167383, at *8. As the Fifth Circuit observed 
in Texas v. United States, nationwide 
injunctions are particularly appropriate in the 
immigration context because "immigration 
laws of the United States should be enforced 
vigorously and uniformly." 809 F.3d at 187-
88; see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("The 
Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o establish 
an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . .") 
(emphasis added). Enjoining the conduct as 
to Plaintiffs may result in "fragmented 
immigration policy [that] would run afoul of 
the constitutional and statutory requirement 
for uniform immigration law and 
policy." Washington, 847 F.3d at 1166-
67 (citing to Texas, 809 F.3d at 187-88)). 
  
Second, the district court made clear that the 
Government did not provide a workable 
framework for narrowing the geographic 
scope of the injunction. See id. at 
1167 ("[E]ven if limiting the geographic 
scope of the injunction would be desirable, 
the Government has not proposed a 
workable alternative form of the TRO that 
accounts for the nation's multiple ports of 
entry and interconnected transit system and 
that would protect the proprietary interests of 
the States at issue here while nevertheless 
applying only within the States' borders."). 
On appeal, the Government has not offered 
any new workable method of limiting the 
geographic scope of the injunction.  
 
An "injunction is not necessarily made over-
broad by extending benefit or protection to 
persons other than prevailing parties in the 
lawsuit—even if it is not a class action—if 
such breadth is necessary to give prevailing 
parties the relief to which they are 
entitled." Bresgal, 843 F.2d at 1170-71. 
Narrowing the injunction to apply only to 
Plaintiffs would not cure the statutory 
violations identified, which in all 
applications would violate provisions of the 
INA. See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9109, 2017 WL 
2273306, at *27 (affirming the nationwide 
injunction because Section 2(c) of EO2 likely 
violates the Establishment Clause, and its 
constitutional deficiency "would endure" in 
all applications); cf. Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 
1409, 330 U.S. App. D.C. 329 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) ("[W]hen a reviewing court determines 
that agency regulations are unlawful, the 
ordinary result is that the rules are vacated—
not that their application to the individual 
petitioners is proscribed." (quoting Harmon 
v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 495 n.21, 278 
U.S. App. D.C. 382 (D.C. Cir. 1989))).  
The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in entering a nationwide 
preliminary injunction.  
   
D  
 
Finally, the Government argues that the 
district court erred by issuing an injunction 
that runs against the President himself. This 
position of the Government is well 
taken. Generally, we lack "jurisdiction of a 
bill to enjoin the President in the performance 
of his official duties." Franklin v. 
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 802-03, 112 S. 
Ct. 2767, 120 L. Ed. 2d 636 
(1992) (quoting Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 
U.S. 475, 501, 18 L. Ed. 437 (1866)); see id. 
at 802 ("[I]njunctive relief against the 
President himself is extraordinary, and 
should . . . raise[] judicial 
eyebrows."). Injunctive relief, however, may 
run against executive officials, including the 
Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
Secretary of State. See, e.g., Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 588-
89 (holding that President Truman did not act 
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within his constitutional power in seizing 
steel mills and affirming the district court's 
decision enjoining the Secretary of 
Commerce from carrying out the 
order); Franklin, 505 U.S. at 802-03.  
We conclude that Plaintiffs' injuries can be 
redressed fully by injunctive relief against the 
remaining Defendants, and that the 
extraordinary remedy of enjoining the 
President is not appropriate 
here. See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 803. We 
therefore vacate the district court's injunction 
to the extent the order runs against the 
President, but affirm to the extent that it runs 
against the remaining "Defendants and all 
their respective officers, agents, servants, 
employees, and attorneys, and persons in 
active concert or participation with them."  
   
E  
 
The district court did err in enjoining the 
entirety of Sections 2 and 6, particularly the 
portions that pertain to interagency review, 
despite the Government's requests for 
clarification and requests to narrow the 
injunction to enjoin conduct that actually 
harms Plaintiffs. The district court abused its 
discretion in enjoining inward-facing agency 
conduct because enjoining this conduct 
would not remedy the harms asserted by 
Plaintiffs. Further, the district court abused 
its discretion in enjoining the President. We 
would not be able to affirm in full the 
preliminary injunction even if Plaintiffs were 
also likely to succeed on their constitutional 
claims, for reasons that enjoining internal 
review procedures does not remedy harms to 
Plaintiffs and because it is improper to enjoin 
the President without necessity. As we have 
affirmed the injunction in part on statutory 
grounds, and vacated certain parts on the 
basis of considerations governing the proper 
scope of an injunction, we need not consider 
the constitutional claims here.   
  
VI  
 
We affirm in part and vacate in part the 
district court's preliminary injunction order. 
As to the remaining Defendants, we affirm 
the injunction as to Section 2(c), suspending 
entry of nationals from the six designated 
countries for 90 days; Section 6(a), 
suspending USRAP for 120 days; and 
Section 6(b), capping the entry of refugees to 
50,000 in the fiscal year 2017. We vacate the 
portions of the injunction that prevent the 
Government from conducting internal 
reviews, as otherwise directed in Sections 2 
and 6, and the injunction to the extent that it 
runs against the President. We remand the 
case to the district court with instructions to 
re-issue a preliminary injunction consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part; 
and REMANDED with instructions. Each 
party shall bear its own costs on appeal. 
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Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project 
16-436 
Ruling Below: Int’l Refugee Assistance Program v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017). 
President Trump issued Executive Order 13780, section 2(c) of which suspends entry of foreign 
nationals from six countries. Six individuals challenge Executive Order 13780; four of these 
individuals claim that the Order will prolong their separation from loved ones, and two claim that 
the Order spreads anti-Muslim sentiment that harms them.  
 
The District Court enjoined enforcement of Section 2(c). The government appealed. The Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed.  
 
Question Presented: Whether respondents' challenge to the temporary suspension of entry of 
aliens abroad under Section 2(c) of Executive Order No. 13,780 is justiciable? 
Whether Section 2(c)'s temporary suspension of entry violates the Establishment Clause? 
Whether the global injunction, which rests on alleged injury to a single individual plaintiff, is 
impermissibly overbroad? 
Whether the challenges to Section 2(c) became moot on June 14, 2017? 
 
International Refugee Assistance Project, 
v. 
Donald J. Trump. 
 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
May 25, 2017 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
GREGORY, Chief Judge:  
The question for this Court, distilled 
to its essential form, is whether the 
Constitution, as the Supreme Court declared 
in Ex parte Milligan, remains “a law for 
rulers and people, equally in war and in 
peace.” And if so, whether it protects 
Plaintiffs’ right to challenge an Executive 
Order that in text speaks with vague words of 
national security, but in context drips with 
religious intolerance, animus, and 
discrimination. Surely the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment yet stands as 
an untiring sentinel for the protection of one 
of our most cherished founding principles—
that government shall not establish any 
religious orthodoxy, or favor or disfavor one 
religion over another. Congress granted the 
President broad power to deny entry to aliens, 
but that power is not absolute. It cannot go 
unchecked when, as here, the President 
wields it through an executive edict that 
stands to cause irreparable harm to 
individuals across this nation. Therefore, for 
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the reasons that follow, we affirm in 
substantial part the district court’s issuance of 
a nationwide preliminary injunction as to 
Section 2(c) of the challenged Executive 
Order.  
I.  
A.  
In the early evening of January 27, 2017—
seven days after taking the oath of office—
President Donald J. Trump signed Executive 
Order 13769, “Protecting the Nation From 
Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United 
States” (“EO-1” or “First Executive Order”). 
Referencing the past and present failings of 
the visa-issuance process, the First Executive 
Order had the stated purpose of “protect[ing] 
the American people from terrorist attacks by 
foreign nationals.” EO-1, Preamble. To 
protect Americans, EO-1 explained, the 
United States must ensure that it does not 
admit foreign nationals who “bear hostile 
attitudes” toward our nation and our 
Constitution, who would “place violent 
ideologies over American law,” or who 
“engage in acts of bigotry or hatred” (such as 
“‘honor’ killings”). Id. § 1.  
To that end, the President invoked his 
authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and 
immediately suspended for ninety days the 
immigrant and nonimmigrant entry of foreign 
aliens from seven predominantly Muslim 
countries: Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, 
Syria, and Yemen. See EO-1, § 3(c). During 
the ninety-day period, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, Secretary of State, and 
Director of National Intelligence were to 
“immediately conduct a review to determine 
the information needed from any country” to 
assess whether individuals seeking entry 
from those countries posed a national 
security threat. Those cabinet officers were to 
deliver a series of reports updating the 
President as to that review and the 
implementation of EO-1.  
The First Executive Order also placed several 
constraints on the admission of refugees into 
the country. It reduced the number of 
refugees to be admitted in fiscal year 2017 
from 110,000 to 50,000 and barred 
indefinitely the admission of Syrian 
refugees. It further ordered the Secretary of 
State to suspend for 120 days the United 
States Refugee Admissions Program 
(“USRAP”). Upon resumption of USRAP, 
EO-1 directed the Secretary of State to 
“prioritize refugee claims made by 
individuals on the basis of religious-based 
persecution, provided that the religion of the 
individual is a minority religion in the 
individual’s country of nationality.”  
Individuals, organizations, and states across 
the nation challenged the First Executive 
Order in federal court. A judge in the Western 
District of Washington granted a Temporary 
Restraining Order (“TRO”), enjoining 
enforcement nationwide of Sections 3(c), 
5(a)–(c), and 5(e).  The Ninth Circuit 
subsequently denied the Government’s 
request to stay the TRO pending appeal and 
declined to “rewrite” EO-1 by narrowing the 
TRO’s scope, noting that the “political 
branches are far better equipped” for that 
task. At the Ninth Circuit’s invitation, and in 
an effort to avoid further litigation 
concerning the First Executive Order, the 
President enacted a second order (“EO-2” or 
“Second Executive Order”) on March 6, 
2017. The Second Executive Order revoked 
and replaced the First Executive Order.  
Section 2(c) of EO-2—“Temporary 
Suspension of Entry for Nationals of 
Countries of Particular Concern During 
Review Period”—is at the heart of the dispute 
in this case. This section reinstated the 
ninety-day suspension of entry for nationals 
from six countries, eliminating Iraq from the 
list, but retaining Iran, Libya, Somalia, 
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (the “Designated 
Countries”). EO-2, § 2(c). The President, 
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again invoking 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and also 
citing 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a), declared that the 
“unrestricted entry” of nationals from these 
countries “would be detrimental to the 
interests of the United States.”  
The Second Executive Order, unlike its 
predecessor, states that nationals from the 
Designated Countries warrant “additional 
scrutiny” because “the conditions in these 
countries present heightened threats.” In 
justifying the selection of the Designated 
Countries, EO-2 explains, “Each of these 
countries is a state sponsor of terrorism, has 
been significantly compromised by terrorist 
organizations, or contains active conflict 
zones.” The Second Executive Order states 
that “until the assessment of current 
screening and vetting procedures required by 
section 2 of this order is completed, the risk 
of erroneously permitting entry of a national 
of one of these countries who intends to 
commit terrorist acts or otherwise harm the 
national security of the United States is 
unacceptably high.”  
The Second Executive Order also provides 
brief descriptions of the conditions in each of 
the Designated Countries. It notes, for 
instance, that “Sudan has been designated as 
a state sponsor of terrorism since 1993 
because of its support for international 
terrorist groups, including Hizballah and 
Hamas[, and] . . . elements of core al-
Qa’ida and ISISlinked terrorist groups 
remain active in the country.” The Second 
Executive Order further states that 
“[s]ince 2001, hundreds of persons born 
abroad have been convicted of terrorism-
related crimes in the United States.” It 
provides the following examples: two Iraqi 
refugees who were convicted of terrorism-
related offenses in January 2013, and a 
naturalized citizen who came to this country 
as a child refugee from Somalia and who was 
sentenced for terrorism-related offenses in 
October 2014. The Second Executive Order 
does not include any examples of individuals 
from Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, or Yemen 
committing terrorism-related offenses in the 
United States.  
The Second Executive Order clarifies that the 
suspension of entry applies to foreign 
nationals who (1) are outside the United 
States on its effective date of March 16, 2017, 
(2) do not have a valid visa on that date, and 
(3) did not have a valid visa on the effective 
date of EO-1—January 27, 2017. Section 
2(c) does not bar entry of lawful permanent 
residents, dual citizens traveling under a 
passport issued by a nonbanned country, 
asylees, or refugees already admitted to the 
United States. The Second Executive Order 
also includes a provision that permits 
consular officers, in their discretion, to issue 
waivers on a case-by-case basis to 
individuals barred from entering the United 
States.  
The Second Executive Order retains some—
but not all—of the First Executive Order’s 
refugee provisions. It again suspends USRAP 
for 120 days and decreases the number of 
refugee admissions for fiscal year 2017 by 
more than half, but it does not include the 
indefinite ban on Syrian refugees. The 
Second Executive Order also eliminates the 
provision contained in EO-1 that mandated 
preferential treatment of religious minorities 
seeking refugee status. It explains that this 
provision “applied to refugees from every 
nation, including those in which Islam is a 
minority religion, and it applied to minority 
sects within a religion.” It further explains 
that EO-1 was “not motivated by animus 
toward any religion,” but rather was designed 
to protect religious minorities.   
Shortly before the President signed EO-2, an 
unclassified, internal report from the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis dated 
March 2017 was released to the public. The 
report found that most foreign-born, U.S.-
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based violent extremists became radicalized 
many years after entering the United States, 
and concluded that increased screening and 
vetting was therefore unlikely to significantly 
reduce terrorism-related activity in the 
United States. According to a news article, a 
separate DHS report indicated that 
citizenship in any country is likely an 
unreliable indicator of whether a particular 
individual poses a terrorist threat. In a 
declaration considered by the district court, 
ten former national security, foreign policy, 
and intelligence officials who previously 
served in the White House, State Department, 
DHS, and Central Intelligence Agency—four 
of whom were aware of intelligence related 
to terrorist threats as of January 20, 2017—
advised that “[t]here is no national security 
purpose for a total ban on entry for aliens 
from the [Designated Countries].” J.A. 91.  
B.  
The First and Second Executive Orders were 
issued against a backdrop of public 
statements by the President and his advisors 
and representatives at different points in time, 
both before and after the election and 
President Trump’s assumption of office. We 
now recount certain of those statements.  
On December 7, 2015, then-candidate Trump 
published a “Statement on Preventing 
Muslim Immigration” on his campaign 
website, which proposed “a total and 
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the 
United States until our country’s 
representatives can figure out what is going 
on.” J.A. 346. That same day, he highlighted 
the statement on Twitter, “Just put out a very 
important policy statement on the 
extraordinary influx of hatred & danger 
coming into our country. We must be 
vigilant!” And Trump read from the 
statement at a campaign rally in Mount 
Pleasant, South Carolina, that evening, where 
he remarked, “I have friends that are 
Muslims. They are great people—but they 
know we have a problem.” 
In an interview with CNN on March 9, 2016, 
Trump professed, “I think Islam hates us,” 
J.A. 516, and “[W]e can’t allow people 
coming into the country who have this 
hatred,” J.A. 517. Katrina Pierson, a Trump 
spokeswoman, told CNN that 
“[w]e’ve allowed this propaganda to spread 
all through the country that [Islam] is a 
religion of peace.” J.A. 518. In a March 22, 
2016 interview with Fox Business television, 
Trump reiterated his call for a ban on Muslim 
immigration, claiming that this proposed ban 
had received “tremendous support” and 
stating, “we’re having problems with the 
Muslims, and we’re having problems with 
Muslims coming into the country.” J.A. 522. 
“You need surveillance,” Trump explained, 
and “you have to deal with the mosques 
whether you like it or not.” J.A. 522.  
Candidate Trump later recharacterized his 
call to ban Muslims as a ban on nationals 
from certain countries or territories. On July 
17, 2016, when asked about a tweet that said, 
“Calls to ban Muslims from entering the U.S. 
are offensive and unconstitutional,” then-
candidate Trump responded, “So you call it 
territories. OK? We’re gonna do territories.” 
J.A. 798. He echoed this statement a week 
later in an interview with NBC’s Meet the 
Press. When asked whether he had “pulled 
back” on his “Muslim ban,” Trump replied, 
“We must immediately suspend immigration 
from any nation that has been compromised 
by terrorism until such time as proven vetting 
mechanisms have been put in place.” J.A. 
480. Trump added, “I actually don’t think it’s 
a rollback. In fact, you could say it’s an 
expansion. I’m looking now at territories. 
People were so upset when I used the word 
Muslim. Oh, you can’t use the word Muslim. 
Remember this. And I’m okay with that, 
because I’m talking territory instead of 
Muslim.” Trump continued, “Our 
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Constitution is great. . . . Now, we have a 
religious, you know, everybody wants to be 
protected. And that’s great. And that’s the 
wonderful part of our Constitution. I view it 
differently.”  
On December 19, 2016, following a terrorist 
attack in Germany, President-Elect Trump 
lamented the attack on people who were 
“prepared to celebrate the Christmas holiday” 
by “ISIS and other Islamic terrorists [who] 
continually slaughter Christians in their 
communities and places of worship as part of 
their global jihad.” Two days later, when 
asked whether recent violence in Europe had 
affected his plans to bar Muslims from 
immigrating to the United States, President-
Elect Trump commented, “You know my 
plans. All along, I’ve been proven to be right. 
100% correct. What’s happening is 
disgraceful.” 
The President gave an interview to the 
Christian Broadcasting News on January 27, 
2017, the same day he issued the First 
Executive Order. In that interview, the 
President explained that EO-1 would give 
preference to Christian refugees: “They’ve 
been horribly treated. Do you know if you 
were a Christian in Syria it was impossible, 
at least very tough to get into the United 
States? If you were a Muslim you could come 
in, but if you were a Christian, it was almost 
impossible . . . .” He found that situation 
“very, very unfair.” Just before signing EO-
1, President Trump stated, “This is the 
‘Protection of the Nation from 
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United 
States.’ We all know what that means.” The 
following day, former New York City Mayor 
and presidential advisor Rudolph Giuliani 
appeared on Fox News and was asked, “How 
did the President decide the seven 
countries?” Giuliani answered, “I’ll tell you 
the whole history of it. So when [the 
President] first announced it, he said ‘Muslim 
ban.’ He called me up. He said, ‘Put a 
commission together. Show me the right way 
to do it legally.’” J.A. 508. Giuliani said he 
assembled a group of “expert lawyers” that 
“focused on, instead of religion, danger—the 
areas of the world that create danger for us. . 
. . It’s based on places where there [is] 
substantial evidence that people are sending 
terrorists into our country.”  
In response to the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
not to stay enforcement of the nationwide 
injunction, the President stated at a news 
conference on February 16, 2017, that he 
intended to issue a new executive order 
tailored to that court’s decision—despite his 
belief that the First Executive Order was 
lawful. In discussing the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision and his “[e]xtreme vetting” 
proposal, the President stated, “I got elected 
on defense of our country. I keep my 
campaign promises, and our citizens will be 
very happy when they see the result.” A few 
days later Stephen Miller, Senior Policy 
Advisor to the President, explained that the 
new order would reflect “mostly minor 
technical differences,” emphasizing that it 
would produce the “same basic policy 
outcome for the country.” J.A. 339. White 
House Press Secretary Sean Spicer stated, 
“The principles of the executive order remain 
the same.” J.A. 379. And President Trump, in 
a speech at a rally in Nashville, Tennessee, 
described EO-2 as “a watered down version 
of the first order.” 
At the March 6, 2017 press conference 
announcing the Second Executive Order, 
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said, “This 
executive order is a vital measure for 
strengthening our national security.” That 
same day, Attorney General Jefferson 
Sessions and Secretary of Homeland Security 
John Kelly submitted a letter to the President 
detailing how weaknesses in our immigration 
system compromise our nation’s security and 
recommending a temporary pause on entry of 
nationals from the Designated Countries. In a 
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CNN interview the next day, Secretary Kelly 
specified that there are probably “13 or 14 
countries” that have “questionable vetting 
procedures,” not all of which are Muslim 
countries or in the Middle East. He noted that 
there are “51 overwhelmingly Muslim 
countries” and rejected the characterization 
of EO-2 as a “Muslim ban.”  
C.  
This action was brought by six individuals, 
all American citizens or lawful permanent 
residents who have at least one family 
member seeking entry into the United States 
from one of the Designated Countries, and 
three organizations that serve or represent 
Muslim clients or members.  
Four of the individual Plaintiffs—John Doe 
#1, Jane Doe #2, John Doe #3, and Paul 
Harrison—allege that EO-2 would impact 
their immediate family members' ability to 
obtain visas. Collectively, they claim that 
Section 2(c) of EO-2, the provision that 
suspends entry for certain foreign nationals 
for ninety days, will prolong their separation 
from their loved ones. John Doe #1 has 
applied for a spousal immigration visa so that 
his wife, an Iranian national, can join him in 
the United States; the application was 
approved, and she is currently awaiting her 
visa interview. J.A. 305. Jane Doe #2, a 
college student in the United States, has a 
pending I-130 visa application on behalf of 
her sister, a Syrian refugee living in Saudi 
Arabia. Since the filing of the operative 
Complaint on March 10, 2017, two of 
Plaintiffs' family members have obtained 
immigrant visas. The Government informed 
the district court that Paul Harrison's fiancé 
secured and collected a visa on March 15, 
2017, the day before EO-2 was to take effect. 
Doe #3's wife secured an immigrant visa on 
May 1, 2017, and Plaintiffs anticipate that she 
will arrive in the United States within the next 
eight weeks. The remaining two individual 
Plaintiffs—Muhammed Meteab and Ibrahim 
Ahmed Mohomed—allege that EO-2 would 
delay or deny the admission of their family 
members as refugees.  
Beyond claiming injury to their family 
relationships, several of the individual 
Plaintiffs allege that the anti-Muslim 
message animating EO-2 has caused them 
feelings of disparagement and exclusion. Doe 
#1, a scientist who obtained permanent 
resident status through the National Interest 
Waiver program for people with 
extraordinary abilities, references these "anti-
Muslim views," worries about his safety in 
this country, and contemplates whether he 
should return to Iran to be with his wife. 
Plaintiff Meteab relays that the "anti-Muslim 
sentiment" motivating EO-2 had led him to 
feel "isolated and disparaged in [his] 
community." He explains that when he is in 
public with his wife, who wears a hijab, he 
"sense[s] a lot of hostility from people" and 
recounts that his nieces, who both wear a 
hijab, "say that people make mean comments 
and stare at them for being Muslim." A 
classmate "pulled the hijab off" one of his 
nieces in class.  
Two of the organizational Plaintiffs, the 
International Refugee Assistance Project and 
the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, 
primarily assist refugees with the 
resettlement process. These organizations 
claim that they have already diverted 
significant resources to dealing with EO-2's 
fallout, and that they will suffer direct 
financial injury from the anticipated 
reduction in refugee cases. They further 
claim that their clients, who are located in the 
United States and the Middle East, will be 
injured by the delayed reunification with 
their loved ones. The final Plaintiff, the 
Middle East Studies Association, an umbrella 
organization dedicated to fostering 
awareness of the Middle East, asserts that 
EO-2 will, among other injuries, reduce 
attendance at its annual conference and cause 
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the organization to lose $18,000 in 
registration fees.  
D.  
Plaintiffs initiated this suit on February 7, 
2017, seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief against enforcement of the First 
Executive Order. Plaintiffs claimed that EO-
1 violated the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment; the equal protection 
component of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment; the Immigration and 
Nationality Act ("INA");  the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act; the Refugee Act; 
and the Administrative Procedure Act. They 
named as Defendants the President, DHS, the 
Department of State, the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
Secretary of State, and the Director of 
National Intelligence.  
On March 10, 2017, four days after the 
President issued EO-2, Plaintiffs filed the 
operative Complaint, along with a motion for 
a TRO and/or preliminary injunction. 
Plaintiffs sought to enjoin implementation of 
EO-2 in its entirety, prior to its effective date. 
In quick succession, the Government 
responded to the motion, Plaintiffs filed a 
reply, and the parties appeared for a hearing.  
The district court construed the motion as a 
request for a preliminary injunction, and on 
March 16, 2017, it granted in part and denied 
in part that motion. In its 
Memorandum Opinion, the district court first 
found that three individual Plaintiffs (Doe #1, 
Doe #2, and Doe #3) had standing to bring 
the claim that Section 2(c) violates the INA's 
provision prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of nationality in the issuance of 
immigrant visas.  The court also determined 
that at least three individual Plaintiffs 
(Meteab, Doe #1, and Doe #3) had standing 
to pursue the claim that EO-2 violates 
the Establishment Clause.  
After finding Plaintiffs' claims justiciable, the 
district court turned to the merits of their 
claims. The court determined that Plaintiffs 
are likely to succeed only in part on the merits 
of their INA claim. It found that Section 2(c) 
likely violates § 1152(a)(1)(A), but only as to 
its effective bar on the issuance 
of immigrant visas, because § 
1152(a)(1)(A) explicitly applies solely to 
immigrant visas. To the extent that Section 
2(c) prohibits the issuance of nonimmigrant 
visas and bars entry on the basis of 
nationality, the court found that it was not 
likely to violate § 1152(a)(1)(A). The court 
did not discuss this claim in addressing the 
remaining preliminary injunction factors.  
The district court next found that Plaintiffs 
are likely to succeed on the merits of 
their Establishment Clause claim. It then 
considered the remaining preliminary 
injunction requirements, but only as to 
the Establishment Clause claim: it found that 
Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury if 
EO-2 were to take effect, that the balance of 
the equities weighed in Plaintiffs' favor, and 
that a preliminary injunction was in the 
public interest. The district court concluded 
that a preliminary injunction was therefore 
proper as to Section 2(c) of EO-2 because 
Plaintiffs' claims centered primarily on that 
provision's suspension of entry. The court 
accordingly issued a nationwide injunction 
barring enforcement of Section 2(c). 
Defendants timely noted this appeal, and we 
possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(a)(1).  
II.  
Because the district court enjoined Section 
2(c) in its entirety based solely on 
Plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim, we 
need not reach the merits of Plaintiffs' 
statutory claim under the INA.  
In Section 2(c) of EO-2, the President 
suspended the entry of nationals from the six 
216 
  
Designated Countries, pursuant to his power 
to exclude aliens under Section 212(f) of the 
INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(f),  and Section 215(a)(1) of the INA, 
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1). The 
Government contends that Section 2(c)'s 
suspension of entry falls squarely within the 
"expansive authority" granted to the 
President by § 1182(f) and § 
1185(a)(1). Appellants' Br. 28. Plaintiffs, on 
the other hand, argue that Section 2(c) 
violates a separate provision of the INA, 
Section 202(a)(1)(A), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1152(a)(1)(A), prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of nationality "in the issuance of 
immigrant visas.”  
The district court determined that Plaintiffs 
are likely to succeed on their claim under § 
1152(a)(1)(A) only in limited part. Because 
Section 2(c) has the practical effect of halting 
the issuance of immigrant visas on the basis 
of nationality, the court reasoned, it is 
inconsistent with § 1152(a)(1)(A). To that 
extent—and contrary to the Government's 
position—the court found that Presidential 
authority under § 1182(f) and § 1185(a)(1) is 
cabined by the INA's prohibition on 
nationality-based discrimination in visa 
issuance. But the district court's ruling was 
limited in two important respects. First, 
because § 1152(a)(1)(A) applies only to the 
issuance of immigrant visas, the district court 
discerned no conflict between that provision 
and the application of Section 2(c) to persons 
seeking non-immigrant visas. And second, 
the district court found that because § 
1152(a)(1)(A) governs the issuance of visas 
rather than actual entry into the United States, 
it poses no obstacle to enforcement of Section 
2(c)'s nationality-based entry bar. The district 
court summarized as follows:  
Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success 
on the merits of their claim that the Second 
Executive Order violates § 1152(a), but only 
as to the issuance of immigrant visas . . . . 
They have not shown a likelihood of success 
on the merits of the claim that § 
1152(a) prevents the President from barring 
entry to the United States pursuant to § 
1182(f), or the issuance of non-immigrant 
visas, on the basis of nationality.  
This narrow statutory ruling is not the basis 
for the district court's broad preliminary 
injunction enjoining Section 2(c) of EO-2 in 
all of its applications. Rather, Plaintiffs' 
constitutional claim, the district court 
determined, was what justified a nationwide 
preliminary injunction against any 
enforcement of Section 2(c). If we were to 
disagree with the district court that § 
1152(a)(1)(A) partially restrains 
the  President's authority under § 
1182(f) and § 1185(a)(1), then we would be 
obliged to consider Plaintiffs' 
alternative Establishment Clause claim. And, 
importantly, even if we were to agree with 
the district court's statutory analysis, we still 
would be faced with the question of whether 
the scope of the preliminary injunction, 
which goes beyond the issuance of immigrant 
visas governed by § 1152(a)(1)(A) to enjoin 
Section 2(c) in its entirety, can be sustained 
on the basis of Plaintiffs' Establishment 
Clause claim.  
In light of this posture, we need not address 
the merits of the district court's statutory 
ruling. We recognize, of course, the doctrine 
of constitutional avoidance, which counsels 
against the issuance of "unnecessary 
constitutional rulings." But as we have 
explained, the district court's constitutional 
ruling was necessary to its decision, and 
review of that ruling is necessary to ours. 
Accordingly, we decline to reach the merits 
of Plaintiffs' claim under § 
1152(a)(1)(A). The breadth of the 
preliminary injunction issued by the district 
court may be justified if and only if Plaintiffs 
can satisfy the requirements for a preliminary 
injunction based on their Establishment 
217 
  
Clause claim. We therefore turn to consider 
that claim.  
III.  
The Government first asks us to reverse the 
preliminary injunction on the grounds that 
Plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim is non-
justiciable. In its view, Plaintiffs have not 
satisfied the foundational Article III 
requirements of standing and ripeness, and in 
any event, the doctrine of 
consular nonreviewability bars judicial 
review of their claim. We consider these 
threshold challenges in turn.  
A.  
The district court found that at least three 
individual Plaintiffs—Muhammed Meteab, 
Doe #1, and Doe #3—have standing to assert 
the claim that EO-2 violates 
the Establishment Clause.  We review this 
legal determination de novo. 
The Constitution's gatekeeping requirement 
that federal courts may only adjudicate 
"Cases" or "Controversies," U.S. Const. art. 
III, § 2, obligates courts to determine whether 
litigants have standing to bring suit. To 
demonstrate standing and thus invoke federal 
jurisdiction, a party must establish that "(1) it 
has suffered an injury in fact, (2) the injury is 
fairly traceable to the defendants' actions, and 
(3) it is likely, and not merely speculative, 
that the injury will be redressed by a 
favorable decision." The parties' core dispute 
is whether Plaintiffs have suffered a 
cognizable injury. To establish a cognizable 
injury, "a plaintiff must show that he or she 
suffered 'an invasion of a legally protected 
interest' that is 'concrete and particularized' 
and 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.'" 
In evaluating standing, "the court must be 
careful not to decide the question on the 
merits for or against the plaintiff, and must 
therefore assume that on the  merits the 
plaintiffs would be successful in their 
claims." This means, for purposes of 
standing, we must assume that Section 2(c) 
violates the First Amendment's prohibition 
against governmental "establishment of 
religion."  
"Standing in Establishment Clause cases may 
be shown in various ways," though as oft-
repeated, "the concept of injury for standing 
purposes is particularly elusive" in this 
context. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
and this Circuit have developed a set of rules 
that guide our review.  
To establish standing for an Establishment 
Clause claim, a plaintiff must have "personal 
contact with the alleged establishment of 
religion." A "mere abstract objection to 
unconstitutional conduct is not sufficient to 
confer standing." The Supreme Court has 
reinforced this principle in recent years: 
"plaintiffs may demonstrate standing based 
on the direct harm of what is claimed to be an 
establishment of religion." This "direct harm" 
can resemble injuries in other 
contexts. Merchants who suffered economic 
injury, for instance, had standing to challenge 
Sunday closing laws as violative of 
the Establishment Clause.  But 
because Establishment Clause violations 
seldom lead to "physical injury or pecuniary 
loss," the standing inquiry has been adapted 
to also include "the kind of 
injuries Establishment Clause plaintiffs" are 
more "likely to suffer." As such, 
"noneconomic or intangible injury may 
suffice to make an Establishment 
Clause claim justiciable." "Feelings of 
marginalization and exclusion are cognizable 
forms of injury," we recently explained, 
"particularly in the Establishment 
Clause context, because one of the core 
objectives of modern Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence has been to prevent the 
State from sending a message to non-
adherents of a particular religion 'that they 
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are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community.'" 
Doe #1—who is a lawful permanent resident 
of the United States, Muslim, and originally 
from Iran—filed a visa application on behalf 
of his wife, an Iranian national. Her 
application has been approved, and she is 
currently awaiting her consular interview. If 
it took effect, EO-2 would bar the entry of 
Doe #1's wife. Doe #1 explains that because 
EO-2 bars his wife's entry, it "forces [him] to 
choose between [his] career and being with 
[his] wife," and he is unsure "whether to keep 
working here" as a scientist or to return to 
Iran. Doe #1 adds that EO-2 has "created 
significant fear, anxiety, and insecurity" for 
him and his wife. He highlights the 
"statements that have been made about 
banning Muslims from entering, and the 
broader context," and states, "I worry that I 
may not be safe in this country." J.A. 306; see 
also J.A. 314 (Plaintiff Meteab describing 
how the "anti-Muslim sentiment motivating" 
EO-2 has led him to feel "isolated and 
disparaged in [his] community").  
Doe #1 has therefore asserted two distinct 
injuries stemming from his "personal 
contact" with the alleged establishment of 
religion—EO-2. First, EO-2 will bar his 
wife's entry into the United States and 
prolong their separation. And second, EO-2 
sends a state-sanctioned message 
condemning his religion and causing him to 
feel excluded and marginalized in his 
community.  
We begin with Doe #1's allegation that EO-2 
will prolong his separation from his wife. 
This Court has found that standing can be 
premised on a "threatened rather than actual 
injury," as long as this "threat of injury [is] 
both real and immediate.” The purpose of the 
longstanding "imminence" requirement, 
which is admittedly "a somewhat elastic 
concept," is "to ensure that the alleged injury 
is not too speculative for Article III 
purposes—that the injury is 
'certainly impending.'" 
The Government does not contest that, in 
some circumstances, the prolonged 
separation of family members can constitute 
an injury-in-fact. The Government instead 
argues that Doe #1's claimed injury is 
speculative and non-imminent, Appellants' 
Br. 19, such that it is not "legally and 
judicially cognizable." According to the 
Government, Doe #1 has failed to show that 
his threatened injury—prolonged separation 
from his wife—is imminent. It asserts that 
Doe #1 has offered no reason to believe that 
Section 2(c)'s "short pause" on entry "will 
delay the issuance of [his wife's] visa."  
But this ignores that Section 2(c) appears to 
operate by design to delay the issuance of 
visas to foreign nationals. Section 2(c)'s 
"short pause" on entry effectively halts the 
issuance of visas for ninety days—as the 
Government acknowledges, it "would be 
pointless to issue a visa to an alien who the 
consular officer already knows is barred from 
entering the country." The Government also 
cites 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g), which provides in 
relevant part that "[n]o visa or other 
documentation shall be issued to an alien if [] 
it appears to the consular officer . . . that such 
alien is ineligible to receive a visa or other 
documentation under section 1182 of this 
title." A ninety-day pause on issuing visas 
would seem to necessarily inject at least some 
delay into any pending application's timeline. 
And in fact, the Government suggests that 
pending visa applications might not be 
delayed, but denied. A denial on 
such grounds would mean that once the entry 
suspension period concludes, an alien would 
have to restart from the beginning the lengthy 
visa application process. What is more, 
Section 2(c) is designed to "reduce 
investigative burdens on relevant agencies" 
to facilitate worldwide review of the current 
procedures for "screening and vetting of 
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foreign nationals." Logically, dedicating time 
and resources to a global review process will 
further slow the adjudication of pending 
applications.  
Here, Doe #1 has a pending visa application 
on behalf of his wife, seeking her admission 
to the United States from one of the 
Designated Countries. Prior to EO-2's 
issuance, Doe #1 and his wife were nearing 
the end of the lengthy immigrant visa 
process, as they were waiting for her consular 
interview to be scheduled. J.A. 305. They had 
already submitted a petition, received 
approval of that petition, begun National Visa 
Center ("NVC") Processing, submitted the 
visa application form, collected and 
submitted the requisite financial and 
supporting documentation to NVC, and paid 
the appropriate fees. If Section 2(c) were in 
force—restricting the issuance of visas to 
nationals in the Designated Countries for 
ninety days and initiating the worldwide 
review of existing visa standards—we find a 
"real and immediate" threat that it would 
prolong Doe #1's separation from his wife, 
either by delaying the issuance of her visa or 
denying her visa and forcing her to restart the 
application process.  
This prolonged family separation is not, as 
the Government asserts, a remote or 
speculative possibility. Unlike threatened 
injuries that rest on hypothetical actions a 
plaintiff may take "some day," or on a "highly 
attenuated chain of possibilities," the 
threatened injury here is imminent, 
sufficiently "real" and concrete, and would 
harm Doe #1 in a personal and 
"particularized" way. The progression of Doe 
#3's wife's visa application illustrates this. 
Doe #3's wife received a visa on May 1, 2017, 
while Section 2(c) was enjoined. If Section 
2(c) had been in effect, she would have been 
ineligible to receive a visa until after the 
expiration of the ninety-day period. Put 
simply, Section 2(c) would have delayed the 
issuance of Doe #3's wife's visa. This cuts 
directly against the Government's assertion 
that it is uncertain whether or how Section 
2(c) would affect visa applicants. Clearly 
Section 2(c) will delay and disrupt pending 
visa applications.  
Even more, flowing from EO-2 is the alleged 
state-sanctioned message that foreign-born 
Muslims, a group to which Doe #1 belongs, 
are "outsiders, not full members of the 
political community." Doe #1 explains how 
the Second Executive Order  has caused him 
to fear for his personal safety in this country 
and wonder whether he should give up his 
career in the United States and return to Iran 
to be with his wife. This harm is consistent 
with the "[f]eelings of marginalization and 
exclusion" injury we recognized in Moss.  
In light of these two injuries, we find that Doe 
#1 has had "personal contact with the alleged 
establishment of religion." Regardless of 
whether EO-2 actually violates 
the Establishment Clause's command not to 
disfavor a particular religion, a merits inquiry 
explored in Section IV.A, his injuries are on 
par with, if not greater than, injuries we 
previously deemed sufficient in this context.  
The Government attempts to undercut these 
injuries in several ways. It first frames 
Plaintiffs' injuries as "stress." That minimizes 
the psychological harm that flows from 
confronting official action preferring or 
disfavoring a particular religion and, in any 
event, does not account for the impact on 
families. The Government next argues that 
because the Second Executive Order 
"directly applies only to aliens abroad from 
the specified countries," it is "not directly 
targeted at plaintiffs," who are based in the 
United States, "in the way that local- or state-
government messages are." An executive 
order is of course different than a local 
Sunday closing law or a Ten Commandments 
display in a state courthouse, but that does not 
mean its impact is any less direct. Indeed, 
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because it emanates from the highest elected 
office in the nation, its impact is arguably felt 
even more directly by the individuals it 
affects. From Doe #1's perspective, the 
Second Executive Order does not apply to 
arbitrary or anonymous "aliens abroad." It 
applies to his wife.  
More than abstractly disagreeing with the 
wisdom or legality of the President's policy 
decision, Plaintiffs show how EO-2 impacted 
(and continues to impact) them personally. 
Doe #1 is not simply "roam[ing] the country 
in search of governmental wrongdoing." 
Rather, he is feeling the direct, painful effects 
of the Second Executive Order—both its 
alleged message of religious 
condemnation and the prolonged separation 
it causes between him and his wife—in his 
everyday life. This case thus bears little 
resemblance to Valley Forge.  
 We likewise reject the Government's 
suggestion that Plaintiffs are seeking to 
vindicate the legal rights of third parties. The 
prudential standing doctrine includes a 
"general prohibition on a litigant's raising 
another person's legal rights." This "general 
prohibition" is not implicated here, however, 
as Doe #1 has shown that he himself suffered 
injuries as a result of the challenged Order. 
For all of these reasons, we find that Doe #1 
has met his burden to establish an Article III 
injury. We further find that Doe #1 has made 
the requisite showing that his claimed 
injuries are causally related to the challenged 
conduct—the Second 
Executive Orderas opposed to "the 
independent action of some third party not 
before the court." Enjoining enforcement of 
Section 2(c) therefore will likely redress 
those injuries. Doe #1 has thus met 
the constitutional standing requirements with 
respect to the Establishment Clause claim. 
And because we find that at least one Plaintiff 
possesses standing, we need not decide 
whether the other individual Plaintiffs or the 
organizational Plaintiffs have standing with 
respect to this claim. 
Lastly, the Government asserts that 
Plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim is 
unripe. It argues that under EO-2, Plaintiffs' 
relatives can apply for a waiver, and unless 
and until those waiver requests are denied, 
Plaintiffs' claims are dependent on future 
uncertainties. When evaluating ripeness, we 
consider "(1) the fitness of the issues for 
judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the 
parties of withholding court consideration." 
An action is fit for resolution "when the 
issues are purely legal and when the action in 
controversy is final and not dependent on 
future uncertainties." The "hardship prong is 
measured by the immediacy of the threat and 
the burden imposed on the [plaintiff]." 
Our ripeness doctrine is clearly not 
implicated here. Plaintiffs have brought a 
facial challenge, alleging that EO-2 violates 
the Establishment Clause regardless of 
whether their relatives secure waivers. This 
legal question is squarely presented for our 
review and is not dependent on the factual 
uncertainties of the waiver process. What is 
more, Plaintiffs will suffer undue hardship, as 
explained above, were we to require their 
family members to attempt to secure a waiver 
before permitting Plaintiffs to challenge 
Section 2(c). We accordingly find the claim 
ripe for judicial decision.  
B.  
In one final justiciability challenge, the 
Government asserts that 
consular nonreviewability bars any review of 
Plaintiffs' claim. This Court has scarcely 
discussed the doctrine, so the Government 
turns to the District of Columbia Circuit, 
which has stated that "a consular official's 
decision to issue or withhold a visa is not 
subject to judicial review, at least unless 
Congress says otherwise."  But in the same 
opinion, the court explained that judicial 
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review was proper in cases involving "claims 
by United States citizens rather than by aliens 
. . . and statutory claims that are accompanied 
by constitutional ones."  This is precisely 
such a case. More fundamentally, the 
doctrine of consular nonreviewability does 
not bar judicial review of constitutional 
claims. The Government's reliance on the 
doctrine is therefore misplaced.  
Behind the casual assertion of 
consular nonreviewability lies a dangerous 
idea—that this Court lacks the authority to 
review high-level government policy of the 
sort here. Although the Supreme Court has 
certainly encouraged deference in our review 
of immigration matters that implicate 
national security interests, see infra Section 
IV.A, it has not countenanced judicial 
abdication, especially where constitutional 
rights, values, and principles are at stake. To 
the contrary, the Supreme Court has affirmed 
time and again that "it is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is." This "duty will 
sometimes involve the 'resolution of 
litigation challenging the constitutional 
authority of one of the three branches,' but 
courts cannot avoid their responsibility."  In 
light of this duty, and having determined that 
the  present case is justiciable, we now 
proceed to consider whether the district court 
properly enjoined Section 2(c) of the Second 
Executive Order.  
IV.  
A preliminary injunction is an 
"extraordinary remed[y] involving the 
exercise of very far-reaching power" and is 
"to be granted only sparingly and in limited 
circumstances."  For a district court to grant a 
preliminary injunction, "a plaintiff 'must 
establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the 
merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of 
preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of 
equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an 
injunction is in the public interest.'" The 
district court found that Plaintiffs satisfied all 
four requirements as to their Establishment 
Clause claim, and it enjoined Section 2(c) of 
EO-2. We evaluate the court's findings for 
abuse of discretion, reviewing its factual 
findings for clear error and its legal 
conclusions de novo.  
A.  
The district court determined that Plaintiffs 
are likely to succeed on the merits of their 
claim that EO-2 violates the Establishment 
Clause. It found that because EO-2 is 
"facially neutral in terms of religion," the test 
outlined in Lemon v. Kurtzman, governs the 
constitutional inquiry. And applying 
the Lemon test, the court found that EO-2 
likely violates the Establishment Clause. The 
Government argues that the court 
erroneously applied the Lemon test instead of 
the more deferential test set forth 
in Kleindienst v. Mandel. And under Mandel, 
the Government contends, Plaintiffs' claim 
fails.   
  
1.  
We begin by addressing the Government's 
argument that the district court applied the 
wrong test in evaluating Plaintiffs' 
constitutional claim. The Government 
contends that Mandel sets forth the 
appropriate test because it recognizes the 
limited scope of judicial review of executive 
action in the immigration context. We agree 
that Mandel is the starting point for our 
analysis, but for the reasons that follow, we 
find that its test contemplates the application 
of settled Establishment Clause doctrine in 
this case.  
In Mandel, American university professors 
had invited Mandel, a Belgian citizen and 
revolutionary Marxist and professional 
journalist, to speak at a number of 
conferences in the United States.  But 
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Mandel's application for a nonimmigrant visa 
was denied under a then-existing INA 
provision that barred the entry of aliens "who 
advocate the economic, international, and 
governmental doctrines of world 
communism." The Attorney General had 
discretion to waive § 1182(a)(28)(D)'s bar 
and grant Mandel an individual exception, 
but declined to do so on the grounds that 
Mandel had violated the terms of his visas 
during prior visits  to the United States. The 
American professors sued, alleging, among 
other things, that the denial of Mandel's visa 
violated their First Amendment rights to 
"hear his views and engage him in a free and 
open academic exchange."  
The Supreme Court, citing "Congress' 
'plenary power to make rules for the 
admission of aliens and to exclude those who 
possess those characteristics which Congress 
has forbidden,'" found that the longstanding 
principle of deference to the political 
branches in the immigration context limited 
its review of plaintiffs' challenge. The Court 
held that "when the Executive exercises this 
power [to exclude an alien] on the basis of a 
facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the 
courts will neither look behind the exercise of 
that discretion, nor test it by balancing its 
justification against the [plaintiffs'] First 
Amendment interests." The Court concluded 
that the Attorney General's stated reason for 
denying Mandel's visa—that he had violated 
the terms of prior visas—satisfied this test. It 
therefore did not review plaintiffs' First 
Amendment claim.  
Courts have continuously applied Mandel's 
"facially legitimate and bona fide" test to 
challenges to individual visa denials. 
Subsequently, in Fiallo v. Bell, the Supreme 
Court applied Mandel's test to a facial 
challenge to an immigration law, finding "no 
reason to review the broad congressional 
policy choice at issue here under a more 
exacting standard than was applied 
in Kleindienst v. Mandel, a First 
Amendment case." And in a case where 
plaintiffs brought a constitutional challenge 
to an immigration law, this Court has found 
that "we must apply the same standard as 
the Fiallo court and uphold the statute if a 
'facially legitimate and bona fide reason' 
supports [it]." Mandel is therefore the 
starting point for our review.  
 But in another more recent line of cases, the 
Supreme Court has made clear that despite 
the political branches' plenary power over 
immigration, that power is still "subject to 
important constitutional limitations," and that 
it is the judiciary's responsibility to uphold 
those limitations. These cases instruct that the 
political branches' power over immigration is 
not tantamount to a constitutional blank 
check, and that vigorous judicial review is 
required when an immigration action's 
constitutionality is in question.  
We are bound to give effect to both lines of 
cases, meaning that we must enforce 
constitutional limitations on immigration 
actions while also applying Mandel's 
deferential test to those actions as the 
Supreme Court has instructed. For the 
reasons that follow, however, we find that 
these tasks are not mutually exclusive, and 
that Mandel's test still contemplates 
meaningful judicial review of constitutional 
challenges in certain, narrow circumstances, 
as we have here.  
To begin, Mandel's test undoubtedly imposes 
a heavy burden on plaintiffs, consistent with 
the significant deference we afford the 
political branches in the immigration context. 
The government need only show that the 
challenged action is "facially legitimate and 
bona fide" to defeat a constitutional 
challenge. These are separate and quite 
distinct requirements. To be "facially 
legitimate," there must be a valid reason for 
the challenged action stated on the face of the 
action. 
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And as the name suggests, the "bona fide" 
requirement concerns whether the 
government issued the challenged action in 
good faith. In Kerry v. Din, Justice Kennedy, 
joined by Justice Alito, elaborated on this 
requirement. Here, the burden is on the 
plaintiff. Justice Kennedy explained that 
where a plaintiff makes "an affirmative 
showing of bad faith" that is "plausibly 
alleged with sufficient particularity," courts 
may "look behind" the challenged action to 
assess its  "facially legitimate" justification. 
In the typical case, it will be difficult for a 
plaintiff to make an affirmative showing of 
bad faith with plausibility and 
particularity. And absent this affirmative 
showing, courts must defer to the 
government's "facially legitimate" reason for 
the action.  
Mandel therefore clearly sets a high bar for 
plaintiffs seeking judicial review of a 
constitutional challenge to an immigration 
action. But although Mandel's "facially 
legitimate and bona fide" test affords 
significant deference to the political 
branches' decisions in this area, it does not 
completely insulate those decisions 
from any meaningful review. Where 
plaintiffs have seriously called into question 
whether the stated reason for the challenged 
action was provided in good faith, we 
understand Mandel, as construed by Justice 
Kennedy in his controlling concurrence 
in Din, to require that we step away from our 
deferential posture and look behind the stated 
reason for the challenged action. In other 
words, Mandel's requirement that an 
immigration action be "bona fide" may in 
some instances compel more searching 
judicial review. Plaintiffs ask this Court to 
engage in such searching review here under 
the traditional Establishment Clause test, and 
we therefore turn to consider whether such a 
test is warranted.  
We start with Mandel's requirement that the 
challenged government action be "facially 
legitimate." EO-2's stated purpose is "to 
protect the Nation from terrorist activities by 
foreign nationals admitted to the United 
States." EO-2, Preamble. We find that this 
stated national security interest is, on its face, 
a valid reason for Section 2(c)'s suspension of 
entry. EO-2 therefore satisfies Mandel's first 
requirement. Absent allegations of bad faith, 
our analysis would end here in favor of the 
Government. But in this case, Plaintiffs have 
alleged that EO-2's stated purpose was given 
in bad faith. We therefore must consider 
whether they have made the requisite 
showing of bad faith.  
As noted, Plaintiffs must "plausibly allege[] 
with sufficient particularity" that the reason 
for the government action was provided in 
bad faith. Plaintiffs here claim that EO-2 
invokes national security in bad faith, as a 
pretext for what really is an anti-Muslim 
religious purpose. Plaintiffs point to ample 
evidence that national security is not the true 
reason for EO-2, including, among other 
things, then-candidate Trump's numerous 
campaign statements expressing animus 
towards the Islamic faith; his proposal to ban 
Muslims from entering the United States; his 
subsequent explanation that he would 
effectuate this ban by targeting "territories" 
instead of Muslims directly; the issuance of 
EO-1, which targeted certain majority-
Muslim nations and included a preference for 
religious minorities; an advisor's statement 
that the President had asked him to find a way 
to ban Muslims in a legal way; and the 
issuance of EO-2, which resembles EO-1 and 
which President Trump and his advisors 
described as having the same policy goals as 
EO-1. Plaintiffs also point to the 
comparably weak evidence that EO-2 is 
meant to address national security interests, 
including the exclusion of national security 
agencies from the decisionmaking process, 
the post hoc nature of the national security 
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rationale, and evidence from DHS that EO-2 
would not operate to diminish the threat of 
potential terrorist activity.  
Based on this evidence, we find that Plaintiffs 
have more than plausibly alleged that EO-2's 
stated national security interest was provided 
in bad faith, as a pretext for its religious 
purpose. And having concluded that the 
"facially legitimate" reason proffered by the 
government is not "bona fide," we no longer 
defer to that reason and instead may "look 
behind" EO-2. 
Since Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Din, 
no court has confronted a scenario where, as 
here, plaintiffs have plausibly alleged with 
particularity that an immigration action was 
taken in bad faith. We therefore have minimal 
guidance on what "look[ing] behind" a 
challenged immigration action entails. See 
id. In addressing this issue of first impression, 
the Government does not propose a 
framework for this inquiry. Rather, the 
Government summarily asserts that because 
EO-2 states that it is motivated by national 
security interests, it therefore 
satisfies Mandel's test. But this only responds 
to Mandel's "facially legitimate" 
requirement—it reads out Mandel's "bona 
fide" test altogether. Plaintiffs, for their part, 
suggest that we review their claim using our 
normal constitutional tools. And in 
the Establishment Clause context, our 
normal constitutional tool for reviewing 
facially neutral government actions is the test 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman.  
We find for several reasons that because 
Plaintiffs have made an affirmative showing 
of bad faith, applying the Lemon test to 
analyze EO-2's constitutionality is 
appropriate. First, as detailed above, the 
Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that 
the political branches' immigration actions 
are still "subject to important constitutional 
limitations." The constitutional limitation in 
this case is the Establishment Clause, and this 
Court's duty to uphold the Constitution even 
in the context of a presidential immigration 
action counsels in favor of applying our 
standard constitutional tool. Second, that 
Plaintiffs have satisfied Mandel's heavy 
burden to plausibly show that the reason for 
the challenged action was proffered in bad 
faith further supports the application of our 
established constitutional doctrine. The 
deferential framework set forth in Mandel is 
based in part on general respect for the 
political branches' power in the immigration 
realm. Once plaintiffs credibly call into 
question the political branches' motives for 
exercising that power, our reason for 
deferring is severely undermined. In the rare 
case where plaintiffs plausibly allege bad 
faith with particularity, more meaningful 
review—in the form of constitutional 
scrutiny—is proper. And third, in the context 
of this case, there is an obvious symmetry 
between Mandel's "bona fide" prong and the 
constitutional inquiry established in Lemon. 
Both tests ask courts to evaluate the 
government's purpose for acting.  
Because Plaintiffs have made a substantial 
and affirmative showing that the 
government's national security purpose was 
proffered in bad faith, we find it appropriate 
to apply our longstanding Establishment 
Clause doctrine. Applying this doctrine 
harmonizes our duty to engage in the 
substantial deference required by Mandel and 
its progeny with our responsibility to ensure 
that the political branches choose 
constitutionally permissible means of 
exercising their immigration power. We 
therefore proceed to "look behind" EO-2 
using the framework developed in Lemon to 
determine if EO-2 was motivated by a 
primarily religious purpose, rather than its 
stated reason of promoting national security.  
2.  
To prevail under the Lemon test, the 
Government must show that the challenged 
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action (1) "ha[s] a secular legislative 
purpose," (2) that "its principal or primary 
effect [is] one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion," and (3) that it does "not 
foster 'an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.'" The 
Government must satisfy all three prongs 
of Lemon to defeat an Establishment 
Clause challenge. The dispute here centers 
on Lemon's first prong.  
In the Establishment Clause context, 
"purpose matters." Under the Lemon test's 
first prong, the Government must show that 
the challenged action "ha[s] a secular 
legislative purpose." Accordingly, the 
Government must show that the challenged 
action has a secular purpose that is "genuine, 
not a sham, and not merely secondary to a 
religious objective."  The government cannot 
meet this requirement by 
identifying any secular purpose for the 
challenged action.  Rather, the government 
must show that the challenged 
action's primary purpose is secular.  
When a court considers whether a challenged 
government action's primary purpose is 
secular, it attempts to discern the "official 
objective . . . from readily discoverable fact, 
without any judicial psychoanalysis of a 
drafter's heart of hearts."  The court acts as a 
reasonable, "objective observer," taking into 
account "the traditional external signs that 
show up in the 'text, legislative history, and 
implementation of the statute,' or comparable 
official act." It also considers the action's 
"historical context" and "the specific 
sequence of events leading to [its] 
passage." And as a reasonable observer, a 
court has a "reasonable memor[y]," and it 
cannot "'turn a blind eye to the context in 
which [the action] arose.'"  
 The evidence in the record, viewed from the 
standpoint of the reasonable observer, creates 
a compelling case that EO-2's primary 
purpose is religious. Then-candidate Trump's 
campaign statements reveal that on numerous 
occasions, he expressed anti-Muslim 
sentiment, as well as his intent, if elected, to 
ban Muslims from the United States. For 
instance, on December 7, 2015, Trump 
posted on his campaign website a "Statement 
on Preventing Muslim Immigration," in 
which he "call[ed] for a total and complete 
shutdown of Muslims entering the United 
States until our representatives can figure out 
what is going on" and remarked, "[I]t is 
obvious to anybody that the hatred is beyond 
comprehension. . . . [O]ur country cannot be 
the victims of horrendous attacks by people 
that believe only in Jihad, and have no sense 
of reason or respect for human life." In a 
March 9, 2016 interview, Trump stated that 
"Islam hates us," and that "[w]e can't allow 
people coming into this country who have 
this hatred.” Less than two weeks later, in a 
March 22 interview, Trump again called for 
excluding Muslims, because "we're having 
problems with the Muslims, and we're having 
problems with Muslims coming into the 
country." And on December 21, 2016, when 
asked whether recent attacks in Europe 
affected his proposed Muslim ban, President-
Elect Trump replied, "You know my plans. 
All along, I've proven to be right. 100% 
correct."  
As a candidate, Trump also suggested that he 
would attempt to circumvent scrutiny of the 
Muslim ban by formulating it in terms of 
nationality, rather than religion. On July 17, 
2016, in response to a tweet stating, "Calls to 
ban Muslims from entering the U.S. are 
offensive and unconstitutional," Trump said, 
"So you call it territories. OK? 
We're gonna do territories." One week later, 
Trump asserted that entry should be 
"immediately suspended[ed] . . . from any 
nation that has been compromised by 
terrorism." When asked whether this meant 
he was "roll[ing ]back" his call for a Muslim 
ban, he said his plan was an "expansion" and 
explained that "[p]eople were so upset when 
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I used the word Muslim," so he was instead 
"talking territory instead of Muslim."  
Significantly, the First Executive Order 
appeared to take this exact form, barring 
citizens of seven predominantly Muslim 
countries from entering the United States. 
And just before President Trump signed EO-
1 on January 27, 2017, he stated, "This is the 
'Protection of the Nation from Foreign 
Terrorist Entry into the United States.' We all 
know what that means." The next day, 
presidential advisor and former New York 
City Mayor Giuliani appeared on Fox News 
and asserted that "when [Trump] first 
announced it, he said, 'Muslim ban.' He called 
me up. He said, 'Put a commission together. 
Show me the right way to do it legally.'"  
Shortly after courts enjoined the First 
Executive Order, President Trump issued 
EO-2, which the President and members of 
his team characterized as being substantially 
similar to EO-1. EO-2 has the same name and 
basic structure as EO-1, but it does not 
include a preference for religious-minority 
refugees and excludes Iraq from its list of 
Designated Countries. EO-2, § 1(e). It also 
exempts certain categories of nationals from 
the Designated Countries and institutes a 
waiver process for qualifying individuals. 
EO-2, § 3(b), (c). Senior Policy Advisor 
Miller described the changes to EO-2 as 
"mostly minor technical differences," and 
said that there would be "the same basic 
policy outcomes for the country." White 
House Press Secretary Spicer stated 
that "[t]he principles of the [second] 
executive order remain the same." And 
President Trump, in a speech at a rally, 
described EO-2 as "a watered down version 
of the first order." These statements suggest 
that like EO-1, EO-2's purpose is to 
effectuate the promised Muslim ban, and that 
its changes from EO-1 reflect an effort to help 
it survive judicial scrutiny, rather than to 
avoid targeting Muslims for exclusion from 
the United States.  
These statements, taken together, provide 
direct, specific evidence of what motivated 
both EO-1 and EO-2: President Trump's 
desire to exclude Muslims from the United 
States. The statements also reveal President 
Trump's intended means of effectuating the 
ban: by targeting majority-Muslim nations 
instead of Muslims explicitly. And after 
courts enjoined EO-1, the statements show 
how President Trump attempted to preserve 
its core mission: by issuing EO-2a "watered 
down" version with "the same basic policy 
outcomes." These statements are the exact 
type of "readily discoverable fact[s]" that we 
use in determining a government action's 
primary purpose.  They are explicit 
statements of purpose and are attributable 
either to President Trump directly or to his 
advisors. We need not probe anyone's heart 
of hearts to discover the purpose of EO-2, for 
President Trump and his aides have 
explained it on numerous occasions and in no 
uncertain terms.  EO-2 cannot be read in 
isolation from the statements of planning and 
purpose that accompanied it, particularly in 
light of the sheer number of statements, their 
nearly singular source, and the close 
connection they draw between the proposed 
Muslim ban and EO-2 itself.   The reasonable 
observer could easily connect these 
statements to EO-2 and understand that its 
primary purpose appears to be religious, 
rather than secular.  
The Government argues, without 
meaningfully addressing Plaintiffs' proffered 
evidence, that EO-2's primary purpose is in 
fact secular because it is facially neutral and 
operates to address the risks of potential 
terrorism without targeting any particular 
religious group. That EO-2's stated objective 
is religiously neutral is not dispositive; the 
entire premise of our review under Lemon is 
that even facially neutral government actions 
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can violate the Establishment Clause.  We 
therefore reject the Government's suggestion 
that EO-2's facial neutrality might somehow 
fully answer the question of EO-2's primary 
purpose.  
The Government's argument that EO-2's 
primary purpose is related to national 
security, is belied by evidence in the record 
that President Trump issued the First 
Executive Order without consulting the 
relevant national security agencies, and that 
those agencies only offered a national 
security rationale after EO-1 was enjoined. 
Furthermore, internal reports from DHS 
contradict this national security rationale, 
with one report stating that "most foreign-
born, US-based violent extremists likely 
radicalized several years after their entry to 
the United States, limiting the ability of 
screening and vetting officials to prevent 
their entry because of national security 
concerns."  According to former National 
Security Officials, Section 2(c) serves "no 
legitimate national security purpose," given 
that "not a single American has died in a 
terrorist attack on U.S. soil at the hands of 
citizens of these six nations in the last forty 
years" and that there is no evidence of any 
new security risks emanating from these 
countries. Like the district court, we think 
this strong evidence that any national security 
justification for EO-2 was secondary to its 
primary religious purpose and was offered as 
more of a "litigating position" than as the 
actual purpose of EO-2.  And EO-2's text 
does little to bolster any national security 
rationale: the only examples it provides of 
immigrants born abroad and convicted of 
terrorism-related crimes in the United States 
include two Iraqis—Iraq is not a designated 
country in EO-2—and a Somalian refugee 
who entered the United States as a child and 
was radicalized here as an adult. EO-2, § 
1(h). The Government's asserted national 
security purpose is therefore no more 
convincing as applied to EO-2 than it was to 
EO-1.  
Relatedly, the Government argues that EO-
2's operation "confirms its stated purpose." 
"[I]t applies to six countries based on risk, not 
religion; and in those six countries, the 
suspension applies irrespective of any alien's 
religion." In support of its argument that EO-
2 does not single out Muslims, the 
Government notes that these six countries are 
either places where ISIS has a heavy presence 
(Syria), state sponsors of terrorism (Iran, 
Sudan, and Syria), or safe havens for 
terrorists (Libya, Somalia, and Yemen). The 
Government also points out that the six 
Designated Countries represent only a small 
proportion of the world's majority-Muslim 
nations, and EO-2 applies to everyone in 
those countries, even non-Muslims. This 
shows, the Government argues, that EO-2's 
primary purpose is secular. The trouble with 
this argument is that EO-2's practical 
operation is not severable from the myriad 
statements explaining its operation as 
intended to bar Muslims from the United 
States. And that EO-2 is underinclusive by 
targeting only a small percentage of the 
world's majority-Muslim nations 
and overinclusive for targeting all citizens, 
even non-Muslims, in the Designated 
Countries, is not responsive to the purpose 
inquiry. This evidence might be relevant to 
our analysis under Lemon's second prong, 
which asks whether a government act has the 
primary effect of endorsing or disapproving 
of religion, but it does not answer whether the 
government acted with a primarily religious 
purpose to begin with. If we limited our 
purpose inquiry to review of the operation of 
a facially neutral order, we would be caught 
in an analytical loop, where the order would 
always survive scrutiny. It is for this precise 
reason that when we attempt to discern 
purpose, we look to more than just the 
challenged action itself. And here, when we 
consider the full context of EO-2, it is evident 
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that it is likely motivated primarily by 
religion. We do not discount that there may 
be a national security concern 
motivating EO-2; we merely find it likely that 
any such purpose is secondary to EO-2's 
religious purpose.  
The Government separately contends that our 
purpose inquiry should not extend to 
"extrinsic evidence" that is beyond EO-2's 
relevant context. The Government first 
argues that we should not look beyond EO-
2's "text and operation." But this is clearly 
incorrect, as the Supreme Court has explicitly 
stated that we review more than just the face 
of a challenged action.  
The Government next argues that even if we 
do look beyond EO-2 itself, under McCreary, 
we are limited to considering only "the 
operative terms of governmental action and 
official pronouncements," Appellants' Br. 46, 
which we understand to mean only EO-2 
itself and a letter signed by the Attorney 
General and the Secretary of State that 
largely echoes EO-2's text. We find no 
support for this view 
in McCreary. The McCreary Court 
considered "the traditional external signs that 
show up in the 'text, legislative history, and 
implementation of the [challenged 
action],'"but it did not limit other courts' 
review to those particular terms. Id. Nor did it 
make such an artificial distinction between 
"official" and "unofficial" context. Rather, it 
relied on principles of "common sense" and 
the "reasonable observer[']s . . . 
reasonable memor[y]" to cull the relevant 
context surrounding the challenged 
action. The Government would have us 
abandon this approach in favor of an 
unworkable standard that is contrary to the 
well-established framework for considering 
the context of a challenged government 
action.  
And finally, the Government argues that even 
if we could consider unofficial acts and 
statements, we should not rely on campaign 
statements. Those statements predate 
President Trump's constitutionally 
significant "transition from private life to the 
Nation's highest public office," and as such, 
they are less probative than official 
statements, the Government contends.  We 
recognize that in many cases, campaign 
statements may not reveal all that much about 
a government actor's purpose. But we decline 
to impose a bright-line rule against 
considering campaign statements, because as 
with any evidence, we must make an 
individualized determination as to a 
statement's relevancy and probative value in 
light of all the circumstances. The campaign 
statements here are probative of purpose 
because they are closely related in time, 
attributable to the primary decisionmaker, 
and specific and easily connected to the 
challenged action.  
Just as the reasonable observer's "world is not 
made brand new every morning," nor are we 
able to awake without the vivid memory of 
these statements. We cannot shut our eyes to 
such evidence when it stares us in the face, 
for "there's none so blind as they that won't 
see." If and when future courts are confronted 
with campaign or other statements proffered 
as evidence of governmental purpose, those 
courts must similarly determine, on a case-
by-case basis, whether such statements are 
probative evidence of governmental 
purpose. Our holding today neither limits nor 
expands their review. 
The Government argues that reviewing 
campaign statements here would encourage 
scrutiny of all religious statements ever made 
by elected officials, even remarks from 
before they assumed office. Appellants' Br. 
49-50. But our review creates no such 
sweeping implications, because as the 
Supreme Court has counseled, our purpose 
analysis "demands a sensitive inquiry into 
such circumstantial and direct evidence of 
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intent as may be available."  Just as a 
reasonable observer would not understand 
general statements of religious conviction to 
inform later government action, nor would 
we look to such statements as evidence of 
purpose. A person's particular religious 
beliefs, her college essay on religious 
freedom, a speech she gave on the Free 
Exercise Clause—rarely, if ever, will such 
evidence reveal anything about that person's 
actions once in office. For a past statement to 
be relevant to the government's purpose, 
there must be a substantial, specific 
connection between it and the challenged 
government action. And here, in this highly 
unique set of circumstances, there is a direct 
link between the President's numerous 
campaign statements  promising a Muslim 
ban that targets territories, the discrete action 
he took only one week into office executing 
that exact plan, and EO-2, the "watered 
down" version of that plan that "get[s] just 
about everything," and "in some ways, 
more."  
For similar reasons, we reject the 
Government's argument that our review of 
these campaign statements will "inevitably 
'chill political debate during campaigns.'" 
Not all—not even most—political debate will 
have any relevance to a challenged 
government action. Indeed, this case is 
unique not because we are considering 
campaign statements, but because we have 
such directly relevant and probative 
statements of government purpose at all. To 
the extent that our review chills campaign 
promises to condemn and exclude entire 
religious groups, we think that a welcome 
restraint.  
Lastly, the Government contends that we are 
ill-equipped to "attempt[] to assess what 
campaign statements reveal about the 
motivation for later action." The Government 
argues that to do so would "mire [us] in a 
swamp of unworkable litigation," and "forc[e 
us] to wrestle with intractable questions," 
such as "the level of generality at which a 
statement must be made, by whom, and how 
long after its utterance the statement remains 
probative." But discerning the motives 
behind a challenged government action is a 
well-established part of our purpose 
inquiry. As part of this inquiry, courts 
regularly evaluate decisionmakers' 
statements that show their purpose for acting. 
 And the purpose inquiry is not limited 
to Establishment Clause challenges; we 
conduct this analysis in a variety of 
contexts. We therefore see nothing 
"intractable" about evaluating a statement's 
probative value based on the identity of the 
speaker and how specifically the statement 
relates to the challenged government action, 
for this is surely a routine part of 
constitutional analysis. And this analysis is 
even more straightforward here, because we 
are not attempting to discern motive from 
many legislators' statements, as in Brown, but 
rather are looking primarily to one person's 
statements to discern that person's motive for 
taking a particular action once in office.  
The Government has repeatedly asked this 
Court to ignore evidence, circumscribe our 
own review, and blindly defer to executive 
action, all in the name of the Constitution's 
separation of powers. We decline to do so, 
not only because it is the particular province 
of the judicial branch to say what the law is, 
but also because we would do a disservice to 
our constitutional structure were we to let its 
mere invocation silence the call for 
meaningful judicial review. The deference 
we give the coordinate branches is surely 
powerful, but even it must yield in certain 
circumstances, lest we abdicate our own 
duties to uphold the Constitution.  
EO-2 cannot be divorced from the cohesive 
narrative linking it to the animus that inspired 
it. In light of this, we find that the reasonable 
observer would likely conclude that EO-2's 
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primary purpose is to exclude persons from 
the United States on the basis of their 
religious beliefs. We therefore find that EO-
2 likely fails Lemon's purpose prong in 
violation of the Establishment 
Clause. Accordingly, we hold that the district 
court did not err in concluding that Plaintiffs 
are likely to succeed on the merits of 
their Establishment Clause claim.  
B.  
Because we uphold the district court's 
conclusion that Plaintiffs are likely to 
succeed on the merits of their Establishment 
Clause claim, we next consider whether 
Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are 
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 
absence of a preliminary injunction. As we 
have previously recognized, "in the context 
of an alleged violation of First 
Amendment rights, a plaintiff's claimed 
irreparable harm is inseparably linked to the 
likelihood of success on the merits." 
Accordingly, our finding that Plaintiffs are 
likely to succeed on the merits of their 
constitutional claim counsels in favor of 
finding that in the absence of an injunction, 
they will suffer irreparable harm.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated in no 
uncertain terms that "loss of First 
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal 
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes 
irreparable injury."  Though the Elrod Court 
was addressing freedom of speech and 
association, our sister circuits have 
interpreted it to apply equally 
to Establishment Clause violations.  We 
agree with these courts that because of "the 
inchoate, one-way nature of Establishment 
Clause violations," they create the same type 
of immediate, irreparable injury as do other 
types of First Amendment violations. We 
therefore find that Plaintiffs are likely to 
suffer irreparable harm if Section 2(c) of EO-
2 takes effect.  
C.  
Even if Plaintiffs are likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of a 
preliminary injunction, we still must 
determine that the balance of the equities tips 
in their favor, "pay[ing] particular regard for 
the public consequences in employing the 
extraordinary remedy of injunction." This is 
because "courts of equity may go to greater 
lengths to give 'relief in furtherance of the 
public interest than they are accustomed to go 
when only private interests are involved.'" As 
the district court did, we consider the balance 
of the equities and the public interest factors 
together.  
The Government first contends that "the 
injunction causes [it] direct, irreparable 
injury" that outweighs the irreparable harm to 
Plaintiffs because "'no governmental interest 
is more compelling than the security of the 
Nation.'" When it comes to national security, 
the Government argues, the judicial branch 
"should not second-guess" the President's 
"'[p]redictive judgment[s].'" The 
Government further argues that the 
injunction causes institutional injury, because 
according to two single-Justice opinions, 
"[a]ny time a State is enjoined by a court 
from effectuating statutes enacted by 
representatives of its people, it suffers a form 
of irreparable injury." The Government 
contends that this principle applies here 
because the President "represents the people 
of all 50 states." 
At  the outset, we reject the notion that the 
President, because he or she represents the 
entire nation, suffers irreparable harm 
whenever an executive action is enjoined. 
This Court has held that the Government is 
"in no way harmed by issuance of a 
preliminary injunction which prevents [it] 
from enforcing restrictions likely to be found 
unconstitutional." "If anything," we said, "the 
system is improved by such an injunction." 
 Because Section 2(c) of EO-2 is likely 
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unconstitutional, allowing it to take effect 
would therefore inflict the greater 
institutional injury. And we are not persuaded 
that the general deference we afford the 
political branches ought to nevertheless tip 
the equities in the Government's favor, for 
even the President's actions are not above 
judicial scrutiny, and especially not where 
those actions are likely unconstitutional.  
We are likewise unmoved by the 
Government's rote invocation of harm to 
"national security interests" as the silver 
bullet that defeats all other asserted injuries. 
National security may be the most 
compelling of government interests, but this 
does not mean it will always tip the balance 
of the equities in favor of the government.  A 
claim of harm to national security must still 
outweigh the competing claim of injury. Here 
and elsewhere, the Government would have 
us end our inquiry without scrutinizing either 
Section 2(c)'s stated purpose or the 
Government's asserted interests, but 
"unconditional deference to a 
government agent's invocation of 
'emergency' . . . has a lamentable place in our 
history," and is incompatible with our duty to 
evaluate the evidence before us.  
As we previously determined, the 
Government's asserted national security 
interest in enforcing Section 2(c) appears to 
be a post hoc, secondary justification for an 
executive action rooted in religious animus 
and intended to bar Muslims from this 
country. We remain unconvinced that 
Section 2(c) has more to do with national 
security than it does with effectuating the 
President's promised Muslim ban. We do not 
discount that EO-2 may have some national 
security purpose, nor do we disclaim that the 
injunction may have some impact on the 
Government. But our inquiry, whether for 
determining Section 2(c)'s primary purpose 
or for weighing the harm to the parties, is one 
of balance, and on balance, we cannot say 
that the Government's asserted national 
security interest outweighs the competing 
harm to Plaintiffs of the likely Establishment 
Clause violation.  
For similar reasons, we find that the public 
interest counsels in favor of upholding the 
preliminary injunction. As this and other 
courts have recognized, upholding the 
Constitution undeniably promotes the public 
interest. These cases recognize that when we 
protect the constitutional rights of the few, it 
inures to the benefit of all. And even more so 
here, where the constitutional violation 
injures Plaintiffs and in the process 
permeates and ripples across entire religious 
groups, communities, and society at large.  
When the government chooses sides on 
religious issues, the "inevitable result" is 
"hatred, disrespect and even contempt" 
towards those who fall on the wrong side of 
the line. Improper government involvement 
with religion "tends to destroy government 
and to degrade religion," encourage 
persecution of religious minorities and 
nonbelievers, and foster hostility and division 
in our pluralistic society. The risk of these 
harms is particularly acute here, where from 
the highest elected office in the nation has 
come an Executive Order steeped in animus 
and directed at a single religious group. "The 
fullest realization of true religious liberty 
requires that government neither engage in 
nor compel religious practices, that it effect 
no favoritism among sects or between 
religion and nonreligion, and that it work 
deterrence of no religious belief." We 
therefore conclude that enjoining Section 
2(c) promotes the public interest of the 
highest order. And because Plaintiffs have 
satisfied all the requirements for securing a 
preliminary injunction, we find that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in 
enjoining Section 2(c) of EO-2.  
V.  
232 
  
Lastly, having concluded that Plaintiffs are 
entitled to a preliminary injunction, we 
address the scope of that injunction. The 
Government first argues that the district court 
erred by enjoining Section 2(c) nationwide, 
and that any injunctive relief should be 
limited solely to Plaintiffs.  
It is well-established that "district courts have 
broad discretion when fashioning injunctive 
relief." Nevertheless, "their powers are not 
boundless." The district court's choice of 
relief "should be carefully addressed to the 
circumstances of the case," and "should be no 
more burdensome to the defendant than 
necessary to provide complete relief to the 
plaintiffs.” Courts may issue nationwide 
injunctions consistent with these principles. 
The district court here found that a number of 
factors weighed in favor of a nationwide 
injunction, and we see no error. First, 
Plaintiffs are dispersed throughout the United 
States. Second, nationwide injunctions are 
especially appropriate in the immigration 
context, as Congress has made clear that "the 
immigration laws of the United States should 
be enforced vigorously and uniformly."  And 
third, because Section 2(c) likely violates 
the Establishment Clause, enjoining it only as 
to Plaintiffs would not cure the constitutional 
deficiency, which would endure in all Section 
2(c)'s applications. Its continued enforcement 
against similarly situated individuals would 
only serve to reinforce the "message" that 
Plaintiffs "are outsiders, not full members of 
the political community."  For these reasons, 
we find that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that a nationwide 
injunction was "necessary to provide 
complete relief."  
Finally, the Government argues that the 
district court erred by issuing the injunction 
against the President himself. We recognize 
that "in general, 'this court has no jurisdiction 
of a bill to enjoin the President in the 
performance of his official duties,'" and that 
a "grant of injunctive relief against the 
President himself is extraordinary, and 
should . . . raise[] judicial eyebrows.” In light 
of the Supreme Court's clear warning that 
such relief should be ordered only in the 
rarest of circumstances we find that the 
district court erred in issuing an injunction 
against the President himself. We therefore 
lift the injunction as to the President only. 
The court's preliminary injunction shall 
otherwise remain fully intact.  
To be clear, our conclusion does not "in any 
way suggest[] that Presidential action 
is unreviewable. Review of the legality of 
Presidential action can ordinarily be obtained 
in a suit seeking to enjoin the officers who 
attempt to enforce the President's directive." 
Even though the President is not "directly 
bound" by the injunction, we "assume it is 
substantially likely that the President . . 
.  would abide by an authoritative 
interpretation" of Section 2(c) of the Second 
Executive Order. 
VI.  
For all of these reasons, we affirm in part and 
vacate in part the preliminary injunction 
awarded by the district court. We also deny 
as moot Defendants' motion for a stay 
pending appeal.  
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART  
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“Supreme Court finds a compromise in reviving Trump's travel ban” 
 
The Los Angeles Times 
David G Savage, Laura King, Noah Bierman 
June 26, 2017 
 
The Supreme Court on Monday took a 
pragmatic approach to resolving the dispute 
over President Trump’s foreign travel ban 
with a middle-ground ruling that may defuse 
the controversy — for now. 
The decision, the first from the high court to 
review Trump’s exercise of presidential 
power, allowed much of the ban to take 
effect, but it also applied significant 
restrictions that will narrow the order’s 
impact. 
In a short, unsigned but unanimous opinion, 
the justices avoided taking a stance on the 
larger constitutional questions concerning 
religious discrimination or presidential 
authority. Instead, they agreed to hear those 
arguments in the fall. 
But they also largely rejected the lower court 
rulings that had blocked Trump’s order as 
unconstitutional, handing a partial victory to 
the president and his lawyers after a string of 
rebukes in federal courts from Hawaii to 
Maryland. 
The ruling clears the way for Trump’s 90-day 
ban on foreign arrivals from six Muslim-
majority countries to take effect, but it also 
carved out exemptions for those with “bona 
fide relationships” with Americans or U.S. 
entities, including spouses, other close family 
members, employers and universities. 
The justices also strongly hinted that they 
may never need to settle the larger 
constitutional issues because the case could 
be moot by the time they hear it in the fall. 
The administration argued it needed the 90-
day pause to review and revise its vetting 
procedures for travelers from Iran, Somalia, 
Sudan, Syria, Libya and Yemen. Assuming 
the order takes effect now, the ban will have 
expired by October when the court 
reconvenes. 
Trump had long voiced confidence he would 
prevail when the travel ban case reached the 
high court and on Monday he called the 
decision a “clear victory” for his 
administration. 
“Today’s ruling allows me to use an 
important tool for protecting our nation’s 
homeland,” the president said. 
The administration did not provide 
immediate specifics on how the decision 
would change existing policy, leaving 
attorneys at the Justice Department to review 
the court’s language before working with 
other federal agencies to draft temporary 
rules. 
Trump officials also acknowledged that their 
optimism may be subject to change, 
depending on how far the government’s 
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lawyers are willing to push the ruling and 
how lower courts interpret the high court’s 
language. 
That caution contrasted with the 
administration’s earlier handling of the issue, 
when Trump signed a hastily drafted travel 
ban just days after taking office. The result 
was a chaotic execution, with uncertainty at 
airports around the world over who would be 
allowed to enter the country. 
Immigrant rights lawyers who sued to block 
Trump’s order were disappointed with 
Monday’s ruling, but downplayed its impact. 
The order “will take effect in a very limited 
way,” said Karen Tumlin, legal director for 
the National Immigration Law Center in Los 
Angeles. The ban will apply “only to a small 
subset of people who lack any relationship” 
with a person in this country or an institution 
such as a school or a hospital. 
Some welcomed what they described as an 
implicit rebuke of the White House’s 
assertion that Trump has unfettered powers to 
exclude arrivals based on purported national 
security concerns. 
But others worried about the message it may 
send. It “ignores the anti-Muslim bigotry that 
is at the heart of the travel ban executive 
orders and will inevitably embolden 
Islamphobes in the administration,” said 
Nihad Awad, executive director of the 
Council on American-Islamic Relations. 
David Miliband, president of the 
International Rescue Committee, said the 
partial reinstatement of the ban particularly 
threatens “vulnerable people waiting to come 
to the U.S.,” including those with urgent 
medical conditions. 
All nine justices apparently agreed with the 
outcome Monday. Three of the court’s 
conservatives — Justices Clarence Thomas, 
Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Neil M. Gorsuch — 
said they would have gone further and 
allowed the entire order to take effect 
immediately. 
Under the compromise crafted by the 
court,“foreign nationals who have a credible 
claim of a bona fide relationship with a 
person or entity in the United States” are 
exempted from the ban. 
"The students from the designated countries 
who have been admitted to the University of 
Hawaii have such a relationship with an 
American entity," the court said. "So too 
would a worker who accepted an offer of 
employment from an American company or 
a lecturer invited to address an American 
audience." 
Since many visitors from the six affected 
countries have such a relationship, the impact 
of the order may be narrow. 
But in his dissent, Thomas predicted the 
court’s approach would fail and lead to a 
“flood of litigation” to determine which 
visitors are exempt. 
“I fear that the court’s remedy will prove 
unworkable,” Thomas said. “Today’s 
compromise will burden executive officials 
with the task of deciding — on peril of 
contempt — whether individuals from the six 
affected countries who wish to enter the 
United States have a sufficient connection to 
a person or entity in this country.” 
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Last month, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Virginia upheld a district judge’s ruling in 
Maryland blocking Trump’s order. The 
appeals court, in a 10-3 decision, said the 
executive order reflected an unconstitutional 
discrimination based on religion. Its opinion 
cited Trump’s campaign pledge to enact a 
“Muslim ban.” 
Shortly afterward, the 9th Circuit Court in 
California upheld a district judge’s ruling in 
Hawaii and ruled Trump’s order was illegal 
because the president did not demonstrate a 
threat to national security. 
Trump's lawyers argued both decisions were 
fundamentally mistaken. They said the 
Constitution and immigration laws give the 
president the power to temporarily “suspend” 
the entry of foreigners, either individuals or 
groups. And they argued that the high court 
has made clear judges have no authority to 
“second-guess” the president’s determination 
that national security was in danger. 
Without hearing arguments in the two cases, 
the justices agreed the lower courts had gone 
too far. The outcome suggests that many of 
the justices were as troubled by the bold 
intervention of the judges who blocked 
Trump’s order as they were by the bold action 
of the new president. 
The court’s opinion noted the government is 
free to work on the new vetting procedures 
for immigrants from the six countries. This 
was the ostensible purpose of the order in the 
first place. 
"We fully expect that the relief we grant 
today will permit the executive to conclude 
its internal work and provide adequate notice 
to foreign governments within the 90-day life 
of Sec. 2c," the court said, referring to the key 
clause in the travel ban order. 
The case decided Monday was named Trump 
vs. International Refugee Assistance Project 
and Trump vs. Hawaii.
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“Trump Refugee Restrictions Allowed for Now; Ban on Grandparents Is 
Rejected” 
 
The New York Times 
Adam Liptak 
July 19, 2017 
 
The Supreme Court on Wednesday 
temporarily upheld broad restrictions against 
refugees entering the United States but 
allowed grandparents and other relatives of 
American residents to come while legal 
challenges to the Trump administration’s 
travel ban move forward. 
The justices, in a brief unsigned order, let 
stand part of a ruling from a federal judge in 
Hawaii that had narrowed the 
administration’s efforts to limit travel from 
six predominantly Muslim countries, an 
effort that has prompted confusion at the 
nation’s airports, a global outcry and much 
litigation since President Trump announced it 
a week into his presidency. 
But the justices suspended a second part of 
the lower court’s ruling, standing firm for 
now against allowing an estimated 24,000 
refugees from across the world to resettle in 
the United States. 
In the terse order, Justices Clarence Thomas, 
Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Neil M. Gorsuch said 
they would have blocked the judge’s entire 
order while the case proceeds — including 
the part that allowed American residents’ 
grandparents and other relatives to travel to 
the United States from the six countries: Iran, 
Libya, Syria, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. 
Last month, the Supreme Court agreed to 
decide whether the travel ban was lawful, and 
it scheduled arguments for October. In the 
meantime, the justices temporarily reinstated 
the travel ban — but only for people without 
“a credible claim of a bona fide relationship 
with a person or entity in the United States.” 
The court did not specify who qualified as a 
close relative, though it did say that spouses 
and mothers-in-law “clearly” counted. 
The Trump administration interpreted the 
Supreme Court’s decision as excluding most 
refugees and entry only of American 
residents’ parents, children, spouses, parents-
in-law, sons- and daughters-in-law, people 
engaged to be married and siblings. 
Last week, Judge Derrick K. Watson of 
Federal District Court in Honolulu ruled that 
the administration’s approach had 
disregarded the language and logic of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling, fairness and the 
conventional understanding of who counts as 
a close family member. 
“Common sense, for instance, dictates that 
close family members be defined to include 
grandparents,” Judge Watson wrote. “Indeed, 
grandparents are the epitome of close family 
members. The government’s definition 
excludes them. That simply cannot be.” 
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The next day, Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
criticized the ruling as undermining national 
security, creating confusion and violating 
respect for separation of powers. 
“The district court has improperly substituted 
its policy preferences for the national security 
judgments of the executive branch in a time 
of grave threats, defying both the lawful 
prerogatives of the executive branch and the 
directive of the Supreme Court,” Mr. 
Sessions said in a statement. 
Later that day, the administration filed a 
motion asking the Supreme Court to clarify 
its decision. It said the justices should act 
immediately, without waiting for a ruling 
from the appeals court. 
The administration said it was entitled to 
exclude refugees whom resettlement 
agencies had planned to help move to the 
United States. Judge Watson disagreed, 
writing that the Supreme Court had meant to 
allow such people to enter the country. 
“An assurance from a United States refugee 
resettlement agency, in fact, meets each of 
the Supreme Court’s touchstones,” he wrote. 
“It is formal, it is a documented contract, it is 
binding, it triggers responsibilities and 
obligations, including compensation, it is 
issued specific to an individual refugee only 
when that refugee has been approved for 
entry by the Department of Homeland 
Security.” 
In its Supreme Court brief, the Justice 
Department said that Judge Watson’s ruling 
“would render the refugee portion of this 
court’s decision effectively meaningless.” 
Lawyers for Hawaii who are challenging the 
travel ban disputed that assertion. They said 
about 24,000 refugees had a formal assurance 
of help from a settlement agency, while 
another 175,000 in the pipeline did not. 
“Many of those refugees — as well as 
countless visa applicants from the targeted 
nations — will be unable to demonstrate any 
other form of bona fide relationship with an 
American party, meaning that they will be 
absolutely barred from entering the country 
in the next several months,” the Hawaii 
lawyers wrote. 
They also said Judge Watson’s order did 
nothing to stop the administration from 
enforcing its travel ban against an estimated 
85 percent of refugees, or to exclude 
extended family members “who indisputably 
lack close relationships with American 
individuals and entities.” 
On Wednesday, the Supreme Court rejected 
the administration’s request for clarity on the 
scope of last month’s decision. The justices 
said that the appeal in the case should follow 
the ordinary course and that the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San 
Francisco, should first address the question. 
In temporarily blocking the part of Judge 
Watson’s order concerning refugees, the 
Supreme Court indicated that the 
government’s arguments had weight. In 
declining to disturb the part of the order that 
allowed relatives to enter, the Supreme Court 
suggested that the administration might have 
overreached. 
Challenges to Mr. Trump’s travel bans have 
been ricocheting around the federal courts for 
almost as long as he has been president. 
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His first ban, issued in January, caused chaos 
at the nation’s airports until it was blocked by 
the courts. Rather than appealing to the 
Supreme Court, the administration issued a 
revised executive order in March. But that 
order, too, was blocked by federal appeals 
courts, which ruled that it violated the 
Constitution by discriminating based on 
religion and that it exceeded Mr. Trump’s 
authority. 
The Supreme Court is scheduled to hear 
arguments on October 10. 
In a partial dissent from the Supreme Court’s 
decision last month, Justice Thomas said the 
line the court had drawn, allowing those with 
“bona fide relationships” to enter the country, 
was unworkable. He predicted — accurately 
— that the court’s compromise would “invite 
a flood of litigation until this case is finally 
resolved on the merits, as parties and courts 
struggle to determine what exactly 
constitutes a ‘bona fide relationship.’”
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“Hawaii Challenges Trump Administration Again As Travel Ban Takes 
Effect” 
 
Associated Press 
June 29, 2017 
 
The state of Hawaii has filed a court 
challenge to the Trump administration’s 
definition of a close U.S. relationship needed 
to avoid the new travel ban. 
Hawaii Attorney General Doug Chin says 
he’s concerned the administration may be 
violating the U.S. Supreme Court’s travel ban 
ruling. 
The travel ban temporarily barring some 
citizens of six majority-Muslim countries 
from coming into the United States went into 
effect Thursday. The new rules stop people 
from Syria, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Iran and 
Libya from getting a visa to the United States 
unless they have a “bona fide” relationship 
with a close relative, school or business in the 
U.S. 
Based on a schedule set by U.S. District 
Judge Derrick Watson, the administration has 
until Monday to respond to Hawaii’s motion, 
Chin said at a Friday press conference. The 
state will then have until Thursday to respond 
to the federal government, he said. 
Watson will issue a decision after that, Chin 
said, adding there are no plans for a hearing 
at this time. 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday 
exempted people from the ban if they can 
prove a “bone fide” relationship with a U.S. 
citizen or entity. The Trump administration 
had said the exemption would apply to 
citizens with a parent, spouse, child, adult son 
or daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law or 
sibling already in the U.S. 
Chin says many of the people that the federal 
government decided to exclude are 
considered “close family” in Hawaii. 
At a press conference Monday, Chin said he 
welcomed the Supreme Court’s 
announcement that it will hear challenges to 
the travel ban this fall, even though it allowed 
part of the ban to temporarily take effect. 
Hawaii has been on the front line of the battle 
against Trump’s travel ban and other policies. 
Oral arguments in the case are scheduled for 
October. Chin said he would attend, but that 
he expected Neal Katyal, the lead attorney for 
the state in Hawaii v. Trump, would conduct 
arguments before the court. 
Hawaii filed its lawsuit Feb. 3, one week after 
the president issued the original travel ban. It 
called for suspending the U.S. refugee 
program for 120 days, banned Syrian 
refugees indefinitely and barred citizens of 
seven Muslim-majority countries from 
entering the United States for 90 days. 
That suit was suspended by Judge Watson in 
Honolulu after a federal judge in Seattle 
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issued a nationwide injunction against the 
plan. 
In March, Trump modified his ban, removing 
Iraq from the list of seven banned nations 
(Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and 
Yemen) and not singling Syrian refugees for 
an indefinite ban or giving preferential 
treatment to the refugee claims of religious 
minorities. 
Watson then allowed Hawaii to modify its 
suit to challenge the second ban, and 
ultimately issued a nationwide injunction 
against it.
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“Trump Takes Travel Ban Dispute to U.S. Supreme Court Again” 
 
Bloomberg Law 
Greg Stohr 
July 14, 2017 
 
President Donald Trump’s administration 
took the dispute over his temporary travel ban 
to the Supreme Court again, asking the 
justices to let the government bar entry into 
the U.S. by people with grandparents and 
cousins in the country. 
The administration filed papers late Friday 
asking the court to clarify a June 26 decision 
that said the government had to admit at least 
some close relatives, including spouses and 
parents-in-law. A federal trial judge in 
Hawaii this week said the government 
couldn’t exclude several other types of 
family members either, and the 
administration is seeking to free itself from 
that ruling. 
That ruling “distorts this court’s decision and 
upends the equitable balance this court 
struck,” acting U.S. Solicitor General Jeffrey 
Wall said in court papers. 
The Supreme Court told the challengers to 
the ban to file a response by noon 
Washington time on July 18. 
The Supreme Court already has agreed to 
hear arguments in the fall on Trump’s 90-day 
ban, which applies to people entering the 
U.S. from six mostly Muslim countries. The 
June 26 ruling said a limited form of the ban 
could take effect in the meantime, allowing 
only people with a “credible claim of a bona 
fide relationship with a person or entity in the 
United States” to enter. 
The limited travel ban took effect June 30. 
The Trump administration announced it 
would let people enter the U.S. who had a 
parent, spouse, fiance, child, sibling, son- or 
daughter-in-law, or a parent-in-law in the 
country. The standard excluded those whose 
closest connections were grandparents, 
grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, 
nephews, cousins, and brothers- or sisters-in-
law. 
U.S. District Judge Derrick Watson ruled 
Thursday that the government’s exemption 
from the ban was too narrow. “Common 
sense, for instance, dictates that close family 
members be defined to include 
grandparents,” Watson wrote. 
The Supreme Court had said people with a 
“bona fide relationship” included those 
visiting a close family member, students who 
have been admitted to a university, or 
workers who have accepted an employment 
offer. 
In announcing the administration would 
immediately take the matter to the Supreme 
Court, Attorney General Jeff Sessions said in 
a statement Friday, “Once again, we are faced 
with a situation in which a single federal 
district court has undertaken by a nationwide 
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injunction to micromanage decisions of the 
co-equal executive branch related to our 
national security.” 
Trump’s March 6 executive order said the 90-
day travel ban would give officials time to 
assess U.S. vetting procedures and would 
address an “unacceptably high” risk that 
terrorists could slip into the country. Lower 
courts blocked the ban, saying Trump 
overstepped his authority and 
unconstitutionally targeted Muslims. 
When the Supreme Court partially revived 
the travel ban in June, Justices Clarence 
Thomas, Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch said 
they would have let the entire ban take effect 
immediately. Thomas warned that the 
definition of bona fide relationships would 
open the door to a “flood of litigation” as U.S. 
customs and border officials wrestle with 
whether travelers from the six countries have 
sufficient ties. 
In its new court filing, the Trump 
administration asked the court to block 
Watson’s order temporarily while the justices 
consider the motion to clarify. 
The administration also said Watson was 
wrong to permit more refugees to be admitted 
under a separate provision in Trump’s 
executive order. Watson said the government 
couldn’t exclude refugees once a resettlement 
agency has provided a formal assurance that 
it will provide basic services for the person. 
In a separate filing Saturday, the Trump 
administration also asked a San Francisco-
based federal appeals court to put Watson’s 
decision on hold. The two filings overlap, and 
the appeals court could defer action until it 
sees what the Supreme Court does. 
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“Challengers file briefs in Supreme Court on travel ban, while 9th 
Circuit leaves freeze on ban in place” 
 
SCOTUSblog 
Amy Howe 
June 12, 2017 
 
It was a busy day for litigation in the 
challenges to President Donald Trump’s 
March 6 executive order, often known as the 
“travel ban.” Citing national security 
concerns, the order imposed a temporary hold 
on new visas for travelers from six Muslim-
majority countries (Iran, Libya, Somalia, 
Sudan, Syria and Yemen) and suspended 
travel by refugees into the United States. The 
order was the second of its kind; an earlier 
version, issued in late January, was blocked 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th 
Circuit. The March order didn’t fare much 
better in the lower courts, and on June 1 the 
Trump administration asked the Supreme 
Court to enter the fray. Today the challengers 
submitted their responses to the 
government’s filings in the Supreme Court. 
However, those briefs were partly 
overshadowed by another development: a 9th 
Circuit decision that largely upheld a Hawaii 
district court’s ruling barring the government 
from enforcing the ban. 
There are two different sets of challenges to 
the travel ban involved in today’s Supreme 
Court filings. The first comes via the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, which in 
late May rejected the federal government’s 
plea to set aside an order by a Maryland judge 
prohibiting the implementation of the travel 
ban. In that case, the appeals court relied 
heavily on the Constitution’s bar against 
favoring one religion over another, known as 
the establishment clause: Although the 
executive order indicates that it was intended 
to protect the United States from foreign 
terrorists, the court concluded, statements by 
the president reveal that the order was 
actually intended to exclude Muslims from 
the country. 
The government’s June 1 filings asked the 
justices both to review the 4th Circuit’s ruling 
and to freeze the Maryland court’s order 
barring the government from putting the ban 
into effect. But it also asked the government 
to step into a second challenge, which hails 
from Hawaii. Like the Maryland judge, a 
federal district court in Hawaii also blocked 
the government from implementing the travel 
ban, but the 9th Circuit had not yet issued its 
decision in that case when the government 
went to the Supreme Court at the beginning 
of this month. 
The 9th Circuit’s ruling came today. Like the 
4th Circuit, the Hawaii district court had 
ruled that the challengers had shown that they 
were likely to win (part of the legal test for 
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obtaining temporary relief) on their claim 
that the travel ban violated the establishment 
clause, and it entered a nationwide order 
barring the government from enforcing the 
ban. 
The 9th Circuit also ruled for the challengers, 
but on a different ground. In an unsigned and 
apparently unanimous opinion, it explained 
that courts should try whenever possible not 
to reach constitutional questions if they can 
decide the case on another ground. In this 
case, the court continued, it did not need to 
rule on whether the ban violates the 
establishment clause because the ban also 
exceeds the power that Congress has given to 
the president to regulate immigration. 
The 9th Circuit acknowledged that the 
Immigration and Nationality Act “gives the 
President broad powers to control the entry 
of” immigrants into the country, and it also 
allows him to “take actions to protect the 
American public.” But, the court of appeals 
explained, the president cannot simply 
invoke “national security” as a “talismanic 
incantation” to justify an exercise of 
executive power. Rather, the INA allows the 
president to act only after he finds that 
allowing an immigrant or group of 
immigrants to enter the country “would be 
detrimental” to U.S. interests, and the 
government has not made that showing. 
For example, the court stressed, the 
government did not find that allowing 
refugees or any citizens from the six covered 
Muslim-majority countries would harm the 
national interest. And the court perceived a 
disconnect between the government’s 
announced desire to protect national security 
and the way that it wanted to accomplish that 
goal. The 9th Circuit observed that the ban 
would bar “more than 180 million people 
from entry based on their national origin, 
including nationals who may have never been 
physically present in those countries.” But at 
the same time, the court added, it would allow 
nationals of other countries who do have ties 
to the six covered countries to come to the 
United States. As the Hawaii district court 
put it, the ban “could have the paradoxical 
effect of barring entry by a Syrian national 
who has lived in Switzerland for decades, but 
not a Swiss national who has immigrated to 
Syria during its civil war.” 
The president also did not find that current 
standards for vetting visa applicants or 
refugees are inadequate before issuing the 
executive order, nor did he find that the 
United States would be harmed if the current 
standards weren’t changed. Indeed, the court 
of appeals pointed out, the government 
already can deny a visa application if the 
individual seeking the visa cannot show that 
he is eligible. This case-by-case tool allows 
the government to screen visa applicants and 
deny applications from individuals who 
might pose a threat to the United States, and 
the executive order does not explain why the 
individual visa process is so “flawed” that the 
government must instead exclude “an entire 
class of nationals” from the country. 
The 9th Circuit did hand the Trump 
administration one minor victory: It agreed 
that the Hawaii district court should not have 
blocked the government from carrying out 
some internal government procedures – for 
example, reviewing the vetting process to 
determine what information foreign 
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governments need to provide – that don’t 
affect anyone outside the executive branch. 
The 9th Circuit issued its opinion just a few 
hours before the deadline for the challengers 
to file their briefs in the Supreme Court. 
Several themes emerged in the three filings. 
The American Civil Liberties Union (which 
represents the challengers in the Maryland 
case) told the justices that it would be 
“pointless” for them to grant review because 
the executive order specifically provides that 
nationals of the six Muslim-majority 
countries may not enter the United States for 
90 days after the order became effective. The 
challengers maintain that the 90-day period 
ends in two days, on Wednesday, June 14 – 
at which point, they argue, the government’s 
appeal will no longer matter. 
In a separate filing opposing the 
government’s request to allow the ban to go 
into effect until the Supreme Court can weigh 
in, the ACLU contended that if the travel ban 
doesn’t expire on Wednesday, allowing it to 
go into effect would effectively enable the 
government to run out the clock, because the 
Justice Department has asked the court to 
review the case next fall, “more than 90 days 
from now.” Moreover, the ACLU tells the 
justices, if the ban is implemented it will 
create “enormous confusion” while causing 
“immediate and widespread harm to” the 
challengers and “others like them.” 
Hawaii adds that despite the government’s 
protests that time is of the essence, the 
government itself is responsible for the slow 
pace of litigation over the travel ban. For 
example, although the 9th Circuit put the first 
ban on hold on February 9, the Trump 
administration did not issue the second, 
revised order for nearly a month – “with some 
of that delay,” Hawaii suggests, “motivated 
by a desire to take advantage of a favorable 
news cycle.” And when the Hawaii district 
court blocked the second order, the state 
notes, the government spent “weeks litigating 
the issues” in the district court before it went 
to the court of appeals. “These are not the 
actions,” Hawaii contends, “of a Government 
that believes the immediate implementation 
of its order is necessary to avoid irreparable 
harm.” 
But in any event, the challengers add, the 
Supreme Court should not grant review of the 
4th Circuit’s decision because the court of 
appeals “carefully and correctly applied this 
Court’s precedents to this unique situation.” 
Accepting the government’s argument, the 
challengers maintain, would allow “the 
executive branch to act in open bad faith, 
even though there is plenty of evidence that 
the order was intended “to disfavor 
Muslims.” 
Today’s ruling by the 9th Circuit could add a 
procedural wrinkle to the proceedings in the 
Supreme Court. The justices may, for 
example, want additional briefing on the 
effect of the 9th Circuit’s ruling, or the 
government could ask the court to weigh in 
on the 9th Circuit’s ruling as well. But with 
the end of the court’s term less than three 
weeks away, the next steps – whatever they 
may be – are likely to come quickly.
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“Trump’s New Travel Ban Blocks Migrants From Six Nations, Sparing 
Iraq” 
 
The New York Times 
Glenn Thrush 
March 6, 2017 
 
President Trump signed an executive order 
on Monday blocking citizens of six 
predominantly Muslim countries from 
entering the United States, the most 
significant hardening of immigration policy 
in generations, even with changes intended to 
blunt legal and political opposition. 
The order was revised to avoid the tumult and 
protests that engulfed the nation’s airports 
after Mr. Trump signed his first immigration 
directive on Jan. 27. That order was 
ultimately blocked by a federal appeals court. 
The new order continued to impose a 90-day 
ban on travelers, but it removed Iraq, a 
redaction requested by Defense Secretary Jim 
Mattis, who feared it would hamper 
coordination to defeat the Islamic State, 
according to administration officials. 
It also exempts permanent residents and 
current visa holders, and drops language 
offering preferential status to persecuted 
religious minorities, a provision widely 
interpreted as favoring other religious groups 
over Muslims. In addition, it reversed an 
indefinite ban on refugees from Syria, 
replacing it with a 120-day freeze that 
requires review and renewal. 
But the heart of the sweeping executive 
action is still intact, reflecting Mr. Trump’s 
“America first” pledge to safeguard against 
what he has portrayed as a hidden influx of 
terrorists and criminals — a hard-line 
campaign promise that resonated deeply with 
white working-class voters. 
The new order retains central elements of the 
old one, cutting the number of refugees 
admitted to the United States each year to 
50,000 from about 110,000. Mr. Trump is 
also leaving open the possibility of 
expanding the ban to other countries, or even 
putting Iraq back on the banned list if the 
country’s leaders fail to comply with a 
requirement that they increase intelligence 
sharing, officials said. 
“Unregulated, unvetted travel is not a 
universal privilege, especially when national 
security is at stake,” said John F. Kelly, the 
homeland security secretary, appearing 
alongside Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson 
and Attorney General Jeff Sessions at the 
Ronald Reagan Federal Building in 
Washington on Monday. 
Mr. Kelly said the order was now 
“prospective” and applied “only to foreign 
nationals outside of the United States” who 
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do not have a valid visa. None of the men 
took questions. 
The Trump administration quickly tried to 
break the legal logjam, filing papers in 
United States District Court in Washington 
late on Monday seeking to lift an order 
blocking the fulfillment of the initial ban. 
But the president’s revisions did little to halt 
criticism from Democrats and immigrant 
rights advocates, who predicted a renewed 
fight in the courts. 
The Senate Democratic leader, Chuck 
Schumer of New York, described the new 
order as a “watered-down ban” that was still 
“meanspirited and un-American.” 
Margaret Huang, the executive director of 
Amnesty International USA, said in a 
statement that the new order would “cause 
extreme fear and uncertainty for thousands of 
families by, once again, putting anti-Muslim 
hatred into policy.” 
The new measure will be phased in over the 
next two weeks to avoid the frenetic, same-
day execution of the order in January, which 
prompted protests across the country and left 
tearful families stranded at airports abroad 
and in the United States. 
The redrafted order, delayed by a week so it 
would not overshadow Mr. Trump’s address 
to a joint session of Congress last Tuesday, 
represented a recognition that the rushed first 
attempt at the ban did not pass muster legally 
or politically. 
Administration officials privately conceded 
that the initial version of the order was a 
political debacle that damaged Mr. Trump’s 
nascent presidency. But they were much 
more sanguine about the second order, 
arguing that the new, multiagency review 
process could be used in the future to bend 
Mr. Trump’s uncompromising messages 
toward Washington’s bureaucratic realities. 
Mr. Trump signed the first ban with great 
fanfare, in front of reporters, at the Pentagon. 
“We don’t want them here,” Mr. Trump said 
of Islamist terrorists. “We want to ensure that 
we are not admitting into our country the very 
threats our soldiers are fighting overseas. We 
only want to admit those into our country 
who will support our country, and love 
deeply our people.” 
This time, the White House issued a 
photograph of the president signing the order 
alone at his desk in the Oval Office. 
Justice Department lawyers said the revisions 
rendered moot legal cases against the original 
travel ban. But opponents said the removal of 
a section that had granted preferential 
treatment to victims of religious persecution 
was a cosmetic change that did nothing to 
alter the order’s prejudicial purpose. 
Immigrant rights lawyers had argued that the 
provision was intended to discriminate 
against Muslims, pointing to recent 
statements by Mr. Trump. 
“This is a retreat, but let’s be clear — it’s just 
another run at a Muslim ban,” said Omar 
Jadwat, the director of the Immigrants’ 
Rights Project at the American Civil 
Liberties Union, one of the groups that sued 
to stop the first order. “They can’t unring the 
bell.” 
Eric T. Schneiderman, the attorney general of 
New York and a plaintiff in a suit seeking to 
block the first order, said his office was 
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reviewing the new ban, adding, “I stand ready 
to litigate — again — in order to protect New 
York’s families, institutions and economy.” 
Congressional Republicans, who were split 
over the first travel ban, had a more muted 
reaction. But Speaker Paul D. Ryan, who 
backed the first order, issued a statement 
saying the revised order “advances our 
shared goal of protecting the homeland.” 
Citizens of Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, 
Syria and Libya will face a 90-day 
suspension of visa processing as the 
administration analyzes how to strengthen 
vetting procedures, according to a homeland 
security summary of the order. 
The removal of Iraq from the list came after 
talks with security officials in Baghdad and at 
the urging of Mr. Mattis and State 
Department officials, who have been in 
communication with Iraqi officials alarmed 
that the ban will turn public sentiment in their 
country against the United States. 
“On the basis of negotiations that have taken 
place between the government of Iraq and the 
U.S. Department of State in the last month, 
Iraq will increase cooperation with the U.S. 
government on the vetting of its citizens 
applying for a visa to travel to the United 
States,” homeland security officials wrote in 
a fact sheet given to reporters. 
The timing of the ban seemed intended to 
reset the White House political narrative, 
after a turbulent week that began with Mr. 
Trump’s well-received address to Congress. 
That success was quickly overshadowed by 
the controversies over Mr. Sessions’s failure 
to inform the Senate of his contacts with the 
Russian ambassador and Mr. Trump’s 
unsupported accusation that President Barack 
Obama tapped Mr. Trump’s phones during 
the 2016 campaign. 
Critics say that Mr. Trump’s vow to impose 
“extreme vetting” on migrants, especially 
those fleeing the war in Syria, disregards 
already stringent screening measures, and the 
fact that none of the recent terrorist attacks or 
mass shootings on American soil were 
perpetrated by people from the nations listed 
in the ban. 
Last week, The Associated Press reported 
that it had obtained a draft homeland security 
assessment concluding that citizenship was 
an “unlikely indicator” of a threat. 
Homeland security officials, speaking to 
reporters by telephone on Monday, pushed 
back against that news report, arguing that it 
was culled from public sources and excluded 
classified information that paints a more 
dangerous picture. 
An official speaking on the call said the 
Justice Department had identified 300 
“refugees” who were being investigated for 
their links to Islamist terrorist groups or for 
holding pro-Islamic State positions. Some of 
those people already have permanent resident 
status, the official said. 
But homeland security and Justice 
Department officials declined to provide 
further details, and would not say how many 
of the 300 people being investigated came 
from the countries covered by the revised 
travel ban.
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“Trump Concedes Defeat on Travel Ban—for Now” 
 
The Atlantic 
Matt Ford 
February 17, 2017 
 
The Trump administration told a federal 
appeals court Thursday it would rewrite its 
controversial travel ban targeting several 
Muslim-majority countries, effectively 
conceding defeat for now in the new 
president’s first major confrontation with the 
federal judiciary. 
In a 61-page filing in the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, Justice Department lawyers 
strongly disagreed with a three-judge 
appellate panel’s decision to keep blocking 
the order’s enforcement while proceedings 
continue in a federal district court in Seattle. 
But the lawyers declined to ask the Ninth 
Circuit to convene a broader panel to 
reconsider the three judges’ decision. 
“Rather than continuing this litigation, the 
President intends in the near future to rescind 
the Order and replace it with a new, 
substantially revised Executive Order to 
eliminate what the panel erroneously thought 
were constitutional concerns,” the Justice 
Department told the court. “In so doing, the 
President will clear the way for immediately 
protecting the country rather than pursuing 
further, potentially time-consuming 
litigation.” 
It was a sterile, formalistic admission of 
defeat—at least for now—in a separation-of-
powers standoff that had consumed most of 
the new president’s first month in office. The 
order’s sudden, haphazard rollout on January 
27, one week after President Trump’s 
inauguration, stranded travelers in airports 
and sparked protests at major U.S. airports as 
demonstrators and lawyers demanded their 
release from custody. Federal judges in 
multiple states eventually intervened at the 
request of the ACLU and immigrant-rights 
groups, blunting the order’s impact in a 
patchwork archipelago of temporary 
restraining orders. 
The setback came despite sustained criticism 
from the Trump administration of the rulings; 
of federal district court judge James Robart, 
who issued the broadest nationwide 
injunction against the ruling; of the three-
judge panel that upheld Robart’s injunction; 
of the Ninth Circuit as a whole; and of the 
federal judiciary. Those critiques ranged 
from challenges to the courts’ legitimacy to 
insinuations the judiciary would bear 
responsibility for future terrorist attacks. 
“Just cannot believe a judge would put our 
country in such peril,” Trump tweeted at one 
point. “If something bad happens blame him 
and court system.” 
The president echoed those themes during his 
lengthy Thursday press conference, in which 
he insisted his presidency was operating like 
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a “fine-tuned machine” and instead claimed 
it was the Ninth Circuit that was actually 
adrift. “That circuit is in chaos, and frankly 
that circuit is in turmoil,” Trump told 
reporters. He said he had heard the circuit 
was overturned 80 percent of the time by the 
Supreme Court—a highly misleading way to 
measure a court’s performance. (The 
Supreme Court, by design, reviews lower-
court decisions for error or incongruity, not 
general quality; it also accepts only a handful 
of the thousands of cases decided by the 
Ninth Circuit each year.) 
The White House did not reveal its plans until 
its filing Thursday, as it  spent a week 
weighing whether it should continue to 
defend the order in the courts or start anew. 
Neither of its options for appeal seemed 
likely to succeed. The Trump administration 
could have asked a broader panel of the Ninth 
Circuit to reconsider the ruling, but two-
thirds of the court’s judges were nominated 
by Democratic presidents—not a definitive 
measure of a court’s ideology, but not a 
heartening one for a Republican president, 
either. And if the administration asked the 
U.S. Supreme Court to intervene, five votes 
from the eight justices would be needed to 
overturn the panel’s decision. Even if the four 
justices on the Court’s conservative wing 
sided with the administration, a fifth vote 
from its liberal wing could have been difficult 
to find. 
The Ninth Circuit case, Washington v. 
Trump, is one of more than a dozen lawsuits 
challenging the ban’s legality across the 
country. But it quickly became the highest 
profile case after federal district judge James 
Robart issued a broad nationwide injunction 
on February 3 that temporarily barred the 
federal government from enforcing the order 
pending further hearings. 
Justice Department lawyers quickly sought 
an emergency stay of Robart’s order from a 
three-judge appeals panel in the Ninth 
Circuit. The panel unanimously rejected that 
request on February 9, ruling that the states 
of Washington and Minnesota, which filed 
the lawsuit, had standing to challenge the 
order on behalf of students and faculty in 
their public-university systems. 
The three judges also indicated the states’ 
contention that the order violated the 
Constitution’s due-process protections had a 
chance of success in the lower courts, 
although it declined to rule on the merits of 
those arguments itself. The panel also 
declined to consider whether the order 
violated the First Amendment’s religious-
freedom protections by targeting Muslim-
majority countries. 
The federal government, for its part, strongly 
defended the order’s legality and 
constitutionality since it was issued on 
January 27. Administration officials and 
Justice Department lawyers pointed to the 
executive branch’s traditionally broad 
discretion in immigration and national-
security matters, as well as a federal statute 
authorizing the president to suspend the entry 
of visa holders from certain countries. They 
also rejected the states’ claims of religious 
discrimination by noting the order didn’t 
mention explicitly mention Muslims. 
But those arguments made little headway 
among the federal judiciary. Making the 
president’s executive order unreviewable by 
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federal courts, the Ninth Circuit panel said, 
“runs contrary to the fundamental structure of 
our constitutional democracy.” And in an 
order-related lawsuit in Virginia, federal 
judge Leonie Brinkema extensively cited 
Trump’s previous comments on Muslim 
immigration when issuing a preliminary 
injunction against the ban’s enforcement. 
The administration hasn’t offered details yet 
on its next executive order, which President 
Trump said would be released sometime next 
week. But the Justice Department did 
reiterate some arguments in its Thursday 
filing that will likely resurface in the next 
generation of legal battles over it. 
Central to their brief was the president’s 
statutory power to exclude classes of foreign 
nationals from entry, which they cautioned 
against limiting. “Among other things, it 
would disable the President from suspending 
the entry of immigrants from a country with 
which the United States is on the verge of 
war,” That provision’s scope went 
unaddressed by the Ninth Circuit panel’s 
ruling, even in passing. 
But the most interesting portion of the filing 
dealt with something beyond the order itself. 
President Trump’s campaign comments on 
Muslim immigration shaped the public 
debate of the travel ban, even as he publicly 
downsized his call for a “total and complete 
shutdown of Muslims entering the United 
States” to the opaquer term “extreme vetting” 
and other euphemisms. The order makes no 
specific reference to Muslims, of course, but 
its genealogy is unmistakeable. 
The Justice Department, however, urged the 
Ninth Circuit to look away from those 
comments. The states’ invocation of them 
was “profoundly misguided” because it could 
impose additional judicial constraints on 
presidents for statements made as private 
citizens. “That approach, under which the 
powers of the Presidency would vary based 
on the identity of the individual duly elected 
by the people to hold that Office, has no 
sound basis in precedent and would raise 
significant separation-of-powers concerns,” 
they wrote. 
But their warnings could be too late. As 
Vox’s Dara Lind noted last week, those 
comments could haunt the travel ban’s 
constitutionality in any iteration. The states 
cited Supreme Court religious-freedom 
precedents in which government officials’ 
statements could be used as evidence of 
discrimination when reviewing ostensibly 
neutral laws. And at least one federal judge 
has shown a willingness to use those 
precedents against the Trump administration. 
Many of the executive order’s flaws can be 
ironed out with more thorough review by the 
Justice Department. The president’s own 
words, however, could be a stain that may be 
impossible to wash away.
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“Travel ban 2.0 in effect, court challenges begin” 
 
CNN 
Laura Jarrett, Elise Labott 
June 30, 2017 
 
After months of winding through the courts, 
the so-called "watered-down," revised 
version of President Donald Trump's fiercely 
litigated travel ban finally went into effect at 
8 p.m. ET Thursday. 
Less than an hour before the ban was slated 
to begin, an emergency motion was filed in 
federal court by the state of Hawaii, which 
contests the Trump administration's plan to 
exclude certain categories of foreign 
nationals that the state believes are allowed to 
enter the country under existing court rulings. 
Here's what to expect for the implementation 
of version 2.0 of the travel ban: 
Who can't enter the US? 
The test for foreign nationals under the 
Supreme Court's ruling is whether one has a 
"credible claim of bona fide relationship" 
with either an entity (like a school or a job) or 
a person living in the US (such as a spouse). 
A hotel reservation, for example, will not 
constitute a bona fide relationship under the 
executive order, but an academic lecturer 
invited to speak in the US will be exempt 
from the travel ban. 
If you can't sufficiently establish such a close 
relationship, you are banned for 90 days if 
you are from Libya, Syria, Iran, Somalia, 
Yemen and Sudan, and 120 days if you are a 
refugee from any country. 
The new guidelines provide that applicants 
must prove a relationship with a parent, 
spouse, finacee, child, adult son or daughter, 
son-in-law, daughter-in-law or sibling in the 
US in order to enter the country. 
Other family members -- including 
grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, 
nieces, nephews, cousins, brothers-in-law, 
sisters-in-law, and any other "extended" 
family members will not be considered "close 
family" under the executive order. 
For several hours on Thursday -- prior to the 
executive order going into effect -- 
administration officials had provided 
guidance that fiancees would not be 
considered "bona fide" relationships, but later 
reversed course, and fiancees are now exempt 
just like spouses. 
The State Department criteria applies not 
only to visa applicants, but also to all 
refugees currently awaiting approval for 
admission to the US. 
Senior administration officials further 
confirmed despite any ambiguity in the 
Supreme Court's decision, a refugee 
resettlement organization's "assurance" or 
relationship to a prospective refugee will not 
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be considered sufficiently close or bona fide 
for protection under the administration's 
interpretation of the revised executive order. 
Advocacy groups such as Amnesty 
International plan to send researchers to US 
airports, such as Dulles International Airport 
and John F. Kennedy Airport on Thursday, to 
monitor developments and observe 
implementation of the ban in case any 
disputes arise. 
Who is exempt from the ban? 
The following categories of travelers are 
excluded from the travel ban: 
•US citizens 
•Legal permanent residents (aka 
green card holders) 
•Current visa holders 
•Any visa applicant who was in the 
US as of June 26 
•Dual nationals 
•Anyone granted asylum 
•Any refugee already admitted to the 
US (or cleared for travel by the State 
Department through July 6) 
•Foreign nationals with "bona fide" 
family, educational or business tie to 
the US. 
What about visa holders? 
Importantly, visas that have already been 
approved will not be revoked, and senior 
administration officials confirmed on 
Thursday that previously scheduled visa 
application appointments will not be 
canceled. 
The executive order also permits the issuance 
of a visa to anyone who would otherwise be 
excluded on a case-by-case basis at the 
discretion of DHS and the State Department. 
Senior administration officials expressed 
confidence to reporters Thursday that the 
pandemonium seen at airports would not 
occur this time around and that consular 
officers and border agents are "well-versed" 
in how the process works. 
"We expect business as usual," said one 
official. "We expect things to run smoothly -
- our people are well-prepared for this." 
Why is this happening? 
The intent behind the executive order was 
hotly debated for the past several months. 
On the campaign trail, then-candidate Trump 
called for a "total and complete shutdown of 
Muslims" entering the US. 
But the text of the executive order states that 
"additional scrutiny" is required for foreign 
nationals traveling from the six identified 
nations because "the conditions in these 
countries present heightened threats. Each of 
these countries is a state sponsor of terrorism, 
has been significantly compromised by 
terrorist organizations, or contains active 
conflict zones." 
More lawsuits on the way? 
The Trump administration's narrow reading 
of what constitutes a "bona fide" relationship 
has already elicited at least one challenge in 
court. 
Late Thursday, Hawaii filed an emergency 
motion asking the federal district court judge 
who originally blocked implementation of 
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the travel ban in March to "clarify as soon as 
possible that the Supreme Court meant what 
it said," and issue an order confirming that the 
court orders do not allow the Trump 
administration to exclude grandparents, 
grandchildren, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-
law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews and 
cousins of persons in the United States. 
Experts say more legal battles are on the way, 
given the way the Trump administration has 
decided to interpret the Supreme Court's 
ruling. 
"I predict more litigation as people challenge 
visa denials under these new instructions," 
said Cornell Law School Professor Stephen 
Yale-Loehr. "Why can a stepsister visit the 
United States but not a grandmother?"
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“Trump’s big travel ban win? Let’s not get carried away.” 
 
The Washington Post 
Aaron Blake 
June 26, 2017 
 
Winning in politics is as much about beating 
expectations as anything else. Democrats' 
loss in the special election in a conservative 
Georgia district wasn't particularly 
devastating in and of itself, but the fact that 
they really went for it made it look like a 
massive failure, with nothing but doom and 
gloom ahead. 
With that in mind, I present the White 
House's gloating after the Supreme Court 
partially reinstated its travel ban on Monday. 
“It’s a huge win for the president and the 
executive order,” Trump's lawyer, Jay 
Sekulow, said on Fox Business Network 
shortly after the ruling. 
Some conservative writers also hailed this as 
a win for Trump. David French of the (not 
exactly Trump-friendly) National Review 
wrote: “Victory for Trump: SCOTUS 
Restores Vast Majority of Travel Ban.” 
This is what you might call the soft bigotry of 
low expectations. Yes, the Supreme Court 
allowed for part of the White House's travel 
ban to go into effect after some judges had 
put the whole thing on hold. But if this is 
what passes for a big Trump win, it's going to 
be a long four years for him. 
For a few reasons: 
1) This wouldn't really be seen as a “win” 
unless other judges hadn't halted the ban in 
the first place. If the lower courts had upheld 
the ban and this had been appealed to the 
Supreme Court by the other side, the 
narrative today would be that the Supreme 
Court just put part of Trump's travel ban on 
hold. It's also not altogether surprising that 
the more left-leaning 9th Circuit Court of 
Appeals would go further in halting the ban 
than the Supreme Court would. And the sum 
total is still that part of Trump's ban remains 
blocked, with no ruling on the overall 
constitutionality and the possibility that it 
gets partially struck down for good. 
2) We are simply talking about whether 
Trump overstepped his constitutional bounds 
with the travel ban executive order — a very 
low bar — and not whether the broader policy 
is successful or popular. And in fact, a recent 
poll showed Americans oppose the ban 52-
43. 
3) The degree to which the ban is being 
reinstated is in the eye of the beholder. 
Basically, the court says the ban “may not be 
enforced against foreign nationals who have 
a credible claim of a bona fide relationship 
with a person or entity in the United States.” 
This is who actually sued over the ban in the 
first place, and they remain exempt from it, 
for now. 
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4) This is the revised, scaled-back version of 
Trump's initial travel ban, which was also 
halted by the courts. And just a few weeks 
ago, Trump didn't seem to be a big fan of 
Version 2.0, tweeting, “The Justice Dept. 
should have stayed with the original Travel 
Ban, not the watered down, politically correct 
version they submitted to S.C.” We are now 
to believe that a ban Trump suggested was 
inadequate and “watered down” is some big 
victory for his agenda? 
5) As The Fix's Amber Phillips notes, the 
whole purpose of the ban is now in doubt. 
The White House initially pitched this as 
temporary travel ban needed to address an 
urgent national security concern while it 
developed more foolproof vetting 
procedures. It said it needed 90 days to do 
that (120 days for refugees); it's now been 
150 days since the first attempt at a travel ban 
and 102 since the second (with no attacks by 
immigrants or refugees), but apparently the 
ban is still necessary? Even in their ruling, the 
judges seemed to allude to the idea that their 
input might be moot because that window 
had passed. Here's what the justices wrote: 
In addition to the issues identified in the 
petitions, the parties are directed to address 
the following question: “Whether the 
challenges to §2(c) became moot on June 14, 
2017.” 
Monday's ruling is a win for Trump only 
insofar as it wasn't another big setback — 
something he's become accustomed to both 
legislatively and in the courts. But this is a 
temporary ruling that is still blocking part of 
a signature executive order that Trump 
apparently isn't a huge fan of in the first place. 
For a president who said we'd grow tired of 
winning with him, to claim this as a big 
victory is pretty telling. 
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“Court hands each side a partial victory in dispute over scope of travel 
ban” 
 
SCOTUSblog 
Amy Howe 
July 19, 2017 
 
On the same day that it scheduled oral 
argument in the dispute over President 
Donald Trump’s March 6 executive order, 
the Supreme Court turned down a request by 
the federal government to clarify exactly 
what it meant when it said that individuals 
with a close family relationship could 
continue to apply for visas to enter the United 
States even while the freeze on new visas for 
travelers from six predominantly Muslim 
countries is in place. Today’s order left in 
place a ruling by a federal district judge in 
Hawaii that had defined the relationships 
more expansively than the government had 
wanted – to include, among others, 
grandparents and grandchildren. But the 
justices also put a portion of that lower-court 
ruling relating to refugees on hold while an 
intermediate federal appeals court reviews it. 
The president’s March 6 order, often known 
as the “travel ban,” halted the issuance of new 
visas for travelers from six predominantly 
Muslim countries – Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, 
Somalia and Yemen – and temporarily 
suspended the admission of refugees into the 
United States. Two different lower courts 
blocked the government from implementing 
the order, but on June 26 the Supreme Court 
allowed the government to go ahead and 
enforce it, with an exception for travelers and 
refugees who have a “credible claim” of a 
genuine relationship with an individual or 
institution in the United States. 
The Court’s June 26 order led to litigation 
over the scope of the exception. The Trump 
administration insisted that it extended to 
parents (and stepparents), spouses (and 
fiancés or fiancées), sons and daughters (as 
well as stepchildren and sons- and daughters-
in-law), and siblings, but not to a broader 
group of relatives such as grandparents, 
grandchildren, aunts and uncles, siblings-in-
law, nieces and nephews, and cousins. But 
U.S. District Judge Derrick Watson agreed 
with the state of Hawaii that the second and 
broader group of relatives also have the kind 
of “close” family relationship that should 
allow them to apply for visas even while the 
travel ban is in effect. The justices today 
denied the federal government’s motion to 
clarify which relatives can apply for a visa, 
leaving Judge Watson’s more expansive 
definition in place. 
However, the justices did grant the 
government’s request to put another portion 
of Judge Watson’s ruling on hold while the 
government goes to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 9th Circuit. Judge Watson 
had ruled that, for purposes of the June 26 
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order, the freeze on the admission of refugees 
would not apply to refugees for whom the 
federal government had already entered into 
an agreement with an agency to help the 
refugees with resettlement after they enter the 
United States. The government had argued 
that the judge’s ruling went too far, because a 
resettlement agency does not actually have a 
relationship with the refugees it is assisting 
until they arrive in the United States, and that 
the ruling effectively rendered the limits 
imposed by the March 6 order meaningless. 
Now the 9th Circuit will weigh in on whether 
such refugees have enough of a connection to 
the United States to come here. Notably, 
three justices – Clarence Thomas, Samuel 
Alito and Neil Gorsuch – indicated that they 
would have put all of Judge Watson’s ruling 
(rather than simply the part involving 
refugees) on hold until the 9th Circuit can 
rule on the government’s appeal.
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Jennings v. Rodriguez 
15-1204 
Ruling Below: Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015) 
Rodriguez sought relief on behalf of himself and others detained for more than six months 
without bond hearing during immigration proceedings. The requested relief constituted 
individualized bond hearings with burden on government. The district court denied the petition. 
Rodriguez appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court, 
entered preliminary injunction. The government appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The 
District Court granted summary judgment to class and entered permanent injunction. Parties 
appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Question Presented: Whether aliens subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) 
must be afforded bond hearings if detention lasts six months;  
Whether aliens who fall under the mandatory detention provisions of Section 1226(c) must be 
afforded the same; 
Whether the government must demonstrate that the alien is a flight risk or a danger to the 
community in order to deny release on bond;  
Whether the length of detention must be weighed in the decision to release on bond; 
Whether new bond hearings must be afforded every six months. 
 
Alejandro RODRIGUEZ; Abdirizak Aden Farah; Jose Farias Cornejo; Yussuf Abdikadir; 
Abel Perez Ruelas, for themselves and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, 
Petitioners–Appellees/Cross–Appellants, 
and 
Efren Orozco, Petitioner, 
v. 
Timothy ROBBINS, Field Office Director, Los Angeles District, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement; Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Homeland Security; Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney 
General; Wesley Lee, Assistant Field Office Director, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement; Rodney Penner, Captain, Mira Loma Detention Center; Sandra Hutchens, 
Sheriff of Orange County; Nguyen, Officer, Officer–in–Charge, Theo Lacy Facility; 
Davis Nighswonger, Captain, Commander, Theo Lacy Facility; Mike Kreuger, Captain, 
Operations Manager, James A. Musick Facility; Arthur Edwards, Officer–in–Charge, 
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[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
Duane  WARDLAW, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is the latest decision in our decade-long 
examination of civil, i.e. non-punitive and 
merely preventative, detention in the 
immigration context. As we noted in our 
prior decision in this case, Rodriguez v. 
Robbins, thousands of immigrants to the 
United States are locked up at any given time, 
awaiting the conclusion of administrative and 
judicial proceedings that will determine 
whether they may remain in this country. In 
2014, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) removed 315,943 
individuals, many of whom were detained 
during the removal process. According to the 
most recently available statistics, ICE detains 
more than 429,000 individuals over the 
course of a year, with roughly 33,000 
individuals in detention on any given day. 
 
Alejandro Rodriguez, Abdirizak Aden Farah, 
Jose Farias Cornejo, Yussuf Abdikadir, Abel 
Perez Ruelas, and Efren Orozco 
(“petitioners”) represent a certified class of 
noncitizens who challenge their prolonged 
detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 
1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a) without 
individualized bond hearings and 
determinations to justify their continued 
detention. Their case is now on appeal for the 
third time. After a three-judge panel of our 
court reversed the district court's denial of 
petitioners' motion for class certification, and 
after our decision affirming the district 
court's entry of a preliminary injunction, the 
district court granted summary judgment to 
the class and entered a permanent injunction. 
 
Under the permanent injunction, the 
government must provide any class member 
who is subject to “prolonged detention”—six 
months or more—with a bond hearing before 
an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). At that hearing, 
the government must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the detainee is a 
flight risk or a danger to the community to 
justify the denial of bond. The government 
appeals from that judgment. We affirm in 
part and reverse in part. 
 
I. Background 
 
On May 16, 2007, Alejandro Garcia 
commenced this case by filing a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus in the Central District 
of California. Garcia's case was consolidated 
with a similar case filed by Alejandro 
Rodriguez, and the petitioners moved for 
class certification. The motion was denied on 
March 21, 2008. 
 
A three-judge panel of our court reversed the 
district court's order denying class 
certification. We held that the proposed class 
satisfied each requirement of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23: The government 
conceded that the class was sufficiently 
numerous; each class member's claim turned 
on the common question of whether 
detention for more than six months without a 
bond hearing raises serious constitutional 
concerns; Rodriguez's claims were 
sufficiently typical of the class's because “the 
determination of whether [he] is entitled to a 
bond hearing will rest largely on 
interpretation of the statute authorizing his 
detention”; and Rodriguez, through his 
counsel, adequately represented the class.  
The panel also noted that “any concern that 
the differing statutes authorizing detention of 
the various class members will render class 
adjudication of class members' claims 
impractical or undermine effective 
representation of the class” could be 
addressed through “the formation of 
subclasses.” 
 
261 
  
The government petitioned our court for 
panel rehearing or rehearing en banc. In 
response, the panel amended the opinion to 
expand its explanation of why the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) does not bar 
certification of the class and, with that 
amendment, unanimously voted to deny the 
government's petition. The full court was 
advised of the suggestion for rehearing en 
banc, and no judge requested a vote on 
whether to rehear the matter. The government 
did not file a petition for certiorari in the 
United States Supreme Court. 
 
On remand, the district court certified a class 
defined as: 
 
   “…all non-citizens within the Central 
District of California who: (1) are or were 
detained for longer than six months pursuant 
to one of the general immigration detention 
statutes pending completion of removal 
proceedings, including judicial review, (2) 
are not and have not been detained pursuant 
to a national security detention statute, and 
(3) have not been afforded a hearing to 
determine whether their detention is 
justified.” 
 
The district court also approved the proposed 
subclasses, which correspond to the four 
statutes under which the class members are 
detained—8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 
1226(c), and 1231(a). The class does not 
include suspected terrorists, who are detained 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1537. Additionally, 
because the class is defined as non-citizens 
who are detained “pending completion of 
removal proceedings,” it excludes any 
detainee subject to a final order of removal. 
 
On September 13, 2012, the district court 
entered a preliminary injunction that applied 
to class members detained pursuant to two of 
these four “general immigration detention 
statutes”— §§ 1225(b) and 1226(c). Under 
the preliminary injunction, the government 
was required to “provide each [detainee] with 
a bond hearing” before an IJ and to “release 
each Subclass member on reasonable 
conditions of supervision ... unless the 
government shows by clear and convincing 
evidence that continued detention is justified 
based on his or her danger to the community 
or risk of flight.” 
 
The government appealed, and on April 16, 
2013, we affirmed. We applied the Court's 
preliminary injunction standard set forth in 
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., which requires the petitioner to 
“establish that he is likely to succeed on the 
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable 
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that 
the balance of equities tips in his favor, and 
that an injunction is in the public interest.” 
 
Evaluating petitioners' likelihood of success 
on the merits, we began with the premise that 
“[f]reedom from imprisonment—from 
government custody, detention, or other 
forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart 
of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause 
protects.” “Thus, the Supreme Court has held 
that the indefinite detention of a once-
admitted alien ‘would raise serious 
constitutional concerns.’ ”  
 
Addressing those concerns, we recognized 
that we were not writing on a clean slate: 
“[I]n a series of decisions since 2001, ‘the 
Supreme Court and this court have grappled 
in piece-meal fashion with whether the 
various immigration detention statutes may 
authorize indefinite or prolonged detention of 
detainees and, if so, may do so without 
providing a bond hearing.’ ” First, in 
Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court 
resolved statutory and due process challenges 
to indefinite detention under 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(a)(6), which governs detention beyond 
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the ninety-day removal period, where 
removal was not practicable—for one 
petitioner because he was stateless, and for 
another because his home country had no 
repatriation treaty with the United States. 
 
Drawing on civil commitment jurisprudence, 
the Court reasoned: 
 
A statute permitting indefinite detention of an 
alien would raise a serious constitutional 
problem. The Fifth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause forbids the Government to 
“depriv[e]” any “person ... of ... liberty ... 
without due process of law.” Freedom from 
imprisonment—from government custody, 
detention, or other forms of physical 
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that 
Clause protects. And this Court has said that 
government detention violates that Clause 
unless the detention is ordered in a criminal 
proceeding with adequate procedural 
protections, or, in certain special and 
“narrow” nonpunitive “circumstances,” 
where a special justification, such as harm-
threatening mental illness, outweighs the 
“individual's constitutionally protected 
interest in avoiding physical restraint.” To 
avoid those “serious constitutional 
concerns,” the Court held that § 1231(a)(6) 
does not authorize indefinite detention 
without a bond hearing. Noting that the 
“proceedings at issue here are civil, not 
criminal,” the Court “construe[d] the statute 
to contain an implicit ‘reasonable time’ 
limitation,” and recognized six months as a 
“presumptively reasonable period of 
detention.” 
 
Although in dissent, Justice Kennedy, joined 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, disagreed with 
the majority's application of the canon of 
constitutional avoidance and argued that the 
holding would improperly interfere with 
international repatriation negotiations, 
Justice Kennedy recognized that “both 
removable and inadmissible aliens are 
entitled to be free from detention that is 
arbitrary or capricious.” Justice Kennedy 
further noted that although the government 
may detain non-citizens “when necessary to 
avoid the risk of flight or danger to the 
community,” due process requires “adequate 
procedures to review their cases, allowing 
persons once subject to detention to show that 
through rehabilitation, new appreciation of 
their responsibilities, or under *1068 other 
standards, they no longer present special risks 
or danger if put at large.”  
 
Second, in Demore v. Kim, the Court 
addressed a due process challenge to 
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(c), which applies to non-citizens 
convicted of certain crimes. After discussing 
Congress's reasons for establishing 
mandatory detention, namely, high rates of 
crime and flight by removable non-citizens,  
the Court affirmed its “longstanding view 
that the Government may constitutionally 
detain deportable aliens during the limited 
period necessary for their removal 
proceedings.” Distinguishing Zadvydas, the 
Court in Demore stressed that detention 
under § 1226(c) has “a definite termination 
point” and typically “lasts for less than the 90 
days we considered presumptively valid in 
Zadvydas.” Although the Court therefore 
upheld mandatory detention under § 1226(c), 
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, which 
created the majority, reasoned that “a lawful 
permanent resident alien such as respondent 
could be entitled to an individualized 
determination as to his risk of flight and 
dangerousness if the continued detention 
became unreasonable or unjustified.”  
 
After Zadvydas and Demore, our court 
decided several cases that provided further 
guidance for our analysis in Rodriguez II. In 
Tijani v. Willis, we held that the 
constitutionality of detaining a lawful 
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permanent resident under § 1226(c) for over 
32 months was “doubtful.” “To avoid 
deciding the constitutional issue, we 
interpret[ed] the authority conferred by § 
1226(c) as applying to expedited removal of 
criminal aliens” and held that “[t]wo years 
and eight months of process is not 
expeditious.” We therefore remanded Tijani's 
habeas petition to the district court with 
directions to grant the writ unless the 
government provided a bond hearing before 
an IJ within sixty days.  
 
We next considered civil detention in the 
immigration context in Casas–Castrillon v. 
Department of Homeland Security (Casas ). 
There, a lawful permanent resident who had 
been detained for nearly seven years under § 
1226(c) and then § 1226(a) sought habeas 
relief while his petition for review of his 
removal order was pending before our court. 
Applying Demore, we reasoned that § 
1226(c) “authorize [s] mandatory detention 
only for the ‘limited period of [the non-
citizen's] removal proceedings,’ which the 
Court estimated ‘lasts roughly a month and a 
half in the vast majority of cases in which it 
is invoked, and about five months in the 
minority of cases in which the alien chooses 
to appeal’ his removal order to the [Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) ].” We 
therefore concluded that § 1226(c)'s 
mandatory detention provision applies only 
during administrative removal 
proceedings—i.e. until the BIA affirms a 
removal order. From that point until the 
circuit court has “rejected [the applicant's] 
final petition for review or his time to seek 
such review expires,” the government has 
discretionary authority to detain the non-
citizen pursuant to § 1226(a). We noted, 
however, that “[t]here is a difference between 
detention being authorized and being 
necessary as to any particular person.” 
Because the Court's holding in Demore 
turned on the brevity of mandatory detention 
under § 1226(c), we concluded that “the 
government may not detain a legal permanent 
resident such as Casas for a prolonged period 
without providing him a neutral forum in 
which to contest the necessity of his 
continued detention.” 
 
Soon after, in Singh v. Holder, we clarified 
the procedural requirements for bond 
hearings held pursuant to our decision in 
Casas (“Casas hearings”). In light of “the 
substantial liberty interest at stake,” we held 
that “due process requires a 
contemporaneous record of Casas hearings,” 
and that the government bears the burden of 
proving “by clear and convincing evidence 
that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the 
community to justify denial of bond.” To 
evaluate whether the government has met its 
burden, we instructed IJs to consider the 
factors set forth in In re Guerra, in particular 
“the alien's criminal record, including the 
extensiveness of criminal activity, the 
recency of such activity, and the seriousness 
of the offenses.” 
 
Finally, in Diouf v. Napolitano, we extended 
the procedural protections established in 
Casas to individuals detained under § 
1231(a)(6). We held that “prolonged 
detention under § 1231(a)(6), without 
adequate procedural protections,” like 
prolonged detention under § 1226(a), “would 
raise ‘serious constitutional concerns.’ ” To 
address those concerns, we held that “an alien 
facing prolonged detention under § 
1231(a)(6) is entitled to a bond hearing 
before an immigration judge and is entitled to 
be released from detention unless the 
government establishes that the alien poses a 
risk of flight or a danger to the community.” 
 
In Diouf II, we also adopted a definition of 
“prolonged” detention—detention that “has 
lasted six months and is expected to continue 
more than minimally beyond six months”—
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for purposes of administering the Casas bond 
hearing requirement. We reasoned that: 
 
    “When detention crosses the six-month 
threshold and release or removal is not 
imminent, the private interests at stake are 
profound. Furthermore, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of liberty in the 
absence of a hearing before a neutral 
decisionmaker is substantial. The burden 
imposed on the government by requiring 
hearings before an immigration judge at this 
stage of the proceedings is therefore a 
reasonable one.” 
 
Applying these precedents to Rodriguez class 
members detained under § 1226(c), which 
requires civil detention of non-citizens 
previously convicted of certain crimes who 
have already served their state or federal 
periods of incarceration, we have concluded 
that “the prolonged detention of an alien 
without an individualized determination of 
his dangerousness or flight risk would be 
constitutionally doubtful.” To avoid these 
constitutional concerns, we held that “ § 
1226(c)'s mandatory language must be 
construed ‘to contain an implicit reasonable 
time limitation, the application of which is 
subject to federal-court review.’ ” “[W]hen 
detention becomes prolonged,” i.e., at the 
six-month mark, “ § 1226(c) becomes 
inapplicable”; the government's authority to 
detain the non-citizen shifts to § 1226(a), 
which provides for discretionary detention; 
and detainees are then entitled to bond 
hearings.  
 
In so holding, we rejected the government's 
attempt to distinguish Casas on the basis that 
“Casas concerned an alien who had received 
an administratively final removal order, 
sought judicial review, and obtained a 
remand to the BIA,” whereas this case 
involves “aliens awaiting the conclusion of 
their initial administrative proceedings.” We 
found that this argument reflected “a 
distinction without a difference”: “ 
‘Regardless of the stage of the proceedings, 
the same important interest is at stake—
freedom from prolonged detention.’ ”  
 
We also noted that our conclusion was 
consistent with the decisions of the two other 
circuits that have directly addressed this 
issue. In Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security, the 
Third Circuit, applying the canon of 
constitutional avoidance, construed § 1226(c) 
to “authorize [ ] detention for a reasonable 
amount of time, after which the authorities 
must make an individualized inquiry into 
whether detention is still necessary to fulfill 
the statute's purposes of ensuring that an alien 
attends removal proceedings and that his 
release will not pose a danger to the 
community.” Applying that holding to the 
facts of the case, the Third Circuit held that 
the petitioner's detention, which had lasted 
nearly three years, “was unconstitutionally 
unreasonable and, therefore, a violation of 
the Due Process Clause.” Although the court 
declined to adopt a categorical definition of a 
“reasonable amount of time” to detain a non-
citizen without a bond hearing, it read 
Demore as we do—to connect the 
constitutionality of detention to its length and 
to authorize detention only for a “limited 
time.”  
 
Likewise, in Ly v. Hansen, the Sixth Circuit 
held that, to avoid a constitutional problem, 
removable non-citizens may be detained 
under § 1226(c) only “for a reasonable period 
of time required to initiate and conclude 
removal proceedings promptly.” Finding that 
the petitioner's 500–day–long detention was 
“unreasonable,” the Sixth Circuit affirmed 
the district court's grant of a writ of habeas 
corpus. While maintaining that a “bright-line 
time limitation, as imposed in Zadvydas, 
would not be appropriate for the pre-removal 
period,” the court recognized that Demore's 
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holding “rel[ies] on the fact that Kim, and 
persons like him, will normally have their 
proceedings completed within a short period 
of time and will actually be deported, or will 
be released.” 
 
As to the Rodriguez subclass detained under 
§ 1225(b), we found “no basis for 
distinguishing between” non-citizens 
detained under that section and under § 
1226(c). The cases relied upon by the 
government for the proposition that arriving 
aliens are entitled to lesser due process 
protections—namely, Shaughnessy v. United 
States ex rel. Mezei and Barrera–Echavarria 
v. Rison—were decided under pre-IIRIRA 
law and, as such, were inapposite. We 
therefore held that “to the extent detention 
under § 1225(b) is mandatory, it is implicitly 
time-limited.” As we had with § 1226(c), we 
explained that “the government's detention 
authority does not completely dissipate at six 
months; rather, the mandatory provisions of 
§ 1225(b) simply expire at six months, at 
which point the government's authority to 
detain the non-citizen would shift to § 
1226(a), which is discretionary and which we 
have already held requires a bond hearing.”  
 
After establishing that class members 
detained under § 1226(c) and § 1225(b) are 
entitled to bond hearings after six months of 
detention, we clarified that the procedural 
requirements set forth in Singh apply to those 
hearings. These requirements include 
proceedings before “a neutral IJ” at which 
“the government bear[s] the burden of proof 
by clear and convincing evidence,” a lower 
burden of proof than that required to sustain 
a criminal charge. 
 
Having found that the class was likely to 
succeed on the merits, we turned to the other 
preliminary injunction factors. We found that 
the class members “clearly face irreparable 
harm in the absence of the preliminary 
injunction” because “the deprivation of 
constitutional rights unquestionably 
constitutes irreparable injury.” The 
preliminary injunction safeguards 
constitutional rights by ensuring that 
“individuals whom the government cannot 
prove constitute a flight risk or a danger to 
public safety, and sometimes will not succeed 
in removing at all, are not needlessly 
detained.” Similarly, we found that the 
balance of equities favored the class 
members because “needless prolonged 
detention” imposes “major hardship,” 
whereas the government “cannot suffer harm 
from an injunction that merely ends an 
unlawful practice or reads a statute as 
required to avoid constitutional concerns.” 
Finally, we held that the preliminary 
injunction was consistent with the public 
interest, which is “implicated when a 
constitutional right has been violated,” and 
“benefits from a preliminary injunction that 
ensures that federal statutes are construed and 
implemented in a manner that avoids serious 
constitutional questions.” We therefore 
affirmed the district court's order. 
 
During the pendency of Rodriguez II, the 
parties conducted discovery, and class 
counsel adduced extensive evidence detailing 
the circumstances under which class 
members are detained. The parties then filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment, and 
the petitioners moved for a permanent 
injunction to extend and expand the 
preliminary injunction. 
 
On August 6, 2013, after we issued our 
decision in Rodriguez II, the district court 
granted summary judgment to the class 
members and entered a permanent injunction. 
The permanent injunction applies to class 
members detained under any of the four civil 
“general immigration detention statutes”—
§§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a)—
and requires the government to provide each 
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detainee with a bond hearing by his 195th day 
of detention. Applying our decisions in 
Casas, Singh, and Rodriguez II, the district 
court further ordered that bond hearings 
occur automatically, that detainees receive 
“comprehendible notice,” that the 
government bear the burden of proving “by 
clear and convincing evidence that a detainee 
is a flight risk or a danger to the community 
to justify the denial of bond,” and that 
hearings are recorded. However, the district 
court declined to order IJs to consider the 
length of detention or the likelihood of 
removal during bond hearings, or to provide 
periodic hearings for detainees who are not 
released after their first hearing. 
 
The government now appeals from the entry 
of the permanent injunction, arguing that the 
district court—and we—erred in applying the 
canon of constitutional avoidance to each of 
the statutes at issue. Relying on the Supreme 
Court's decisions in Zadvydas and Demore, 
the government argues that none of the 
subclasses are categorically entitled to bond 
hearings after six months of detention. 
Accordingly, the government contends that 
we should decertify the class and instead 
permit as-applied challenges to individual 
instances of prolonged detention, which 
could occur only through habeas 
proceedings. Petitioners counter that 
Rodriguez II is the law of the case and law of 
the circuit, requiring us to affirm the 
permanent injunction as to the § 1225(b) and 
§ 1226(c) subclasses, and that non-citizens 
detained pursuant to § 1226(a) and § 1231(a) 
are entitled to bond hearings for reasons 
similar to those discussed in Rodriguez II. 
Petitioners cross-appeal the district court's 
order as to the procedural requirements for 
bond hearings; they argue that the district 
court erred in declining to require that IJs 
consider the likelihood of removal and the 
total length of detention, and in declining to 
require that non-citizens detained for twelve 
or more months receive periodic bond 
hearings every six months. 
 
II. Nature of Civil Immigration Detention 
 
Class members spend, on average, 404 days 
in immigration detention. Nearly half are 
detained for more than one year, one in five 
for more than eighteen months, and one in ten 
for more than two years. In some cases, 
detention has lasted much longer: As of April 
28, 2012, when the government generated 
data to produce to the petitioners, one class 
member had been detained for 1,585 days, 
approaching four and a half years of civil 
confinement. 
 
Non-citizens who vigorously pursue claims 
for relief from removal face substantially 
longer detention periods than those who 
concede removability. Requesting relief from 
an IJ increases the duration of class members' 
detention by an average of two months; 
appealing a claim to the BIA adds, on 
average, another four months; and appealing 
a BIA decision to the Ninth Circuit typically 
leads to an additional eleven months of 
confinement. Class members who persevere 
through this lengthy process are often 
successful: About 71% of class members 
have sought relief from removal, and roughly 
one-third of those individuals prevailed. 
However, many detainees choose to give up 
meritorious claims and voluntarily leave the 
country instead of enduring years of 
immigration detention awaiting a judicial 
finding of their lawful status. 
 
Class members frequently have strong ties to 
this country: Many immigrated to the United 
States as children, obtained legal permanent 
resident status, and lived in this country for 
as long as twenty years before ICE initiated 
removal proceedings. As a result, hundreds 
of class members are married to U.S. citizens 
or lawful permanent residents, and have 
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children who were born in this country. 
Further, many class members hold steady 
jobs—including as electricians, auto 
mechanics, and roofers—to provide for 
themselves and their families. At home, they 
are caregivers for young children, aging 
parents, and sick or disabled relatives. To the 
extent class members have any criminal 
record—and many have no criminal history 
whatsoever—it is often limited to minor 
controlled substances offenses. Accordingly, 
when class members do receive bond 
hearings, they often produce glowing letters 
of support from relatives, friends, employers, 
and clergy attesting to their character and 
contributions to their communities. 
 
Prolonged detention imposes severe hardship 
on class members and their families. Civil 
immigration detainees are treated much like 
criminals serving time: They are typically 
housed in shared jail cells with no privacy 
and limited access to larger spaces or the 
outdoors. Confinement makes it more 
difficult to retain or meet with legal counsel, 
and the resources in detention facility law 
libraries are minimal at best, thereby 
compounding the challenges of navigating 
the complexities of immigration law and 
proceedings. In addition, visitation is 
restricted and is often no-contact, 
dramatically disrupting family relationships. 
While in detention, class members have 
missed their children's births and their 
parents' funerals. After losing a vital source 
of income, class members' spouses have 
sought government assistance, and their 
children have dropped out of college. 
 
Lead petitioner Alejandro Rodriguez's story 
is illustrative. Rodriguez came to the United 
States as an infant and has lived here 
continuously since then. Rodriguez is a 
lawful permanent resident of the United 
States, and his entire immediate family—
including his parents, siblings, and three 
young children—also resides in the United 
States as citizens or lawful permanent 
residents. Before his removal proceedings 
began, Rodriguez worked as a dental 
assistant. In 2003, however, Rodriguez was 
convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance and sentenced to five years of 
probation and no jail time. He had one 
previous conviction, for “joyriding.” 
 
In 2004, ICE commenced removal 
proceedings and subjected Rodriguez to civil 
detention. An IJ determined that Rodriguez's 
prior conviction for “joyriding,” i.e. driving a 
stolen vehicle, qualified as an “aggravated 
felony” that rendered him ineligible for relief 
in the form of cancellation of removal, and 
therefore ordered him removed. Rodriguez 
appealed the IJ's decision to the BIA, which 
affirmed, and then to the Ninth Circuit. In 
July 2005, a three-judge panel of our court 
granted the government's motion to hold 
Rodriguez's case in abeyance until the 
Supreme Court decided a related case, 
Gonzales v. Penuliar, which issued eighteen 
months later, in January 2007. In Penuliar, 
the Supreme Court vacated our court's 
opinion and remanded for further 
consideration in light of Gonzales v. Duenas–
Alvarez, which held that violating a 
California statute prohibiting taking a vehicle 
without the owner's consent qualifies as a 
“theft offense.” Between July 2005 and 
January 2007, while Rodriguez's case was in 
abeyance, ICE conducted four custody 
reviews on Rodriguez and repeatedly 
determined that Rodriguez was required to 
remain in detention until our court issued a 
decision on the merits of his claim. In mid–
2007, about a month after Rodriguez had 
moved for class certification, however, ICE 
released him. At that point, Rodriguez had 
been detained for 1,189 days, roughly three 
years and three months. In April 2008, in the 
related case on remand from the Supreme 
Court, our court held that driving a stolen 
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vehicle did not qualify as an aggravated 
felony. On motion of the parties, we then 
remanded Rodriguez's petition to the BIA, 
which granted his application for cancellation 
of removal, vindicating his right to lawfully 
remain in the United States. 
 
III. Standard of Review 
 
“We review a grant of summary judgment de 
novo.” “A permanent injunction ‘involves 
factual, legal, and discretionary components,’ 
so we ‘review a decision to grant such relief 
under several different standards.’” “We 
review legal conclusions ... de novo, factual 
findings for clear error, and the scope of the 
injunction for abuse of discretion.” 
 
IV. Discussion 
 
In resolving whether the district court erred 
in entering the permanent injunction, we 
consider, first, petitioners' entitlement to 
bond hearings and, second, the procedural 
requirements for such hearings. Based on our 
precedents, we hold that the canon of 
constitutional avoidance requires us to 
construe the statutory scheme to provide all 
class members who are in prolonged 
detention with bond hearings at which the 
government bears the burden of proving by 
clear and convincing evidence that the class 
member is a danger to the community or a 
flight risk. However, we also conclude that 
individuals detained under § 1231(a) are not 
members of the certified class. We affirm the 
district court's order insofar as it requires 
automatic bond hearings and requires IJs to 
consider alternatives to detention because we 
presume, like the district court, that IJs are 
already doing so when determining whether 
to release a non-citizen on bond.5 Because 
the same constitutional concerns arise when 
detention approaches another prolonged 
period, we hold that IJs must provide bond 
hearings periodically at six month intervals 
for class members detained for more than 
twelve months. However, we reject the 
class's suggestion that we mandate additional 
procedural requirements. 
 
A. Civil Detention 
 
“In our society liberty is the norm, and 
detention prior to trial or without trial is the 
carefully limited exception.” Civil detention 
violates the Due Process Clause except “in 
certain special and narrow nonpunitive 
circumstances, where a special justification, 
such as harm-threatening mental illness, 
outweighs the individual's constitutionally 
protected interest in avoiding physical 
restraint.” Consistent with these principles, 
the Supreme Court has—outside of the 
immigration context—found civil detention 
constitutional without any individualized 
showing of need only when faced with the 
unique exigencies of global war or domestic 
insurrection. And even in those extreme 
circumstances, the Court's decisions have 
been widely criticized. In all contexts apart 
from immigration and military detention, the 
Court has found that the Constitution requires 
some individualized process and a judicial or 
administrative finding that a legitimate 
governmental interest justifies detention of 
the person in question. 
 
For example, in numerous cases addressing 
the civil detention of mentally ill persons, the 
Court has consistently recognized that such 
commitment “constitutes a significant 
deprivation of liberty,” and so the state “must 
have a constitutionally adequate purpose for 
the confinement.” Further, the “nature and 
duration of commitment” must “bear some 
reasonable relation to the purpose for which 
the individual is committed.”  
 
Accordingly, the state may detain a criminal 
defendant found incapable of standing trial, 
but only for “the reasonable period of time 
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necessary to determine whether there is a 
substantial probability that he will attain [the] 
capacity [to stand trial] in the foreseeable 
future.” At all times, the individual's 
“commitment must be justified by progress 
toward that goal.” Likewise, the state may 
detain a criminal defendant following an 
acquittal by reason of insanity in order to 
“treat the individual's mental illness and 
protect him and society from his potential 
dangerousness.” However, the detainee “is 
entitled to release when he has recovered his 
sanity or is no longer dangerous.” Further, 
although the state may detain sexually 
dangerous individuals even after they have 
completed their criminal sentences, such 
confinement must “take[ ] place pursuant to 
proper procedures and evidentiary 
standards.” To “justify indefinite involuntary 
commitment,” the state must prove both 
“dangerousness” and “some additional 
factor, such as a ‘mental illness' or ‘mental 
abnormality.’ ” 
 
Similarly, the Court has held that pretrial 
detention of individuals charged with “the 
most serious of crimes” is constitutional only 
because, under the Bail Reform Act, an 
“arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention 
hearing” to determine whether his 
confinement is necessary to prevent danger to 
the community. Further, “the maximum 
length of pretrial detention is limited by the 
stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial 
Act.”  
 
In addition, the Court has held that 
incarceration of individuals held in civil 
contempt is consistent with due process only 
where the contemnor receives adequate 
procedural protections and the court makes 
specific findings as to the individual's ability 
to comply with the court order. If compliance 
is impossible—for instance, if the individual 
lacks the financial resources to pay court-
ordered child support—then contempt 
sanctions do not serve their purpose of 
coercing compliance and therefore violate the 
Due Process Clause.  
 
Early cases upholding immigration detention 
policies were a product of their time. Yet 
even these cases recognized some limits on 
detention of non-citizens pending removal. 
Such detention may not be punitive—
Congress may not, for example, impose 
sentences of “imprisonment at hard labor” on 
non-citizens awaiting deportation—and it 
must be supported by a legitimate regulatory 
purpose. Under these principles, the Court 
authorized the “detention or temporary 
confinement” of Chinese-born non-citizens 
“pending the inquiry into their true character, 
and while arrangements were being made for 
their deportation.” The Court also upheld 
executive detention of enemy aliens after the 
cessation of active hostilities because 
deportation is “hardly practicable” in the 
midst of war, and enemy aliens' “potency for 
mischief” continues “even when the guns are 
silent.” Similarly, the Court approved 
detention of communists to limit their 
“opportunities to hurt the United States 
during the pendency of deportation 
proceedings.” The Court recognized, 
however, that “purpose to injure could not be 
imputed generally to all aliens subject to 
deportation.” Rather, if the Attorney General 
wished to exercise his discretion to deny bail, 
he was required to do so at a hearing, the 
results of which were subject to judicial 
review. 
 
More recently, the Supreme Court has drawn 
on decades of civil detention jurisprudence to 
hold that “[a] statute permitting indefinite 
detention of an alien would raise a serious 
constitutional problem.” Although the state 
has legitimate interests in “ensuring the 
appearance of aliens at future immigration 
proceedings” and “protecting the 
community,” post-removal period detention 
270 
  
does not uniformly “ ‘bear[ ] [a] reasonable 
relation to the purpose for which the 
individual [was] committed.’ ” To avoid 
constitutional concerns, the Court construed 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), the statute governing 
post—removal period detention, to “limit[ ] 
an alien's post-removal-period detention to a 
period reasonably necessary to bring about 
that alien's removal from the United States.” 
Detention beyond that point requires “strong 
procedural protections” and a finding that the 
non-citizen is “specially dangerous.”  
 
Soon after Zadvydas, the Court rejected a due 
process challenge to mandatory detention 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which applies to 
non-citizens convicted of certain crimes. 
While affirming its “longstanding view that 
the Government may constitutionally detain 
deportable aliens during the limited period 
necessary for their removal proceedings,” the 
Court emphasized that detention under § 
1226(c) was constitutionally permissible 
because it has “a definite termination point” 
and typically “lasts for less than ... 90 days.” 
 
Since Zadvydas and Demore, our court has 
“grappled in piece-meal fashion with whether 
the various immigration detention statutes 
may authorize indefinite or prolonged 
detention of detainees and, if so, may do so 
without providing a bond hearing.” As we 
recognized in Casas, “prolonged detention 
without adequate procedural protections 
would raise serious constitutional concerns.” 
We have therefore held that non-citizens 
detained pursuant to § 1226(a) and § 
1231(a)(6) are entitled to bond hearings 
before an IJ when detention becomes 
prolonged.  
 
While the government falsely equates the 
bond hearing requirement to mandated 
release from detention or facial invalidation 
of a general detention statute, our precedents 
make clear that there is a distinction 
“between detention being authorized and 
being necessary as to any particular person.” 
Bond hearings do not restrict the 
government's legitimate authority to detain 
inadmissible or deportable non-citizens; 
rather, they merely require the government to 
“justify denial of bond” with clear and 
convincing “evidence that an alien is a flight 
risk or danger to the community.” And, in the 
end, the government is required only to 
establish that it has a legitimate interest 
reasonably related to continued detention; the 
discretion to release a non-citizen on bond or 
other conditions remains soundly in the 
judgment of the immigration judges the 
Department of Justice employs. 
 
Prior decisions have also clarified that 
detention becomes “prolonged” at the six-
month mark. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court 
recognized six months as a “presumptively 
reasonable period of detention.” By way of 
background, the Court noted that in 1996, 
Congress had “shorten[ed] the removal 
period from six months to 90 days.” The 
Court then explained: 
 
    While an argument can be made for 
confining any presumption to 90 days, we 
doubt that when Congress shortened the 
removal period to 90 days in 1996 it believed 
that all reasonably foreseeable removals 
could be accomplished in that time. We do 
have reason to believe, however, that 
Congress previously doubted the 
constitutionality of detention for more than 
six months. Consequently, for the sake of 
uniform administration in the federal courts, 
we recognize that period. 
 
Following Zadvydas, we have defined 
detention as “prolonged” when “it has lasted 
six months and is expected to continue more 
than minimally beyond six months.” At that 
point, we have explained, “the private 
interests at stake are profound,” and “the risk 
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of an erroneous deprivation of liberty in the 
absence of a hearing before a neutral 
decisionmaker is substantial.” 
 
B. Entitlement to a Bond Hearing 
 
With this well-established precedent of the 
Supreme Court and our Court in mind, we 
review the district court's grant of summary 
judgment and entry of a permanent 
injunction. We consider, in turn, whether 
individuals detained under §§ 1226(c), 
1225(b), 1226(a), and 1231(a) are entitled to 
bond hearings after they have been detained 
for six months. 
 
1. The § 1226(c) Subclass 
 
Section 1226(c) requires that the Attorney 
General detain any non-citizen who is 
inadmissible or deportable because of his 
criminal history upon that person's release 
from imprisonment, pending proceedings to 
remove him from the United States. 
Detention under § 1226(c) is mandatory. 
Individuals detained under that section are 
not eligible for release on bond or parole; 
they may be released only if the Attorney 
General deems it “necessary” for witness 
protection purposes, id. § 1226(c)(2). 
 
An individual detained under § 1226(c) may 
ask an IJ to reconsider whether the mandatory 
detention provision applies to him, but such 
review is limited in scope and addresses only 
whether the individual is properly included in 
a category of non-citizens subject to 
mandatory detention based on his criminal 
history. At a “Joseph hearing,” a detainee 
“may avoid mandatory detention by 
demonstrating that he is not an alien, was not 
convicted of the predicate crime, or that the 
[DHS] is otherwise substantially unlikely to 
establish that he is in fact subject to 
mandatory detention.” “A determination in 
favor of an alien” at a Joseph hearing “does 
not lead to automatic release,” because the 
government retains discretionary authority to 
detain the individual under § 1226(a). 
Instead, such a determination allows the IJ to 
consider granting bond under the § 1226(a) 
standards, namely, whether the detainee 
would pose a danger or flight risk if released.  
 
As a result of § 1226(c)'s mandatory language 
and the limited review available through a 
Joseph hearing, individuals are often 
detained for years without adequate process. 
Members of the § 1226(c) subclass also tend 
to be detained for longer periods than other 
class members: The longest-detained class 
member was confined for 1,585 days and 
counting as of April 28, 2012, and the 
average subclass member faces detention for 
427 days. These lengthy detention times bear 
no relationship to the seriousness of class 
members' criminal history or the lengths of 
their previously served criminal sentences. In 
several instances identified by class counsel, 
a class member was sentenced to one to three 
months in prison for a minor controlled 
substances offense, then endured one or two 
years in immigration detention. Nor do these 
detention durations bear any relation to the 
merits of the subclass members' claims: Of 
the § 1226(c) subclass members who apply 
for relief from removal, roughly 40% are 
granted such relief, a rate even higher than 
that of the overall class. 
In Rodriguez II, we held that “the prolonged 
detention of an alien [under § 1226(c) ] 
without an individualized determination of 
his dangerousness or flight risk would be 
constitutionally doubtful.” To avoid these 
“constitutional concerns, § 1226(c)'s 
mandatory language must be construed ‘to 
contain an implicit reasonable time 
limitation.’ ” Accordingly, at the six-month 
mark, “when detention becomes prolonged, § 
1226(c) becomes inapplicable,” and “the 
Attorney General's detention authority rests 
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with § 1226(a).” Under Casas, those 
detainees are then entitled to a bond hearing. 
 
Contrary to the government's argument, this 
holding is consistent with the text of § 
1226(c), which requires that the government 
detain certain non-citizens but does not 
mandate such detention for any particular 
length of time. Our holding is also consistent 
with the Supreme Court's decision in 
Demore, which turned on the brevity of the 
detention at issue.  
 
Since Rodriguez II, no intervening changes in 
the law have affected our conclusions. 
Neither the Supreme Court nor our Circuit 
has had occasion to reexamine these issues, 
and the Third and Sixth Circuits have not 
changed the positions they adopted in Diop 
and Ly, respectively.  
 
Moreover, district courts have relied on 
Rodriguez II in resolving numerous habeas 
petitions filed by immigration detainees.  
 
Thus, Rodriguez II is law of the case and law 
of the circuit. As we recently explained, the 
“law of the case doctrine” provides that “a 
court will generally refuse to reconsider an 
issue that has already been decided by the 
same court or a higher court in the same 
case.” Likewise, pursuant to the “ ‘law of the 
circuit’ rule,” “a published decision of this 
court constitutes binding authority which 
‘must be followed unless and until overruled 
by a body competent to do so.’ ”  
 
The “ ‘general rule’ is that our decisions ‘at 
the preliminary injunction phase do not 
constitute the law of the case.’ ” Because 
preliminary injunction decisions are often 
“made hastily and on less than a full record,” 
they “may provide little guidance as to the 
appropriate disposition on the merits.” 
However, “there is an exception to the 
general rule for ‘conclusions on pure issues 
of law.’ ”  
 
The question resolved in Rodriguez II—
whether non-citizens subject to prolonged 
detention under § 1226(c) are entitled to bond 
hearings—is a pure question of law. We 
interpreted the statute by applying the canon 
of constitutional avoidance, and were bound 
to do so by our prior precedent. The decision 
was not made “hastily”; it provided a “fully 
considered appellate ruling” on the legal 
issues.  
 
2. The § 1225(b) Subclass 
 
Section 1225(b) applies to “applicants for 
admission” who are stopped at the border or 
a port of entry, or who are “present in the 
United States” but “ha[ve] not been 
admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). The statute 
provides that asylum seekers “shall be 
detained pending a final determination of 
credible fear of persecution and, if found not 
to have such a fear, until removed.” As to all 
other applicants for admission, the statute 
provides that “if the examining immigration 
officer determines that an alien seeking 
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt 
entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be 
detained” for removal proceedings.  
 
Under DHS regulations, non-citizens 
detained pursuant to § 1225(b) are generally 
not eligible for release on bond. If there are 
“urgent humanitarian reasons or significant 
public benefit[s]” at stake, however, the 
Attorney General has discretion to 
temporarily parole such an individual into the 
United States, provided that the individual 
presents neither a danger nor a risk of flight. 
Because parole decisions under § 1182 are 
purely discretionary, they cannot be appealed 
to IJs or courts. This lack of review has 
proven especially problematic when 
immigration officers have denied parole 
273 
  
based on blatant errors: In two separate cases 
identified by the petitioners, for example, 
officers apparently denied parole because 
they had confused Ethiopia with Somalia. 
And in a third case, an officer denied parole 
because he had mixed up two detainees' files. 
As with § 1226(c), the government often cites 
§ 1225(b)'s mandatory language to justify 
indefinite civil detention without an 
individualized determination as to whether 
the detainee would pose a danger or flight 
risk if released. Section 1225(b) subclass 
members have been detained for as long as 
831 days, and for an average of 346 days 
each. These individuals apply for and receive 
relief from removal at very high rates: 94% 
apply, and of those who apply, 64% are 
granted relief. In illustrative cases identified 
by the petitioners, non-citizens fled to the 
United States after surviving kidnapping, 
torture, and murder of their family members 
in their home countries. Upon arrival, these 
individuals were detained under § 1225(b), 
and they remained in detention until the 
government granted their asylum 
applications hundreds of days later. 
 
In Rodriguez II, we extended Casas and held 
that to avoid serious constitutional concerns, 
mandatory detention under § 1225(b), like 
mandatory detention under § 1226(c), must 
be construed as implicitly time-limited. 
Accordingly, “the mandatory provisions of § 
1225(b) simply expire at six months, at which 
point the government's authority to detain the 
alien shifts to § 1226(a), which is 
discretionary and which we have already held 
requires a bond hearing.”  
 
In so holding, we recognized that many 
members of the § 1225(b) subclass are 
subject to the “entry fiction” doctrine, under 
which non-citizens seeking admission to the 
United States “may physically be allowed 
within its borders pending a determination of 
admissibility,” but “are legally considered to 
be detained at the border and hence as never 
having effected entry into this country.” Such 
non-citizens therefore “enjoy very limited 
protections under the United States 
constitution.” However, even if the majority 
of prolonged detentions under § 1225(b) are 
constitutionally permissible, “the Supreme 
Court has instructed that, where one possible 
application of a statute raises constitutional 
concerns, the statute as a whole should be 
construed through the prism of constitutional 
avoidance.” Section 1225(b) applies to 
several categories of lawful permanent 
residents who are not subject to the entry 
fiction doctrine but may be treated as seeking 
admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C). 
Because those persons are entitled to due 
process protections under the Fifth 
Amendment, prolonged detention without 
bond hearings would raise serious 
constitutional concerns. We therefore 
construed the statutory scheme to require a 
bond hearing after six months of detention 
under § 1225(b).  
 
The government now argues that “[d]espite 
years of discovery, petitioners have not 
identified any member of the Section 1225(b) 
subclass who is a [lawful permanent 
resident].” Petitioners represent that they 
have found lawful permanent residents who 
have been detained for more than six months 
under § 1225(b), although their submissions 
do not identify any specific individuals who 
fit that description. The question, however, is 
whether “one possible application of [the] 
statute raises constitutional concerns.” 
Because the government concedes that 
detention of lawful permanent residents 
under § 1225(b) is possible under § 
1101(a)(13)(C), “the statute as a whole 
should be construed through the prism of 
constitutional avoidance.”  
 
The government also argues that lawful 
permanent residents treated as seeking 
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admission are entitled to lesser due process 
protections than other lawful permanent 
residents. But the government has not 
provided any authority to support that 
proposition: The cases cited in the 
government's brief address statutory and 
regulatory distinctions between lawful 
permanent residents treated as applicants for 
admission and other lawful permanent 
residents; they do not reflect any 
constitutional distinction between those 
groups.  
 
Finally, the government argues that, instead 
of requiring bond hearings, we could avoid 
constitutional concerns by interpreting § 
1225(b) not to apply to lawful permanent 
residents. This argument relies on an 
implausible construction of the statutes at 
issue. Section 1225(b) applies to “applicants 
for admission,” and § 1101 defines six 
categories of lawful permanent residents as 
“seeking an admission into the United States 
for purposes of the immigration laws.”  
 
The Supreme Court's decision in Kwong Hai 
Chew v. Colding is not to the contrary. Chew 
involved a pre-IIRIRA immigration 
regulation that applied to “excludable” non-
citizens. Because the regulations were silent 
as to whether that category included lawful 
permanent residents returning from voyages 
abroad, the Court distinguished between the 
“exclusion” of newly arriving non-citizens 
and the “expulsion” of lawful permanent 
residents, thereby holding that the regulation 
did not authorize the Attorney General to 
detain arriving lawful permanent residents 
without hearings. Section 1101(a)(13)(C) 
forecloses an analogous construction of § 
1225(b) because it provides that “applicants 
for admission” includes several groups of 
lawful permanent residents. In any event, the 
government's alternative construction of § 
1225(b) was never raised before the district 
court; the argument is therefore forfeited.  
 
Accordingly, we adhere to Rodriguez II's 
holding regarding the § 1225(b) subclass as 
law of the case and law of the circuit. The 
government's attempts to re-litigate 
Rodriguez II are unavailing. 
 
3. The § 1226(a) Subclass 
 
Section 1226(a) authorizes detention 
“pending a decision on whether the alien is to 
be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(a). The statute expressly authorizes 
release on “bond of at least $1,500” or 
“conditional parole.” Following an initial 
custody determination by DHS, a non-citizen 
may apply for a review or redetermination by 
an IJ, and that decision may be appealed to 
the BIA. At these hearings, the detainee bears 
the burden of establishing “that he or she does 
not present a danger to persons or property, is 
not a threat to the national security, and does 
not pose a risk of flight.” “After an initial 
bond redetermination,” a request for another 
review “shall be considered only upon a 
showing that the alien's circumstances have 
changed materially since the prior bond 
redetermination.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). The 
government has taken the position that 
additional time spent in detention is not a 
“changed circumstance” that entitles a 
detainee to a new bond hearing. 
 
Although § 1226(a) provides for 
discretionary, rather than mandatory, 
detention and establishes a mechanism for 
detainees to seek release on bond, non-
citizens often face prolonged detention under 
that section. In an extreme case identified by 
the petitioners, a non-citizen with no criminal 
record entered the United States on a tourist 
visa and affirmatively applied for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and relief under the 
Convention Against Torture shortly after that 
visa expired. ICE detained him throughout 
the ensuing proceedings before the IJ, the 
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BIA, and the Ninth Circuit. At the time 
petitioners generated their report, he had been 
detained for 1,234 days with no definite end 
in sight. 
 
The district court's decision regarding the § 
1226(a) subclass was squarely controlled by 
our precedents. In Casas, we held that a non-
citizen subjected to prolonged detention 
under § 1226(a) is entitled to a hearing to 
establish whether continued detention is 
necessary because he would pose a danger to 
the community or a flight risk upon release. 
Since deciding Casas, we have repeatedly 
affirmed its holding.  
 
The government does not contest that Casas 
is the binding law of this circuit or that 
individuals detained under § 1226(a) are 
entitled to bond hearings. Instead, the 
government argues that § 1226(a) affords 
detainees the right to request bond hearings,  
so there is no basis for requiring the 
government to automatically provide bond 
hearings after six months of detention. This 
argument is foreclosed by Casas, which held 
that “ § 1226(c) must be construed as 
requiring the Attorney General to provide the 
alien with [a bond] hearing.” The record 
evinces the importance of Casas's holding on 
this point: Detainees, who typically have no 
choice but to proceed pro se, have limited 
access to legal resources, often lack English-
language proficiency, and are sometimes 
illiterate. As a result, many class members are 
not aware of their right to a bond hearing and 
are poorly equipped to request one. 
Accordingly, we conclude that class 
members are entitled to automatic bond 
hearings after six months of detention. We 
address the other procedural requirements for 
these hearings in Section IV.B, infra. 
 
4. The § 1231(a) Subclass 
 
Section 1231(a) governs detention of non-
citizens who have been “ordered removed.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a). The statute provides for 
mandatory detention during a ninety-day 
removal period. Id. § 1231(a)(2). Under the 
statute: 
 
The removal period begins on the latest of the 
following: 
 
(i) The date the order of removal 
becomes administratively final. 
 
(ii) If the removal order is judicially 
reviewed and if a court orders a 
stay of the removal of the alien, 
the date of the court's final order. 
 
(iii) If the alien is detained or confined 
(except under an immigration 
process), the date the alien is 
released from detention or 
confinement. 
 
The removal period may be extended beyond 
ninety days if a detainee “fails or refuses” to 
cooperate in his removal from the United 
States. 
 
“If the alien does not leave or is not removed 
within the removal period,” he “shall be 
subject to supervision,” but detention is no 
longer mandatory. Rather, the Attorney 
General has discretion to detain certain 
classes of non-citizens and to impose 
conditions of release on others. Before 
releasing a detainee, the government must 
conclude that removal is “not practicable or 
not in the public interest,” that the detainee is 
“non-violent” and “not likely to pose a threat 
to the community following release,” and that 
the detainee “does not pose a significant 
flight risk” and is “not likely to violate the 
conditions of release.”  
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Here, the class is defined, in relevant part, as 
non-citizens who are detained “pending 
completion of removal proceedings, 
including judicial review.” The class 
therefore by definition excludes any detainee 
subject to a final order of removal. 
 
Petitioners describe the § 1231(a) subclass as 
individuals detained under that section who 
have received a stay of removal from the BIA 
or a court. However, if a non-citizen has 
received a stay of removal from the BIA 
pending further administrative review, then 
the order of removal is not yet 
“administratively final.” The non-citizen has 
not been “ordered removed,” and the removal 
period has not begun, so § 1231(a) is 
inapplicable. Similarly, as long as a non-
citizen's removal order is stayed by a court 
pending judicial review, that non-citizen is 
not subject to “the court's final order.” In such 
circumstances, § 1231(a) is, again, 
inapplicable.  
 
Simply put, the § 1231(a) subclass does not 
exist. The district court's grant of summary 
judgment and permanent injunction are 
therefore reversed to the extent they pertain 
to individuals detained under § 1231(a). 
 
C. Procedural Requirements 
 
In addition to challenging the class members' 
entitlement to automatic bond hearings after 
six months of detention, the government 
objects to the district court's order regarding 
the burden and standard of proof at such 
hearings. The government also appeals the 
district court's ruling that IJs must consider 
alternatives to detention. Petitioners cross-
appeal the district court's rulings that IJs are 
not required to consider the ultimate 
likelihood of removal, assess the total length 
of detention, or conduct periodic hearings at 
six-month intervals. We address each issue in 
turn. 
 
1. Burden and Standard of Proof 
 
The government argues that the district court 
erred in requiring the government to justify a 
non-citizen's detention by clear and 
convincing evidence, an intermediate burden 
of proof that is more than a preponderance of 
the evidence but less than proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. As we noted in Rodriguez 
II, however, we are bound by our precedent 
in Singh, which held that “the government 
must prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the 
community to justify denial of bond at a 
Casas hearing.” 
 
In Singh, we explained that the “Supreme 
Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle 
that ‘due process places a heightened burden 
of proof on the State in civil proceedings in 
which the individual interests at stake ... are 
both particularly important and more 
substantial than mere loss of money.’ ” In the 
civil commitment context, for example, the 
Supreme Court has recognized “the state's 
interest in committing the emotionally 
disturbed,” but has held that “the individual's 
interest in not being involuntarily confined 
indefinitely ... is of such weight and gravity 
that due process requires the state to justify 
confinement by proof more substantial than a 
mere preponderance of the evidence.” 
Drawing on this jurisprudence, Singh 
concluded that “a clear and convincing 
evidence standard of proof provides the 
appropriate level of procedural protection” in 
light of “the substantial liberty interest at 
stake.”  
 
The government now contends that Singh 
was wrongly decided. However, it is well 
established that only a full court, sitting en 
banc, may overrule a three-judge panel 
decision. Right or wrong, we are bound to 
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follow Singh unless intervening Supreme 
Court authority is to the contrary.  
 
2. Restrictions Short of Detention 
 
The government also argues that the district 
court erred in “determin [ing] that IJs are 
required to consider the use of alternatives to 
detention in making bond determinations.” 
As the district court's order states, however, 
IJs “should already be considering 
restrictions short of incarceration.” Indeed, 
Rodriguez II affirmed a preliminary 
injunction that directed IJs to “release each 
Subclass member on reasonable conditions of 
supervision, including electronic monitoring 
if necessary, unless the government” satisfied 
its burden of justifying continued detention. 
 
The government's objections to this 
requirement are unpersuasive. First, the 
government relies on Demore for the 
proposition that the government is not 
required “to employ the least burdensome 
means” of securing immigration detainees. 
But Demore applies only to “brief period[s]” 
of immigration detention. “When the period 
of detention becomes prolonged, ‘the private 
interest that will be affected by the official 
action’ is more substantial; greater 
procedural safeguards are therefore 
required.” Further, the injunction does not 
require that IJs apply the least restrictive 
means of supervision; it merely directs them 
to “consider” restrictions short of detention. 
The IJ ultimately must decide whether any 
restrictions short of detention would further 
the government's interest in continued 
detention. 
 
Second, the government argues that IJs are 
not empowered to impose conditions of 
release. However, federal regulations 
authorize IJs to “detain the alien in custody, 
release the alien, and determine the amount 
of bond, if any, under which the respondent 
may be released” and to “ameliorat[e] the 
conditions” of release imposed by DHS. 
Accordingly, if DHS detains a non-citizen, an 
IJ is already empowered to “ameliorat[e] the 
conditions” by imposing a less restrictive 
means of supervision than detention. 
 
Finally, the government argues that IJs lack 
the resources to engage in continuous 
monitoring of released individuals. However, 
the government fails to cite any law or 
evidence indicating that IJs, rather than DHS 
or ICE agents, would be responsible for 
implementing the conditions of release. 
Moreover, the record indicates that Congress 
authorized and funded an ICE alternatives-to-
detention program in 2002, and DHS has 
operated such a program, called the Intensive 
Supervision and Appearance Program, since 
2004. It is abundantly clear that IJs can and 
do17 consider conditions of release on bond 
when determining whether the government's 
interests can be served by detention only, and 
we conclude that DHS will administer any 
such conditions, regardless of whether they 
are imposed by DHS in the first instance or 
by an IJ upon later review. 
 
3. Length of Detention and 
Likelihood of Removal 
 
In their cross-appeal, petitioners argue that 
the district court erred in failing to require IJs 
to consider the length of a non-citizen's past 
and likely future detention and, relatedly, the 
likelihood of eventual removal from the 
United States. In our prior decisions, we have 
not directly addressed whether due process 
requires consideration of the length of future 
detention at bond hearings. We have noted, 
however, that “the due process analysis 
changes as ‘the period of ... confinement 
grows,’ ” and that longer detention requires 
more robust procedural protections. 
Accordingly, a non-citizen detained for one 
or more years is entitled to greater solicitude 
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than a non-citizen detained for six months. 
Moreover, Supreme Court precedent 
provides that “detention incidental to 
removal must bear a reasonable relation to its 
purpose.” At some point, the length of 
detention could “become[ ] so egregious that 
it can no longer be said to be ‘reasonably 
related’ to an alien's removal.” An IJ 
therefore must consider the length of time for 
which a non-citizen has already been 
detained. 
 
As to the likely duration of future detention 
and the likelihood of eventual removal, 
however, those factors are too speculative 
and too dependent upon the merits of the 
detainee's claims for us to require IJs to 
consider during a bond hearing. We therefore 
affirm the district court's ruling that 
consideration of those factors “would require 
legal and political analyses beyond what 
would otherwise be considered at a bond 
hearing” and is therefore not appropriate. We 
note that Zadvydas and its progeny require 
consideration of the likelihood of removal in 
particular circumstances,18 but we decline to 
require such analysis as a threshold inquiry in 
all bond hearings. 
 
4. Periodic Hearings 
 
The record shows that many class members 
are detained well beyond the six-month 
mark: Almost half remain in detention at the 
twelve-month mark, one in five at eighteen 
months, and one in ten at twenty-four 
months. Petitioners argue that due process 
requires additional bond hearings at six-
month intervals for class members who are 
detained for more than six months after their 
initial bond hearings. We have not had 
occasion to address this issue in our previous 
decisions, and it has been a source of some 
contention in the district courts.  
 
The district court here did not address this 
proposed requirement. For the same reasons 
the IJ must consider the length of past 
detention, we hold that the government must 
provide periodic bond hearings every six 
months so that noncitizens may challenge 
their continued detention as “the period of ... 
confinement grows.”  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This decision flows from the Supreme 
Court's and our own precedent bearing on the 
constitutional implications of our 
government's prolonged civil detention of 
individuals, many of whom have the legal 
right to live and work in our country. By 
upholding the district court's order that 
Immigration Judges must hold bond hearings 
for certain detained individuals, we are not 
ordering Immigration Judges to release any 
single individual; rather we are affirming a 
minimal procedural safeguard—a hearing at 
which the government bears only an 
intermediate burden of proof in 
demonstrating danger to the community or 
risk of flight—to ensure that after a lengthy 
period of detention, the government 
continues to have a legitimate interest in the 
further deprivation of an individual's liberty. 
Immigration Judges, a specialized and 
experienced group within the Department of 
Justice, are already entrusted to make these 
determinations, and need not release any 
individual they find presents a danger to the 
community or a flight risk after hearing and 
weighing the evidence. Accordingly, we 
affirm all aspects of the district court's 
permanent injunction, with three exceptions: 
We reverse as to the § 1231(a) subclass, and 
we hold that IJs must consider the length of 
detention and provide bond hearings every 
six months. We hereby remand to the district 
court to enter a revised injunction consistent 
with our instructions. 
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AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN 
PART; REMANDED. 
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“No decision in two immigration-enforcement cases” 
 
SCOTUSblog 
Kevin Johnson 
June 26, 2017 
 
President Donald Trump has made 
immigration enforcement a top priority. Two 
immigration-enforcement cases looked likely 
to have a big impact on the Trump 
administration’s plans. Both were argued 
before the confirmation of Justice Neil 
Gorsuch. Today, the Supreme Court, 
apparently deadlocked, ordered reargument 
of the cases. 
One of the cases, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 
involved immigration detention. Detained 
immigrants ordinarily have been eligible to 
post bond and be allowed release from 
custody. In a January 25, 2017, executive 
order, among numerous immigration-
enforcement initiatives, Trump announced an 
end to the “catch and release” of immigrants 
facing removal from the United States. 
Detention without bond thus became official 
immigration-enforcement policy. 
Generally speaking, criminal and civil 
detention of U.S. citizens is subject to basic 
constitutional safeguards. Such a rights-
based system, however, fits uncomfortably 
into the much more limited constitutional 
protections historically offered to 
noncitizens. Reflecting this tension, the 
Supreme Court’s immigration-detention 
decisions are not altogether consistent. 
 
In a class-action challenge to immigrant 
detention, Jennings v. Rodriguez raised the 
question whether immigrants, like virtually 
any U.S. citizen placed in criminal or civil 
detention, must be guaranteed a bond 
hearing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
9th Circuit affirmed a district court injunction 
requiring bond hearings every six months for 
immigrant detainees. 
Indefinite detention without a hearing and 
possible release is difficult to justify as a 
matter of constitutional law. At the same 
time, however, some justices at oral 
argument expressed concern that the 9th 
Circuit had acted more like a legislature than 
a court in mandating a bond hearing every six 
months. In the end, the court apparently 
needed a tiebreaking vote and will address 
immigration detention next term. 
Another case that the court did not decide 
involved criminal removal. In the last few 
years, the Supreme Court has decided a 
steady number of criminal-removal cases. In 
light of the Trump administration’s stated 
emphasis on the removal of “criminal aliens,” 
we will likely see more criminal removal 
cases in the future. Most of the removal cases 
that have recently come before the court, 
including Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions 
decided earlier this term, have raised ordinary 
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issues of statutory interpretation and 
administrative deference. 
Sessions v. Dimaya instead was a 
constitutional challenge to a criminal-
removal provision in the immigration laws, 
which historically have been largely immune 
from judicial review. The court appears to be 
moving toward applying ordinary 
constitutional norms to the immigration laws. 
Earlier this term, for example, the court in 
Sessions v. Santana-Morales held that gender 
distinctions favoring women over men in the 
derivative-citizenship provisions of the 
immigration laws violated the Constitution’s 
equal protection guarantee. 
A noncitizen, including a lawful permanent 
resident, who is convicted of an “aggravated 
felony” is subject to mandatory removal. The 
Immigration and Nationality Act defines 
“aggravated felonies” expansively. That 
definition incorporates 18 U.S.C. §16(b), 
known as the “residual clause,” which 
defines a “crime of violence” to encompass 
“any … offense that is a felony and that, by 
its nature, involves a substantial risk that 
physical force against the person or property 
of another may be used in the course of 
committing the offense.” 
James Garcia Dimaya, who immigrated 
lawfully from the Philippines in 1992, has 
two residential burglary convictions; neither 
involved violence. Based on the convictions, 
the immigration court and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals ordered Dimaya 
removed from the United States. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit found 
that Section 16(b) was unconstitutionally 
vague and vacated the order. To reach that 
conclusion, the 9th Circuit relied on the 
Supreme Court’s 2015 opinion in Johnson v. 
United States, in which court found the 
Armed Career Criminal Act’s similarly 
worded definition of “violent felony” was so 
vague as to violate due process. 
The application of the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine to the immigration laws apparently 
divided the court. At oral argument, the 
justices seemed to agree that the court should 
review immigration-removal provisions 
under the standard due process test for 
vagueness. However, they appeared to be 
divided as to whether the case at hand was 
distinguishable from Johnson and thus 
whether Section 16(b) is unconstitutionally 
vague. 
For the last decade, immigration cases have 
been a bread-and-butter part of the Supreme 
Court’s docket. The Supreme Court has 
slowly but surely moved immigration law 
toward the constitutional mainstream. We 
will have to wait until the next term to see if 
the court continues that trend with respect to 
immigrant detention and criminal removal. 
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“Supreme Court to Review No-Bail Policy for Immigrants Awaiting 
Hearings” 
 
The Wall Street Journal 
Jess Bravin 
June 20, 2016 
 
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to 
hear a Justice Department appeal of a 2015 
lower-court decision requiring bail hearings 
for immigrants who have been in detention 
for at least six months awaiting deportation 
proceedings. 
However, the American Civil Liberties 
Union—which won a lower-court ruling 
requiring bail hearings after six months—
said recently disclosed hearing records show 
a 2003 high-court precedent the Justice 
Department cited to bolster its case was 
partly based on government-supplied 
information that understated the length of 
immigration detentions. 
It isn’t clear whether a difference in the time 
frame would have affected the outcome of the 
2003 case. But critics of the government’s 
immigration policies say that prehearing 
detention with no chance for bail becomes 
less reasonable the longer it lasts. 
The 2003 case, Demore v. Kim, upheld by a 
5-4 vote the government’s practice of holding 
without bail immigrants—even those who are 
permanent U.S. residents with “green 
cards”—who became eligible for deportation 
because they committed a crime. 
The majority opinion in that case stressed the 
“very limited” length of no-bail detentions at 
issue, relying on figures showing the average 
detention in 2001 was 47 days, while the 15% 
of immigrants who appeal a deportation order 
were in detention for about 4½ months. The 
figures were provided by the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review, which 
conducts the hearings. 
The ACLU, which worked on the 2003 case, 
said the actual average detention time in 2001 
was 2½ half weeks longer. “The real number 
is 65 days,” said Michael Tan, an ACLU 
attorney. The group learned of issues with 
statistics in the earlier case through a 
Freedom of Information Act request filed 
during the current litigation. 
Mr. Tan said the government reached the 
lower number by factoring in categories of 
aliens that an immigration judge was required 
to deport—cases that are resolved quickly 
because there are no issues for the hearing to 
resolve. Mr. Tan also said the government 
counted as completed cases that weren’t over 
but only transferred—with the immigrant still 
in detention—to another immigration court. 
Justice Department spokesman Patrick 
Rodenbush said officials were re-examining 
the numbers provided in the Kim case, but 
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after an initial review, “we feel our 
information to the court was appropriate.” 
A 2012 Justice Department inspector general 
report criticized the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review for reporting its 
performance in ways that are “incomplete 
and overstate the actual accomplishments” of 
its courts. 
Theodore Olson, who as solicitor general 
argued the government’s position in 2003, 
said he had little recollection of the case and 
didn’t remember any internal dispute over the 
length of detentions.“Statistics like that 
would presumably have come from the 
agency or agencies responsible,” Mr. Olson 
said. It would be “highly unlikely” for 
lawyers in his office to delve “into such 
statistics at a granular level.” 
David Strauss, a law professor at the 
University of Chicago, said the possibility of 
error in a solicitor general brief was troubling 
because unlike other litigants, the office often 
introduces new information at the Supreme 
Court level. 
“What the (solicitor general) says in its brief 
is not subject to the usual testing the legal 
system provides for its claims,” Mr. Strauss 
said. “The court is really counting on them to 
get it right because there’s no other check.” 
The court will hear the case on bail hearings 
in its next term, which begins in October. 
The Kim case marks the second time in recent 
years that a records disclosure suggested the 
Justice Department provided incorrect 
information to the Supreme Court regarding 
immigration practices. 
In 2012, the department told the court it had 
incorrectly stated in 2009 that it “facilitated” 
the return to the U.S. of deported aliens who 
later win their immigration appeals. The 
government then altered its practice to 
conform to what it told the court it already 
had been doing, government and immigration 
lawyers say. 
Last year, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals in San Francisco held the 
Constitution’s due-process guarantee 
requires a bail hearing where detained 
immigrants can argue they will show up later 
for their date in immigration court and pose 
no risk to public safety. The Obama 
administration appealed that decision to the 
Supreme Court. 
In deciding the class-action suit, the Ninth 
Circuit relied on both the Kim precedent and 
an earlier case holding that immigrants 
detained indefinitely are entitled to a bail 
hearing after six months. The appeals court 
observed that affected immigrants “spend, on 
average, 404 days in immigration detention,” 
which is considered an administrative matter 
rather than a form of punishment. 
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“High Court To Decide If Immigrants Entitled To Bond Hearings” 
 
Law360 
Allissa Wickham 
June 20, 2016 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday decided 
to hear a case over whether certain 
immigrants are entitled to automatic bond 
hearings following six months of detention, 
adding another layer to the national debate 
over immigrant detention. 
The high court granted certiorari to Jennings 
v. Rodriguez, in which the Ninth Circuit 
ruled, among other things, that immigrants 
are entitled to bond hearings after six months 
if they were detained under a provision 
allowing the government to hold immigrants 
during their deportation proceedings. As is 
customary, the justices did not explain their 
reasoning for taking up the case. 
In its March 25 petition, the U.S. Department 
of Justice had strongly urged the justices to 
review the October ruling from the Ninth 
Circuit. The agency claimed the appeals 
court’s “wholesale revision” of the law on the 
detention of immigrants during deportation 
proceedings “oversteps the proper judicial 
role.” 
The government also argued that the court’s 
decision gets in the way of the Department of 
Homeland Security’s ability to control U.S. 
borders. 
But Alejandro Rodriguez, a green card holder 
representing a class of noncitizens 
challenging their detention, had asked the 
justices not to hear the appeal. 
“The government’s contention that certiorari 
is warranted to preserve its ability to control 
the borders and reduce the risk of terrorism is 
hyperbolic and unsupported by anything in 
the decision below or the voluminous record 
compiled in the district court,” Rodriguez had 
argued. 
If the high court were to affirm the Ninth 
Circuit, the impact of such a ruling could be 
significant, according to Denise Gilman, the 
director of the immigration clinic at the 
University of Texas School of Law. Such a 
decision would mean "whole swaths of the 
country" would be in a situation where people 
held under mandatory detention provisions 
would have a right to detention review, she 
previously told Law360. 
However, if the justices upheld the Ninth 
Circuit, the already overburdened 
immigration courts across the country could 
find themselves overwhelmed with having to 
set new hearings, according to Holly Cooper, 
the associate director of the immigration law 
clinic at University of California Davis 
School of Law, who submitted an amicus 
brief in the Rodriguez appeal. 
"It would be enormous if every circuit 
adopted this ruling," Cooper said, noting that 
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"immigration courts would probably almost 
buckle with the overwhelming need to set 
new hearings." 
The issue of immigrant detention has also 
popped up in other courts, such as the Second 
Circuit. The appeals court held in October 
that the government cannot indefinitely 
detain immigrants awaiting deportation 
proceedings following criminal offenses, 
saying they must be given a bail hearing 
within six months of being taken into 
custody. 
And in another case, the federal government 
is asking the Ninth Circuit to overturn a 
ruling that found the Obama administration’s 
detention of immigrant families violated a 
1997 agreement that set national standards 
for dealing with undocumented children. 
The federal petitioners are represented by 
Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr. 
The respondents have been represented in the 
case by Ahilan Thevanesan Arulanantham of 
the ACLU Foundation of Southern 
California, Sean Ashley Commons of Sidley 
Austin LLP and others. 
The case is David Jennings v. Alejandro 
Rodriguez, case number 15-1204, in the U.S. 
Supreme Court.
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“Courts Say Detained Non-Citizens Have The Right To Bond Hearings” 
 
NPR 
Richard Gonzales 
October 29, 2015 
 
At the same time that immigration is a hot-
button issue on the presidential campaign 
trail, in the courts, immigration advocates are 
chipping away at the government's authority 
to detain non-citizens indefinitely. 
Two rulings issued this week from the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New 
York and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in California say that detainees have the right 
to a bond hearing while they are fighting their 
deportation cases. 
The practical impact? Thousands of 
immigrants, legal or not, who were held for 
indefinite periods now have the right to a 
release hearing where it will be up to an 
immigration judge to decide whether they are 
dangerous or present a flight risk. The courts' 
rulings apply in the states covered by those 
circuits. 
Ever since 1996, when Congress passed the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act, the government has 
detained broad categories of non-citizens for 
prolonged periods and denied them the right 
to challenge their detention. 
The constitutionality of that section of the 
law was first challenged in 2003. Since then, 
there's been a flurry of court rulings. 
"Every circuit [appeals] court has ruled that it 
is unlawful to hold a detainee without that 
person having the possibility of a hearing," 
said Ahilan Arulanantham, deputy legal 
director of the ACLU of Southern California. 
The Ninth Circuit, in Rodriguez v. Robbins, 
ruled that the government has to justify "by 
clear and convincing evidence that an alien is 
a flight risk or a danger to the community to 
justify denial of bond." It also ruled the 
government has to consider alternatives to 
detention such as electronic monitoring 
devices. Finally, it said detainees should get 
a bond hearing every six months. 
"This decision substantially decreases the 
likelihood people will get lost in the system 
for years on end because there will be some 
examination of why the person is still locked 
away. It provides them with an elemental 
component of due process," said 
Arulanantham. 
In a more limited ruling, the Second Circuit 
in New York, in a case called Lora v. 
Shanahan adopted what it called "a bright-
line rule" that detainees must get a hearing 
within six months of his or her detention. 
Two other appellate courts, the Third and the 
Sixth Circuits, have ruled that a detainee 
287 
  
must file a habeas petition or a lawsuit before 
getting a hearing. 
With respect to the Ninth Circuit ruling, a 
spokesman for U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement said his agency " is 
aware of the judges' order and reviewing it."
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Sessions v. Dimaya 
15-1498 
Ruling Below: Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015) 
Petitioner James Dimaya seeks review of the Board of Immigration’s decision that his 
convictions for first-degree burglary qualify as crimes of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 1101 
(a)(43)(F). Based on the 2015 Johnson v. United States ruling, he claims that the definition of 
“violent crime” under which he was convicted is vague, and therefore unconstitutional.   
 
The Court of Appeals affirms the right of a noncitizen to bring a challenge of vagueness to the 
definition of a crime of violence. The Court ruled that the language under which Dimaya was 
convicted is unconstitutionally vague.  
 
Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and 
Nationality Act's provisions governing an alien's removal from the United States, is 
unconstitutionally vague. 
 
Loretta Lynch, Attorney General, 
v. 
James Dimaya. 
 
United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit 
Decided on October 19, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
OPINION 
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:  
Petitioner James Garcia Dimaya seeks review 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) 
determination that a conviction for burglary 
under California Penal Code Section 459 is 
categorically a “crime of violence” as defined 
by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), a 
determination which rendered petitioner 
removable for having been convicted of an 
aggravated felony. During the pendency of 
petitioner’s appeal, the United States 
Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which held 
that the Armed Career Criminal Act’s 
(“ACCA”) so-called “residual clause” 
definition of a “violent felony” is 
unconstitutionally vague. In this case, we 
consider whether language similar to 
ACCA’s residual clause that is incorporated 
into § 1101(a)(43)(F)’s definition of a crime 
of violence is also void for vagueness. We 
hold that it suffers from the same 
indeterminacy as ACCA’s residual clause 
and, accordingly, grant the petition for 
review. 
I 
Petitioner, a native and citizen of the 
Philippines, was admitted to the United 
States in 1992 as a lawful permanent resident. 
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In both 2007 and 2009, petitioner was 
convicted of first-degree residential burglary 
under California Penal Code section 459 and 
sentenced each time to two years in prison. If 
a non-citizen is convicted of an aggravated 
felony, he is subject to removal. 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Citing petitioner’s two 
first-degree burglary convictions, the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
charged that petitioner was removable 
because he had been convicted of a “crime of 
violence . . . for which the term of 
imprisonment [was] at least one year”—an 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(F). That statute defines a “crime 
of violence” by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16, 
which provides the following definition:  
(a) an offense that has as an 
element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the 
person or property of another, 
or  
(b) any other offense that is a 
felony and that, by its nature, 
involves a substantial risk that 
physical force against the 
person or property of another 
may be used in the course of 
committing the offense. 
The Immigration Judge (IJ) agreed with DHS 
that first degree burglary in California is a 
crime of violence. Citing § 16(b) and United 
States v. Becker, the IJ explained that 
“unlawful entry into a residence is by its very 
nature an offense where is apt to be violence 
[sic], whether in the efforts of the felon to 
escape or in the efforts of the occupant to 
resist the felon.” Because the charging 
documents for each conviction alleged an 
unlawful entry, and because the term of 
imprisonment for each conviction was 
greater than one year, the IJ determined that 
these convictions were crimes of violence. 
On the basis of this conclusion, the IJ held 
that petitioner was removable and ineligible 
for any relief. The BIA dismissed petitioner’s 
appeal on the same ground. Citing § 16(b) 
and Becker, the BIA concluded that 
“[e]ntering a dwelling with intent to commit 
a felony is an offense that by its nature carries 
a substantial risk of the use of force,” and 
therefore affirmed the IJ’s holding that 
petitioner was convicted of a crime of 
violence. 
Petitioner filed a timely petition with this 
Court for review of the BIA’s decision. After 
the parties argued this case, the United States 
Supreme Court decided Johnson and, 
because the definition of a crime of violence 
that the BIA relied on in this case is similar 
to the unconstitutional language in ACCA’s 
residual clause, we ordered supplemental 
briefing and held a supplemental oral 
argument regarding whether § 16(b), as 
incorporated into the INA, is also 
unconstitutionally vague. We have 
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) 
to review questions of law, including whether 
language in the immigration statutes is void 
for vagueness. See Alphonsus v. Holder, 705 
F.3d 1031, 1036–37 (9th Cir. 2013). That 
question, as a pure question of law, receives 
de novo review from this Court. Aguilar-
Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
II 
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
“requires that a penal statute define the 
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness 
that ordinary people can understand what 
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that 
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does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.” Alphonsus, 
705 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)). 
Although most often invoked in the context 
of criminal statutes, the prohibition on 
vagueness also applies to civil statutes, 
including those concerning the criteria for 
deportation. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 
223, 231 (1951) (“Despite the fact that this is 
not a criminal statute, we shall nevertheless 
examine the application of the vagueness 
doctrine to this case. We do this in view of 
the grave nature of deportation.”); see also 
A.B. Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 267 
U.S. 233, 239 (1925) (“The defendant 
attempts to distinguish [prior vagueness] 
cases because they were criminal 
prosecutions. But that is not an adequate 
distinction. The ground or principle of the 
decisions was not such as to be applicable 
only to criminal prosecutions.”). 
Previously, we have recognized the 
vagueness doctrine’s applicability in the 
context of withholding of removal “because 
of the harsh consequences attached to . . . 
denial of withholding of removal.” 
Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1042 (citing Jordan, 
341 U.S. at 230–31). In this case, Petitioner 
challenges a statute as unconstitutionally 
vague in the context of denial of cancellation 
of removal. 
For due process purposes, this context is 
highly analogous to denial of withholding of 
removal because both pose the harsh 
consequence of almost certain deportation. 
Under withholding of removal, a non-citizen 
who is otherwise removable cannot be 
deported to his home country if he establishes 
that his “life or freedom would be threatened 
in that country because of [his] race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(3)(A). Under cancellation of 
removal, immigration authorities may cancel 
the removal of a lawful permanent resident 
who satisfies certain criteria based on length 
of residency, good behavior, and exceptional 
hardship. Id. § 1229b(b)(1). Non-citizens 
who commit certain criminal offenses are 
ineligible for these forms of relief. See id. §§ 
1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), 1229b(b)(1)(C). As with 
denial of withholding of removal, then, 
denial of cancellation of removal renders an 
alien ineligible for relief, making deportation 
“a virtual certainty.” United States v. Bonilla, 
637 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 2011). 
The government argues that our circuit’s 
reliance on Jordan “is misguided as Jordan 
did not authorize vagueness challenges to 
deportation statutes.” We find this suggestion 
baffling. Jordan considered whether the term 
“crime involving moral turpitude” in section 
19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917, a type 
of offense that allowed for a non-citizen to 
“be taken into custody and deported,” was 
void for vagueness. 341 U.S. at 225–31 
(emphasis added). In considering this 
challenge, the Court explicitly rejected the 
argument that the vagueness doctrine did not 
apply. Id. at 231. The government also argues 
that subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
rejected due process challenges to various 
immigration statutes. See Marcello v. Bonds, 
349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955); Galvan v. Press, 
347 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1954); Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–91 (1952). 
None of these cases, however, suggests that 
the Due Process Clause does not apply to 
deportation proceedings. Nor could they, for 
it “is well established that the Fifth 
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of 
law in deportation proceedings.” Demore v. 
Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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As the Supreme Court recognized in Jordan, 
a necessary component of a non-citizen’s 
right to due process of law is the prohibition 
on vague deportation statutes. Recently, the 
Supreme Court noted the need for 
“efficiency, fairness, and predictability in the 
administration of immigration law.” Mellouli 
v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1987 (2015). 
Vague immigration statutes significantly 
undermine these interests by impairing non-
citizens’ ability to “anticipate the 
immigration consequences of guilty pleas in 
criminal court.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 
U.S. 356, 364 (2010) (“[A]ccurate legal 
advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has 
never been more important” because 
“deportation is an integral part—indeed, 
sometimes the most important part—of the 
penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen 
defendants who plead guilty to specified 
crimes.” (footnote omitted)). For these 
reasons, we reaffirm that petitioner may bring 
a void for vagueness challenge to the 
definition of a “crime of violence” in the 
INA. 
III 
To understand Johnson’s effect on this case, 
it is helpful to view §16(b), as incorporated 
into the INA, alongside the residual clause at 
issue in Johnson. The INA provides for the 
removal of non-citizens who have been 
“convicted of an aggravated felony.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Its definition of 
an aggravated felony includes numerous 
offenses, including “a crime of violence (as 
defined in section 16 of Title 18 . . . ).” 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). The subsection of 
18 U.S.C. § 16 that the BIA relied on in this 
case defines a crime of violence as an 
“offense that is a felony and that, by its 
nature, involves a substantial risk that 
physical force against the person or property 
of another may be used in the course of 
committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). 
Had Congress written out the relevant 
definition in full instead of relying on cross-
referencing, a lawful permanent resident 
would be removable if “convicted of an 
offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, 
involves a substantial risk that physical force 
against the person or property of another may 
be used in the course of committing the 
offense” (emphasis added). The language in 
ACCA that Johnson held unconstitutional is 
similar. The ACCA provision defined a 
“violent felony” as “any crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year 
[i.e., a felony] . . . that . . . involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). 
Importantly, both the provision at issue here 
and ACCA’s residual clause are subject to the 
same mode of analysis. Both are subject to 
the categorical approach, which demands that 
courts “look to the elements and the nature of 
the offense of conviction, rather than to the 
particular facts relating to petitioner’s 
crime.” Leocal v. Ashcroft. Specifically, 
courts considering both § 16(b) and the 
residual clause must decide what a “‘usual or 
ordinary’ violation” of the statute entails and 
then determine how great a risk of injury that 
“ordinary case” presents. 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court recognized 
two features of ACCA’s residual clause that 
“conspire[d] to make it unconstitutionally 
vague.” 135 S. Ct. at 2557. First, the Court 
explained, the clause left “grave uncertainty” 
about “deciding what kind of conduct the 
‘ordinary case’ of a crime involves.” That is, 
the provision “denie[d] fair notice to 
defendants and invite[d] arbitrary 
enforcement by judges” because it “tie[d] the 
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judicial assessment of risk to a judicially 
imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a crime, not to 
real-world facts or statutory elements.” 
Second, the Court stated, ACCA’s residual 
clause left “uncertainty about how much risk 
it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent 
felony.” By combining these two 
indeterminate inquiries, the Court held, “the 
residual clause produces more 
unpredictability and arbitrariness than the 
Due Process Clause tolerates.” On that 
ground it held the residual clause void for 
vagueness. The Court’s reasoning applies 
with equal force to the similar statutory 
language and identical mode of analysis used 
to define a crime of violence for purposes of 
the INA. The result is that because of the 
same combination of indeterminate inquiries, 
§ 16(b) is subject to identical unpredictability 
and arbitrariness as ACCA’s residual clause. 
In sum, a careful analysis of the two sections, 
the one at issue here and the one at issue in 
Johnson, shows that they are subject to the 
same constitutional defects and that Johnson 
dictates that § 16(b) be held void for 
vagueness. 
A 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court condemned 
ACCA’s residual clause for asking judges “to 
imagine how the idealized ordinary case of 
the crime subsequently plays out.” To 
illustrate its point, the Court asked 
rhetorically whether the “ordinary instance” 
of witness tampering involved “offering a 
witness a bribe” or instead “threatening a 
witness with violence.”  
As with ACCA’s residual clause, the INA’s 
crime of violence provision requires courts to 
“inquire whether ‘the conduct encompassed 
by the elements of the offense, in the ordinary 
case, presents’” a substantial risk of force. 
We see no reason why this aspect of Johnson 
would not apply here, and indeed the 
government concedes that it does. As with 
the residual clause, the INA’s definition of a 
crime of violence at issue in this case offers 
“no reliable way to choose between these 
competing accounts” of what a crime looks 
like in the ordinary case.  
B 
In many circumstances, of course, statutes 
require judges to apply standards that 
measure various degrees of risk. The vast 
majority of those statutes pose no vagueness 
problems because they “call for the 
application of a qualitative standard such as 
‘substantial risk’ to real-world conduct.” The 
statute at issue in Johnson was not one of 
those statutes, however. Nor is the provision 
at issue here. If the uncertainty involved in 
describing the “ordinary case” of a crime was 
not enough, its combination with the 
uncertainty in determining the degree of risk 
was. ACCA’s violent felony definition 
requires judges to apply “an imprecise 
‘serious potential risk’ standard . . . to [the] 
judge-imagined abstraction” of a crime in the 
ordinary case. The same is equally true of the 
INA’s definition of a crime of violence at 
issue here. Section 16(b) gives judges no 
more guidance than does the ACCA 
provision as to what constitutes a substantial 
enough risk of force to satisfy the statute. 
Accordingly, Johnson’s holding with respect 
to the imprecision of the serious potential risk 
standard is also clearly applicable to § 16(b). 
As with ACCA’s residual clause, § 16(b)’s 
definition of a crime of violence, combines 
“indeterminacy about how to measure the 
risk posed by a crime with indeterminacy 
about how much risk it takes for the crime to 
qualify as” a crime of violence.  
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C 
Notwithstanding the undeniable identity of 
the constitutional defects in the two statutory 
provisions, the government and dissent offer 
several unpersuasive arguments in an attempt 
to save the INA provision at issue in this case. 
First, the government and dissent argue that 
the Supreme Court found ACCA’s standard 
to be arbitrary in part because the residual 
clause “force[d] courts to interpret ‘serious 
potential risk’ in light of the four enumerated 
crimes” in the provision, crimes which are 
“far from clear in respect to the degree of risk 
each poses.” It is true that, after the Court set 
forth its holding in Johnson, it cited the 
provision’s four enumerated offenses in 
responding to the government’s argument 
that the Court’s holding would cast doubt on 
the many criminal statutes that include 
language similar to the indeterminate term 
“serious potential risk.” In doing so, 
however, it stated that while the listed 
offenses added to the uncertainty, the 
fundamental reason for the Court’s holding 
was the residual clause’s “application of the 
‘serious potential risk’ standard to an 
idealized ordinary case of the crime.” In 
short, this response clearly reiterated that 
what distinguishes ACCA’s residual clause 
from many other provisions in criminal 
statutes was, consistent with its fundamental 
holding, the use of the “ordinary case” 
analysis. Johnson therefore made plain that 
the residual clause was void for vagueness in 
and of itself for the reasons stated in reaching 
its decision, and not because of the clause’s 
relation to the four listed offenses. 
Next, the government argues that ACCA’s 
residual clause requires courts to consider the 
risk that would arise after completion of the 
offense, and that § 16(b) applies only to 
violence occurring “in the course of 
committing the offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). 
First, we doubt that this phrase actually 
creates a distinction between the two clauses. 
For example, we have consistently held that 
California’s burglary statute (the very statute 
at issue in this case) is a crime of violence for 
the purposes of the INA precisely because of 
the risk that violence will ensue after the 
defendant has committed the acts necessary 
to constitute the offense. By the time the risk 
of physical force against an occupant arises, 
however, the defendant has frequently 
already satisfied the elements of the offense 
of burglary under California law. More 
important, even if such a distinction did exist, 
it would not save the INA’s definition of a 
crime of violence from unconstitutionality. 
The Court, in Johnson, held ACCA’s residual 
clause to be unconstitutionally vague because 
it combined the indeterminate inquiry of 
“how to measure the risk posed by a crime” 
in the ordinary case with “indeterminacy 
about how much risk it takes for the crime to 
qualify as a violent felony.” This reasoning 
applies equally whether the inquiry considers 
the risk of violence posed by the commission 
and the aftereffects of a crime, or whether it 
is limited to consideration of the risk of 
violence posed by acts necessary to satisfy 
the elements of the offense. 
The government also argues that § 16(b) has 
not generated the same degree of confusion 
among courts that ACCA’s residual clause 
generated. It notes that, in contrast to the five 
residual clause cases that the Supreme Court 
has decided in addition to Johnson, the Court 
has decided only a single case interpreting 
section 16(b). That the Supreme Court has 
decided more residual clause cases than § 
16(b) cases, however, does not indicate that 
it believes the latter clause to be any more 
capable of consistent application. We can 
discern very little regarding he merits of an 
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issue from the composition of the Supreme 
Court’s docket. The Court has 
repeatedly indicated that a 
denial of certiorari means 
only that, for one reason or 
another which is seldom 
disclosed, and not 
infrequently for conflicting 
reasons which may have 
nothing to do with the merits 
and certainly may have 
nothing to do with any view of 
the merits taken by a majority 
of the Court, there were not 
four members of the Court 
who thought the case should 
be heard. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court in recent years 
has decided substantially more federal 
criminal appeals than immigration appeals. 
The Court’s history of deciding ACCA 
residual clause cases in greater numbers than 
INA crime of violence cases is thus 
consistent with its greater interest in federal 
criminal cases than in immigration cases. In 
fact, over this period the ratio of federal 
criminal cases to immigration cases 
significantly exceeds the ratio of ACCA 
residual clause cases to INA crime of 
violence cases on which the government 
relies. 
IV 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that 
ACCA’s residual clause “produces more 
unpredictability and arbitrariness than the 
Due Process Clause tolerates” by “combining 
indeterminacy about how to measure the risk 
posed by a crime with indeterminacy about 
how much risk it takes for the crime to 
qualify as a violent felony.” Although the 
government can point to a couple of minor 
distinctions between the text of the residual 
clause and that of the INA’s definition of a 
crime of violence, none undermines the 
applicability of Johnson’s fundamental 
holding to this case. As with ACCA, section 
16(b) (as incorporated in 8 U.S.C. 
§1101(a)(43)(F)) requires courts to 1) 
measure the risk by an indeterminate 
standard of a “judicially imagined ‘ordinary 
case,’” not by real world-facts or statutory 
elements and 2) determine by vague and 
uncertain standards when a risk is sufficiently 
substantial. Together, under Johnson, these 
uncertainties render the INA provision 
unconstitutionally vague. 
 We GRANT the petition for review 
and REMAND to the BIA for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
Contrary to the majority’s perspective, the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Johnson v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), does 
not infect 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) —or other 
statutes—with unconstitutional vagueness. 
Rather, the Supreme Court carefully 
explained that the statute there in issue, a 
provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), is 
unconstitutionally vague for two specific 
reasons: the clause (1) “leaves grave 
uncertainty about how to estimate the risk 
posed by a crime”; and (2) “leaves 
uncertainty about how much risk it takes for 
a crime to qualify as a violent crime.” Id. at 
2557–58. In contrast, §16(b), as it has been 
interpreted by the Supreme Court and the 
Ninth Circuit, has neither of these 
shortcomings. The majority’s contrary 
conclusion fails to appreciate the purpose of 
§ 16(b), elevates the Supreme Court’s 
reference to “ordinary cases” from an 
example to a rule, and ignores the Court’s 
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statement that it was not calling other statutes 
into question (which explains why the Court 
did not even mention Leocal v. Ashcraft, 543 
U.S. 1 (2004)). Accordingly, I dissent. 
Our criminal and immigration laws are not as 
simple as the majority opinion implies. 
Accordingly, I first describe the purpose of § 
16 and how courts have interpreted the 
statute, before reviewing the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Johnson, and concluding 
that the twin concerns expressed by the 
Supreme Court in Johnson do not infect § 
16(b). 
I. 
Title 18 U.S.C. § 16 contains two distinct 
definitions of “crime of violence,” with 
distinct purposes, effects, and judicial 
pedigrees. Subsection (a) defines “crime of 
violence” as “an offense that has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the person or 
property of another.” (emphasis added). 
Subsection (b) sets forth a distinct definition 
that covers offenses that are not within 
subsection (a)’s definition. It states that 
“crime of violence” means “any other offense 
that is a felony and that, by its nature, 
involves a substantial risk that physical force 
against the person or property of another may 
be used in the course of committing the 
offense.” It follows that an offense that is a 
“crime of violence” under subsection (a) also 
meets the criteria in subsection (b), but that 
subsection (b) covers offenses that do not 
meet the criteria in subsection (a). These 
subsections serve different functions with 
different consequences. 
An appreciation of the differences between 
the subsections and their roles informs my 
understanding of the Supreme Court’s 
opinions in Descamps v. United States, 133 
S. Ct. 2276 (2013), and Moncrieffe v. Holder, 
133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013). Although the terms 
“crime of violence,” “violent felony,” and 
“aggravated felonies” may appear to be 
synonymous to a lay person, courts have 
recognized that, as used in their statutory 
contexts, they are distinct terms of art 
covering distinct acts with different legal 
consequences. 
A. 
In Descamps, the Government sought an 
enhancement of Descamps’ sentence under 
the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), on the basis 
that his California conviction for burglary 
was a “violent felony.” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2281–82. In Taylor v. United States, 495 
U.S. 575 (1990), the Supreme Court had 
established a “rule for determining when a 
defendant’s prior conviction counts as one of 
ACCA’s enumerated predicate offenses.” 
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283. In other words, 
Taylor focused on whether the state crime 
and the enumerated federal predicate offense 
had the same elements. In Taylor, the Court 
first determined the federal definition of 
burglary, and then considered how courts 
were to determine whether a state conviction 
met that definition. The Court, concerned 
with the substantive and practical problems 
of determining that the state conviction met 
the criteria for a federal offense, set forth a 
“categorical approach” instructing 
sentencing courts to look at the statutory 
definitions and not to the particular facts 
underlying a conviction. Descamps, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2283 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600). 
In Shepard v United States, 544 U.S. 13 
(2005), the Court had established the 
“modified categorical approach,” which 
allows a sentencing court to scrutinize a 
restricted set of materials to determine 
296 
  
whether a state conviction matches the 
generic federal offense. The Supreme Court 
later explained in Descamps that the 
modified categorical approach was a tool “to 
identify, from among several alternatives, the 
crime of conviction so that the court can 
compare it to the generic offense.” 133 S. Ct. 
at 2285. The Court reiterated that its 
“elements-centric” approach was based on 
three grounds: (1) “it comports with ACCA’s 
test and history”; (2) “it avoids the Sixth 
Amendment concerns that would arise from 
sentencing courts making findings of fact that 
properly belong to juries”; and (3) “it averts 
the practical difficulties and potential 
unfairness of a factual approach.” Id. at 2287 
(internal citation omitted). 
Similar concerns with fairness underlie the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Moncrieffe, 133 
S. Ct. 1678. The Court stated that it granted 
certiorari “to resolve a conflict among the 
Courts of Appeals with respect to whether a 
conviction under a statute that criminalizes 
conduct described by both [21 U.S.C.] § 
841’s felony provision and its misdemeanor 
provision, such as a statute that punishes all 
marijuana distribution without regard to the 
amount or remuneration, is a conviction for 
an offense that ‘proscribes conduct 
punishable as a felony under’ the CSA 
[Controlled Substance Act].” Id. at 1684. 
This, in turn, required a determination of 
whether the state conviction qualified as an 
“aggravated felony” under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 
et seq. Id. The Court, accordingly, applied the 
categorical approach “to determine whether 
the state offense is comparable to an offense 
listed in the INA.” Id. It explained that in 
order to satisfy the categorical approach, the 
state drug offense “must ‘necessarily’ 
proscribe conduct that is an offense under the 
CSA, and the CSA must ‘necessarily’ 
prescribe felony punishment for that 
offense.” Id. at 1685. The Court concluded 
that Moncrieffe’s state conviction failed to 
meet this standard, and accordingly, he was 
not convicted of an aggravated felony. Id. at 
1687. 
In both Descamps and Moncrieffe, the critical 
inquiry was whether the underlying state 
criminal conviction fit within a generic 
federal definition of a crime so that a 
defendant could be expected to have asserted 
all relevant defenses in his state trial. The 
underlying concerns had been set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Shepard: 
Developments in the law 
since Taylor, and since the 
First Circuit’s decision in 
Harris, provide a further 
reason to adhere to the 
demanding requirement that 
any sentence under the ACCA 
rest on a showing that a prior 
conviction “necessarily” 
involved (and a prior plea 
necessarily admitted) facts 
equating to generic burglary. 
The Taylor Court, indeed, was 
prescient in its discussion of 
problems that would follow 
from allowing a broader 
evidentiary enquiry. “If the 
sentencing court were to 
conclude, from its own review 
of the record, that the 
defendant [who was 
convicted under a nongeneric 
burglary statute] actually 
committed a generic burglary, 
could the defendant challenge 
this conclusion as abridging 
his right to a jury trial?” 495 
U.S. at 601. The Court thus 
anticipated the very rule later 
imposed for the sake of 
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preserving the Sixth 
Amendment right, that any 
fact other than a prior 
conviction sufficient to raise 
the limit of the possible 
federal sentence must be 
found by a jury, in the absence 
of any waiver of rights by the 
defendant. Jones v. United 
States, 526 U.S. 227, 243, n. 6 
(1999); see also Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
490 (2000). 
544 U.S. at 24 (alteration in original). Thus, 
for purposes such as sentencing under the 
ACCA, a state conviction is only an 
aggravated felony under § 16(a) if the court 
can fairly conclude that the conviction 
included all the elements of a federal offense. 
B. 
While 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) looks to whether the 
state conviction contained the elements of a 
federal offense, the Supreme Court and the 
circuit courts have recognized that § 16(b) 
asks a different question with different 
parameters and consequences. In Leocal v. 
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, a unanimous Court held 
that a Florida conviction for driving under the 
influence of alcohol was not a crime of 
violence under § 16(a) or § 16(b). Id. at 4. 
The opinion describes § 16(b) as follows: 
Section 16(b) sweeps more 
broadly than § 16(a), defining 
a crime of violence as 
including “any other offense 
that is a felony and that, by its 
nature, involves a substantial 
risk that physical force against 
the person or property of 
another may be used in the 
course of committing the 
offense.” But § 16(b) does not 
thereby encompass all 
negligent misconduct, such as 
the negligent operation of a 
vehicle. It simply covers 
offenses that naturally involve 
a person acting in disregard of 
the risk that physical force 
might be used against another 
in committing an offense. . . . 
The classic example is 
burglary. A burglary would be 
covered under § 16(b) not 
because the offense can be 
committed in a generally 
reckless way or because 
someone may be injured, but 
because burglary, by its 
nature, involves a substantial 
risk that the burglar will use 
force against a victim in 
completing the crime. 
543 U.S. at 10 (footnote omitted). Thus, 
when applying § 16(b), courts do not ask 
whether the state conviction contained the 
elements of a federal offense, but whether 
there was a “risk that the use of physical force 
against another might be required in 
committing” the state crime. 18 U.S.C. § 
16(b). 
We most recently recognized this distinct 
treatment of § 16(b) in Rodriguez-Castellon 
v. Holder, 733 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2013). In 
this opinion, rendered after the Supreme 
Court issued its decision in Descamps, we 
explained: 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 16, the 
phrase “crime of violence” 
has two meanings. First, 
under § 16(a), a state crime of 
conviction is a crime of 
violence if it “has as an 
element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the 
person or property of 
another.” . . . Second, even if 
the state crime does not 
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include one of the elements 
listed in § 16(a), it is a “crime 
of violence” under § 16(b) if it 
is: (I) a felony; and (ii) “by its 
nature, involves a substantial 
risk that physical force against 
the person or property of 
another may be used in the 
course of committing the 
offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). 
The Supreme Court has 
explained that § 16(b) 
criminalizes conduct that 
“naturally involve[s] a person 
acting in disregard of the risk 
that physical force might be 
used against another in 
committing an offense.” 
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 
1, 10 (2004). 
733 F.3d at 853–54. 
Our holding in Rodriguez-Castellon is 
consistent with our prior opinions 
recognizing that first-degree burglary under 
California Penal Code § 459 remains an 
“aggravated felony” under § 16(b) even if the 
state crime did not include an element of the 
federal crime and thus was not an 
“aggravated felony” under § 16(a). See 
United States v. Ramos-Medina, 706 F.3d 
932, 937–38 (9th Cir. 2013). 
In Chuen Piu Kwong v. Holder, 671 F.3d 872 
(9th Cir. 2011), we explained: 
The question for decision, 
then, is whether Kwong’s 
[burglary] offense “by its 
nature, involves a substantial 
risk that physical force against 
the person or property of 
another may be used in the 
course of [its commission].” 
18 U.S.C. § 16(b). 
We answered that question in 
the affirmative some time ago 
in United States v. Becker, 
919 F.2d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 
1990), where we held that 
“first-degree burglary under 
California law is a ‘crime of 
violence’” as defined by 18 
U.S.C. § 16(b). See also 
United States v. Park, 649 
F.3d 1175, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 
2011). We pointed out in 
Becker that “[a]ny time a 
burglar enters a dwelling with 
felonious or larcenous intent 
there is a risk that in the 
course of committing the 
crime he will encounter one of 
its lawful occupants, and use 
physical force against that 
occupant either to accomplish 
his illegal purpose or to 
escape apprehension.” 919 
F.2d at 571 (footnote 
omitted). 
Id. at 878. 
Similarly, in United States v. Avila, 770 F.3d 
1100, 1105 (4th Cir. 2014), the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that “California first-degree 
burglary qualifies as a crime of violence 
under the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 
16(b).” It held that it need look no further 
than the Supreme Court’s opinion in Leocal, 
543 U.S. at 10, in concluding that burglary 
was the classic example of an offense 
covered by § 16(b). 
Thus, the Supreme Court, our prior decisions, 
and the Fourth Circuit, all recognize that the 
inquiries under § 16(a) and § 16(b) are 
distinct, and that even though a state 
conviction for burglary may not include an 
element of a generic federal offense, as 
required to come within § 16(a), a burglary 
conviction nonetheless involves a substantial 
risk of physical force, and thus is covered by 
§ 16(b). 
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II. 
Having set forth the scope of § 16(b) and the 
courts’ treatment of the section, I turn to the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Johnson. 
A. 
The Supreme Court held that the residual 
clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 
1984 violates the Constitution’s guarantee of 
due process. The Court concluded “that the 
indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry 
required by the residual clause both denies 
fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary 
enforcement by judges.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2557. The Court concluded that two 
features of the residual clause “conspire to 
make it unconstitutional.” Id. at 2557. “In the 
first place, the residual clause leaves grave 
uncertainty about how to estimate the risk 
posed by a crime. It ties judicial assessment 
of risk to a judicially imagined ‘ordinary 
case’ of a crime, not to real world facts or 
statutory elements.” Id. Second, “the residual 
clause leaves uncertainty about how much 
risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent 
felony.” Id. at 2558. 
By asking whether the crime 
“otherwise involves conduct 
that presents a serious 
potential risk,” moreover, the 
residual clause forces courts 
to interpret “serious potential 
risk” in light of the four 
enumerated crimes—
burglary, arson, extortion, and 
crimes involving the use of 
explosives. These offenses are 
“far from clear in respect to 
the degree of risk each poses.” 
Begay [v. United States], 553 
U.S. [137] 143 [(2008)] . . . . 
By combining indeterminacy 
about how to measure the risk 
posed by a crime with 
indeterminacy about how 
much risk it takes for the 
crime to qualify as a violent 
felony, the residual clause 
produces more 
unpredictability and 
arbitrariness than the Due 
Process Clause tolerates. 
Id. at 2558. 
The Court then reviewed its prior efforts to 
establish a standard and concluded that 
“James, Chambers, and Sykes failed to 
establish any generally applicable test that 
prevents the risk comparison required by the 
residual clause from devolving into 
guesswork and intuition.” Id. at 2559. The 
Court further noted that in the lower courts, 
the residual clause has created numerous 
splits and the clause has proved nearly 
impossible to apply consistently.  Id. at 2560. 
The Court concluded that “[n]ine years’ 
experience trying to derive meaning from the 
residual clause convinces us that we have 
embarked on a failed enterprise.” Id. 
The Court stated, in rejecting the argument 
that because there may be straightforward 
cases under the residual clause, the clause is 
not constitutionally vague: 
The Government and the 
dissent next point out that 
dozens of federal and state 
criminal laws use terms like 
“substantial risk,” “grave 
risk,” and “unreasonable 
risk,” suggesting that to hold 
the residual clause 
unconstitutional is to place 
these provisions in 
constitutional doubt. See post, 
at 2558–2559. Not at all. 
Almost none of the cited laws 
links a phrase such as 
“substantial risk” to a 
confusing list of examples. 
“The phrase ‘shades of red,’ 
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standing alone, does not 
generate confusion or 
unpredictability; but the 
phrase ‘fire-engine red, light 
pink, maroon, navy blue, or 
colors that otherwise involve 
shades of red’ assuredly does 
so.” James, 550 U.S., at 230, 
n. 7, (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
More importantly, almost all 
of the cited laws require 
gauging the riskiness of 
conduct in which an 
individual defendant engages 
on a particular occasion. As a 
general matter, we do not 
doubt the constitutionality of 
laws that call for the 
application of a qualitative 
standard such as “substantial 
risk” to real-world conduct; 
“the law is full of instances 
where a man’s fate depends 
on his estimating rightly . . . 
some matter of degree,” Nash 
v. United States, 229 U.S. 
373, 377 (1913). The residual 
clause, however, requires 
application of the “serious 
potential risk” standard to an 
idealized ordinary case of the 
crime. Because “the elements 
necessary to determine the 
imaginary ideal are uncertain 
both in nature and degree of 
effect,” this abstract inquiry 
offers significantly less 
predictability than one “[t]hat 
deals with the actual, not with 
an imaginary condition other 
than the facts.” Int. Harvester 
Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 
U.S. 216, 223 (1914). 
Id. at 2561. 
The Court also declined the dissent’s 
invitation “to save the residual clause from 
vagueness by interpreting it to refer to the risk 
posed by the particular conduct in which the 
defendant engaged, not the risk posed by the 
ordinary case of the defendant’s crime.” Id. at 
2562. It explained: 
In the first place, the 
Government has not asked us 
to abandon the categorical 
approach in residual-clause 
cases. In addition, Taylor had 
good reasons to adopt the 
categorical approach, reasons 
that apply no less to the 
residual clause than to the 
enumerated crimes. Taylor 
explained that the relevant 
part of the Armed Career 
Criminal Act “refers to ‘a 
person who . . . has three 
previous convictions’ for—
not a person who has 
committed—three previous 
violent felonies or drug 
offenses.” 495 U.S. at 600. 
This emphasis on convictions 
indicates that “Congress 
intended the sentencing court 
to look only to the fact that the 
defendant had been convicted 
of crimes falling within 
certain categories, and not to 
the facts underlying the prior 
convictions.” Ibid. Taylor 
also pointed out the utter 
impracticability of requiring a 
sentencing court to 
reconstruct, long after the 
original conviction, the 
conduct underlying that 
conviction. 
Id. at 2562. 
Finally, the opinion’s penultimate paragraph 
reads: 
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We hold that imposing an 
increased sentence under the 
residual clause of the Armed 
Career Criminal Act violates 
the Constitution’s guarantee 
of due process. Our contrary 
holdings in James and Sykes 
are overruled. Today’s 
decision does not call into 
question application of the 
Act to the four enumerated 
offenses, or the remainder of 
the Act’s definition of a 
violent felony. 
Id. at 2563. 
B. 
I read Johnson as setting forth a two-part test: 
whether the statute in issue (1) “leaves grave 
uncertainty about how to estimate the risk 
posed by the crime”; and (2) “leaves 
uncertainty about how much risk it takes for 
a crime to qualify as a violent felony.” Id. at 
2557–58. Applying this test, the Court 
faulted the residual clause for requiring 
potential risk to be determined in light of 
“four enumerated crimes—burglary, arson, 
extortion, and crimes involving the use of 
explosives . . . [which] are far from clear in 
respect to the degree of risk each poses.” Id. 
at 2558 (internal citation omitted). The 
Court’s concern was clarified by its reference 
to a prior dissent by Justice Scalia: “The 
phrase ‘shades of red,’ standing alone does 
not generate confusion or unpredictability; 
but the phrase ‘fire-engine red, light pink, 
maroon, navy blue or colors that otherwise 
involve shades of red’ assuredly does so.” Id. 
at 2561. 
The Court also faulted the residual clause for 
tying “the judicial assessment of risk to a 
judicially imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a 
crime, not to real-world facts or statutory 
elements.” Id. at 2557. However, the Court 
specifically stated that it was not abandoning 
the categorical approach, which, as noted, 
looks to the “ordinary case.” See Descamps, 
133 S. Ct. at 2285 (holding the categorical 
approach’s central feature is “a focus on the 
elements, rather than the facts, of a crime”). 
It is true that Descamps, like § 16(a), looks to 
the elements of a crime, not to the potential 
risk from the crime. Nonetheless, in declining 
the dissent’s suggestion that it “jettison for 
the residual clause . . . the categorical 
approach,” the Court recognized that there 
were “good reasons to adopt the categorical 
approach,” one of which is “the utter 
impracticability of requiring a sentencing 
court to reconstruct, long after the original 
conviction, the conduct underlying that 
conviction.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2562. 
Thus, Johnson does not prohibit all use of the 
“ordinary case.” It only prohibits uses that 
leave uncertain both how to estimate the risk 
and amount of risk necessary to qualify as a 
violent crime. 
Indeed, such an interpretation seems 
compelled in light of the fact that Johnson did 
not even mention Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 
U.S. 1. In Leocal, the Supreme Court 
recognized the breadth of § 16(b) and noted 
that it “simply covers offenses that naturally 
involve a person acting in disregard of the 
risk that physical force might be used against 
another in committing the offense.” Id. at 10. 
Finally, I note that perhaps in an attempt to 
foreclose approaches such as that offered by 
today’s majority in this appeal, the Supreme 
Court concluded by stating that its decision 
“does not call into question application of the 
Act to the four enumerated offenses [which 
include burglary] or the remainder of the 
Act’s definition of a violent felony.” 
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563. 
III. 
After such an esoteric discussion, it would be 
easy to lose sight of what is at issue in this 
case. Dimaya, a native and citizen of the 
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Philippines, was twice convicted of first-
degree residential burglary under California 
Penal Code § 459 and sentenced each time to 
two years in prison. The Department of 
Homeland Security charged Dimaya with 
being removable because he had been 
convicted of an aggravated felony under 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), which is a “crime of 
violence . . . for which the term of 
imprisonment [was] at least one year.” That 
statute in turn defines “crime of violence” by 
reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16. Thus, we are 
asked whether the statutory scheme is 
somehow so vague or ambiguous as to 
preclude the BIA from concluding that 
Dimaya’s two first-degree burglaries under 
California law are “crimes of violence” under 
§ 16(b). Supreme Court precedent and our 
case law answer the question in the negative. 
There is no uncertainty as to how to estimate 
the risk posed by Dimaya’s burglary crimes. 
The Supreme Court held in Leocal that § 
16(b) “covers offenses that naturally involve 
a person acting in disregard of the risk that 
physical force might be used against another 
in committing an offense.” 543 U.S. at 10. 
The court emphasized that burglary as “the 
classic example” of a crime covered by 16(b) 
because “burglary, by its nature involves a 
substantial risk that the burglar will use force 
against a victim in completing the crime.” Id. 
See also Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599 (a person has 
been convicted of a crime for sentencing 
enhancement “if he is convicted of any crime, 
regardless of its exact definition or label, 
having the basic elements of unlawful or 
unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a 
building or structure, with intent to commit a 
crime”). 
We have consistently followed this line of 
reasoning. See United States v. Becker, 919 
F.2d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Any time a 
burglar enters a dwelling with felonious or 
larcenous intent there is a risk that in the 
course of committing the crime he will 
encounter one of its lawful occupants, and 
use physical force against that occupant 
either to accomplish his illegal purpose or to 
escape apprehension.”); Lopez-Cardina v. 
Holder, 662 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(noting that “Becker itself recognized that the 
California crime of burglary might not be a 
‘crime of violence’ under a federal statute 
defining the term by reference to the generic 
crime, even though it is a ‘crime of violence’ 
under the risk-focused text of § 16(b)”); 
Chuen Piu Kwong, 671 F.3d at 877 
(reaffirming that “first-degree burglary under 
[Cal. Penal Code] § 459 is a crime of violence 
because it involves a substantial risk that 
physical force may be used in the course of 
committing the offense.”). 
Nor is there any uncertainty as to “how much 
risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent 
felony,” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558, when 
burglary is at issue. Section 16(b) itself 
requires a “substantial risk” of the use of 
physical force. As noted, neither the Supreme 
Court nor the Ninth Circuit has had any 
trouble in applying this standard. See Leocal, 
543 U.S. at 10; Chuen Piu Kwong, 671 F.3d 
at 877; Becker, 919 F.2d at 571. Any person 
intent on committing a burglary inherently 
contemplates the risk of using force should 
his nefarious scheme be detected. Is this not 
what the Supreme Court was referring to 
when it noted “we do not doubt the 
constitutionality of laws that call for the 
application of a qualitative standard such as 
‘substantial risk’ to real-world conduct”? 
Johnson 135 S. Ct. at 2561. 
IV. 
In Johnson, after nine years of trying to 
derive meaning from the residual clause, the 
Supreme Court held that it was 
unconstitutionally vague. Section 16(b) is not 
the ACCA’s residual clause; nor has its 
standard proven to be unworkably vague. 
Over a decade ago, the Supreme Court in 
Leocal held that § 16(b) “covers offenses that 
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naturally involve a person acting in disregard 
of the risk that physical force might be used 
against another in committing an offense.” 
543 U.S. at 10. Moreover, as the Supreme 
Court recognized, the statute sets forth the 
test of a “substantial risk that physical force 
against the person or property of any may be 
used in the course of committing the 
offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Certainly, there 
is no unconstitutional vagueness in this case, 
which involves the hallmark “crime of 
violence,” burglary. See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 
10. The Supreme Court will be surprised to 
learn that its opinion in Johnson rendered § 
16(b) unconstitutionally vague, particularly 
as its opinion did not even mention Leocal 
and specifically concluded with the statement 
limiting its potential scope. I fear that we 
have again ventured where no court has gone 
before and that the Supreme Court will have 
to intervene to return us to our proper orbit. 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
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“U.S. Supreme Court Orders Second Argument in Deportation Case” 
 
Bloomberg Politics 
Greg Stohr 
June 26, 2017 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court said it will hear 
another argument on the constitutionality of 
a provision in federal immigration law used 
to deport foreigners convicted of serious 
crimes. 
The move suggests that new Justice Neil 
Gorsuch will break what is currently a 4-4 tie. 
The case was argued in January, before 
Gorsuch joined the court. 
The case could affect the Trump 
administration’s efforts to step up deportation 
efforts. 
The issue is whether the law’s definition of 
"crime of violence" is so vague as to be 
unconstitutional. People convicted of a 
violent crime are subject to mandatory 
deportation. 
The case concerns James Dimaya, a 
Philippine citizen who was twice convicted 
of residential burglary in California and has 
been fighting deportation efforts. 
The new argument will take place after the 
court returns from its three-month recess in 
early October. 
The case is Sessions v. Dimaya, 15-1498.. 
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“Supreme Court justices skeptical of deportation order against Bay Area 
burglar” 
 
Los Angeles Times 
David G. Savage 
January 17, 2017 
 
The Supreme Court, hearing arguments 
Tuesday in a California deportation case, 
signaled it may make it harder for the 
government to forcibly remove legal 
immigrants with certain kinds of crimes on 
their record. 
The case involves a native Filipino and 
longtime legal resident of the Bay Area who 
was convicted of breaking into a garage and 
an empty house in separate incidents. 
At issue is whether crimes such as home 
burglary, fleeing from the police, money 
laundering or child abuse can be considered 
“crimes of violence” that trigger mandatory 
deportation under federal law. 
The ruling could set new rules for the Trump 
administration if it seeks to forcibly remove 
legal immigrants who have criminal records. 
James Garcia Dimaya was charged with 
residential burglary under California law and 
served more than five years in prison. U.S. 
immigration officials said those crimes were 
enough to trigger his deportation under the 
law. 
But in their questions, the justices cast doubt 
on whether his crimes were properly 
classified as “aggravated felonies.”  
If they conclude they were not, their ruling 
could complicate efforts by the Trump 
administration to speed up deportations. 
President-elect Donald Trump has pledged to 
accelerate the deportation of immigrants here 
illegally who have been accused or convicted 
of crimes. 
The law in this area is not entirely clear. 
Beginning in 1988, Congress ordered 
deportation for noncitizens who are 
convicted of an “aggravated felony,” and it 
cited specific examples such as murder and 
rape. Later the law was expanded to include 
a general category of “crimes of violence.” 
This was defined to include offenses that 
involve a use of physical force or a 
“substantial risk” that force would be used. 
Judges have been divided as to what crimes 
call for deportation. Looming over Tuesday’s 
argument was an opinion written two years 
ago by the late Justice Antonin Scalia. He 
spoke for an 8-to-1 majority in striking down 
part of a federal law known as the Armed 
Career Criminal Act. It called for extra years 
in prison for people convicted of more than 
one violent felony. 
In that case, the extra prison term was 
triggered by the defendant’s possession of a 
shotgun. In frustration, Scalia and his 
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colleagues said the law was 
unconstitutionally vague because they could 
not decide whether gun possession is itself 
evidence of a violent crime. 
“You could say the exact same thing about 
burglary,” Justice Elena Kagan said Tuesday. 
A midday burglary of a home could result in 
violence, she said, but perhaps not if it were 
an empty garage or an abandoned house. “So 
it seems like we’re replicating the same kind 
of confusion,” she said. 
Justice Stephen G. Breyer said judges have 
no way to decide which crimes typically or 
usually involve violence. “We’re just left 
guessing,” he said, suggesting a better 
approach would be “look at what the person 
did.”  
But Deputy Solicitor Gen. Edwin Kneedler 
said a home burglary poses a risk of violence. 
And he said the court should defer to the 
government on matters of immigration. The 
law, he said, calls for a “broad delegation” of 
authority to executive officials. 
This is the argument government lawyers 
made in defense of President Obama’s use of 
executive authority to try to shield millions of 
immigrants from deportation. It is also the 
argument that would call for upholding an 
aggressive deportation policy if pursued by 
the Trump administration. 
In their legal briefs, government lawyers said 
a ruling in favor of Dimaya, the Philippine 
burglar, could have a domino effect and 
prompt judges to block deportations that 
were triggered by a host of other crimes. 
Dimaya was born in the Philippines and came 
to the United States in 1992, when he was 13 
years old. He went to high school, became a 
lawful permanent resident and settled in 
Hayward. 
He was convicted and sent to state prison for 
the burglaries of a garage in 2007 and an 
empty house in 2009. 
Immigration judges agreed with deporting 
Dimaya because his burglary convictions 
were “crimes of violence” that qualified as 
“aggravated felonies.” 
But the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 
disagreed in a 2-1 ruling and said this 
provision was unconstitutionally vague. 
Judge Stephen Reinhardt in Los Angeles 
cited Scalia’s opinion and said the 
immigration law had the same flaw as the 
Armed Career Criminal Act. Judge Kim 
McLane Wardlaw agreed to form the 
majority, while Judge Consuelo Callahan 
dissented. 
The 7th Circuit Court in Chicago handed 
down a similar ruling, while the 5th Circuit in 
New Orleans ruled in favor of the 
government. 
The split prompted the high court to decide 
the case of Lynch vs. Dimaya. By the time the 
decision is handed down, the case will 
probably be relabeled Sessions vs. Dimaya, 
to reflect expected change of attorney 
general.  
Still pending before the court is a class-action 
suit from Los Angeles challenging whether 
immigrants facing possible deportation may 
be arrested and jailed for more than six 
months without a bail hearing.
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“When Can Immigrants Be Deported for Crimes? Justices Hear Sides” 
 
The New York Times 
Adam Liptak 
January 17, 2017 
 
The Supreme Court considered on Tuesday 
how broad the government’s authority is to 
deport immigrants who commit serious 
crimes. 
The question was in one sense fairly 
technical, concerning whether a federal law 
on the subject was unconstitutionally vague. 
In another sense, though, the argument was 
part of a larger debate over the nation’s 
immigration laws, which President-elect 
Donald J. Trump has pledged to enforce 
vigorously. 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor said the laws have 
grown increasingly draconian. 
“We have many more criminal sanctions with 
harsher sentences now,” she said. “Today 
what’s at stake is a lot more than what was at 
stake decades ago.” 
Edwin S. Kneedler, a deputy solicitor 
general, said there was another side to the 
question. 
“What’s at stake can’t be viewed just from 
that perspective,” he said. “What’s at stake is 
the fact that the immigration laws are vital to 
the nation’s national security and foreign 
relations and the safety and welfare of the 
country.” 
The case, Lynch v. Dimaya, No. 15-1498, 
concerns James Dimaya, a native of the 
Philippines who became a lawful permanent 
resident in 1992, when he was 13. In 2007 
and 2009, he was convicted of residential 
burglary. 
The government sought to deport him on the 
theory that he had committed an “aggravated 
felony,” which the immigration law defines 
to include any offense “that, by its nature, 
involves a substantial risk that physical force 
against the person or property of another may 
be used in the course of committing the 
offense.” 
In 2015, in Johnson v. United States, the 
Supreme Court ruled that a similar criminal 
law was unconstitutionally vague. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, in San Francisco, said the reasoning 
in the Johnson case also doomed the 
provision of the immigration law. 
When the Johnson case was before the 
Supreme Court, the government warned that 
a ruling striking down the law at issue there 
would make the law that was the subject of 
Tuesday’s case “equally susceptible” to 
constitutional attack. 
Both laws, the government said then, require 
courts to identify features of a hypothetical 
typical offense and then to judge the risk of 
violence arising from them. 
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Justice Elena Kagan, quoting from Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion in the 
2015 case, asked how judges are to decide the 
features of a typical offense. 
Should they use, she asked, “a statistical 
analysis” of reported decisions? “A survey? 
Expert evidence? Google? Gut instinct?” 
 “So that’s a multiple-choice test,” Justice 
Kagan said, suggesting that all of the choices 
risked unconstitutional vagueness. “What do 
we do?” 
Mr. Kneedler said there were important 
distinctions between the two cases, notably 
that the one in 2015 arose from a criminal 
prosecution and the one at issue on Tuesday 
from an immigration proceeding, which is a 
civil action. 
In its brief in Tuesday’s case, the government 
said civil laws are almost never so vague as 
to violate the Constitution. “Although the 
court has on occasion tested civil provisions 
for vagueness,” the brief said, “it has struck 
down those provisions under the due process 
clause because they were so unintelligible as 
to effectively supply no standard at all.” 
A 1951 Supreme Court decision, Jordan v. 
De George, indicated that both criminal and 
immigration laws should be tested against the 
same constitutional standard for vagueness 
“in view of the grave nature of deportation.” 
Mr. Kneedler asked the justices not to place 
too much weight on that observation, saying 
the question had not been raised in the briefs 
at the time. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy did 
not seem to think that mattered. 
“Something has to be briefed before we say 
it’s the law?” he asked. 
E. Joshua Rosenkranz, a lawyer for Mr. 
Dimaya, said the 1951 case concluded the 
matter. 
“In our view and in the view of all of the 
lower courts,” he said, “Jordan settles the 
question on whether it’s the same standard 
for criminal deportation.” 
But Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. said that 
extending scrutiny that applies to criminal 
laws challenged for vagueness to civil ones 
would be a major step. 
“It certainly is true that deportation has more 
severe consequences than the typical civil 
case,” he said. “But there are many other civil 
cases that can have a devastating impact on 
someone, such as child custody, loss of a 
professional license, complete destruction of 
a business, loss of the home.”
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“9th Circ. Rules BIA's 'Crime Of Violence' Standard Vague” 
 
Law360 
Daniel Siegal 
October 19, 2015 
 
The Ninth Circuit on Monday ruled that, after 
a recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling, the 
federal test for a “crime of violence” is 
unconstitutionally vague, reversing a Board 
of Immigrant Appeals ruling that a citizen of 
the Philippines can be deported after 
committing felony burglary. 
Petitioner James Garcia Dimaya had asked 
the Ninth Circuit to review the BIA's ruling 
that a conviction for burglary is categorically 
a “crime of violence” as defined by federal 
code — a determination which rendered him 
deportable under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act for having been convicted of 
an aggravated felony. 
In a published opinion, a three-judge panel 
ruled 2 to 1 on Monday that the statutory 
definition relied upon by the BIA violated 
Dimaya's due process rights when taken in 
light of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling this 
summer in Johnson v. United States, which 
struck down a different statute's definition of 
a “violent felony” as unconstitutionally 
vague. Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt, 
writing for the panel, said that the Supreme 
Court in Johnson held that a “necessary 
component” of a non-citizen's right to due 
process of law is a prohibition on vague 
deportation statutes.  
Judge Reinhardt wrote that the definition 
contained in 18 U.S. Code Section 16(b) and 
relied upon by the BIA is subject to the “same 
mode of analysis" as the statute in Johnson, 
which the Supreme court held left “grave 
uncertainty” about what kind of conduct an 
“ordinary case' of a crime involves, and 
which left uncertainty about how much risk it 
takes for a crime to qualify as a violent 
felony. 
“The court’s reasoning applies with equal 
force to the similar statutory language and 
identical mode of analysis used to define a 
crime of violence for purposes of the INA,” 
Judge Reinhardt wrote. “In sum, a careful 
analysis of the two sections, the one at issue 
here and the one at issue in Johnson, shows 
that they are subject to the same 
constitutional defects and that Johnson 
dictates that [Section] 16(b) be held void for 
vagueness.” 
Holly S. Cooper, an associate director of the 
Immigration Law Clinic at the University of 
California Davis School of Law, told Law360 
on Monday that the ruling could impact an 
“extraordinary” number of removal 
proceedings, given the number of 
immigration cases in the Ninth Circuit's 
territory. 
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Dimaya came to the U.S. from the 
Philippines in 1992 and was convicted of 
first-degree residential burglary in both 2007 
and 2009, after which the Department of 
Homeland Security sought to have him 
removed from the country for having been 
convicted of an aggravated felony, according 
to the ruling. 
An Immigration Judge agreed with the DHS 
that first-degree burglary in California is a 
“crime of violence” and held that Dimaya 
was removable, and the BIA dismissed his 
appeal on the same ground, according to the 
ruling. 
On June 2, while Dimaya's appeal was 
pending, the BIA held in In the Matter of 
Francisco-Alonzo that the correct way to 
determine whether a state conviction is for an 
aggravated felony crime of violence is to 
apply an ordinary-case analysis, by looking 
to the risk of violent force present in the 
"ordinary case" rather than the particular case 
in question in considering whether a state 
offense is categorically a crime of violence 
under 18 U.S.C. Section 16(b), the federal 
statute that defines violent crimes. 
Weeks later, after Dimaya's appeal had been 
already argued, the high court in Johnson v. 
U.S. held that imposing an increased 
sentence under the "residual clause" of the 
Armed Career Criminal Act, which allowed a 
crime to be classified as a violent felony if it 
posed a serious risk of injury to others, 
violates the Constitution’s guarantee of due 
process, and it struck down the residual 
clause. 
The Ninth Circuit ordered additional briefing 
and oral argument as to whether Section 
16(b) is unconstitutionally vague, and on 
Monday decided that it is. 
Circuit Judge Consuelo Maria Callahan 
dissented, however, writing that the 
criticisms levied by the Supreme Court 
against the ACCA in the Johnson ruling do 
not apply to Section 16(b), given the 
fundamental distinctions between the 
statutes. 
“Although the terms 'crime of violence,' 
'violent felony' and 'aggravated felonies' may 
appear to be synonymous to a lay person, 
courts have recognized that, as used in their 
statutory contexts, they are distinct terms of 
art covering distinct acts with different legal 
consequences,” Judge Callahan wrote. 
Circuit Judges Stephen Reinhardt, Kim 
McLane Wardlaw and Consuelo M. Callahan 
sat on the panel that issued Monday's 
opinion. 
Dimaya is represented by Andrew Michael 
Knapp of Immigrant Access to Justice 
Assistance at Southwestern Law School. 
The government is represented by Nancy 
Canter, Jennifer Khouri, Stuart F. Delery and 
Jennifer P. Levings of the U.S. Department of 
Justice. 
The case is James Garcia Dimaya v. Loretta 
E. Lynch, case number 11-71307, in the U.S. 
Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit. 
